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Full text of "Japanese Night Combat"

JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT^, 



PART, I OF 3 PARTS 



PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT 



Combined Arms P^earch Library 
Special Collect '.-.ru snd Archives 
Fort Leavenworwi, Kansas 



HEADQUARTERS 
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

AND 

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY 
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION 
JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION 



IN REPLY REFER TO: 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



cm 

SUBJECT: Distribution p£ Manuscript 
TO r Addressee 

The inclosed manuscript is forwarded for your use and 
retention* 

FOR THE CHEF OF IIILITaITI llJSTOlSi 

1 Incl / '. JOEL F* TKOi-L^ON 

Us " Colonel Artillery 

Executive 



JAPANESE NIGHT OOMBAT 



Part 1 of 3 Parts 
PRINCIPIES OF NIGHT COMBAT 



HEADQUARTERS 
UNITED STATES ARMY FCRCES, FAR EAST 
and 

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY 
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION 
Japanese Research Division 



FOREWORD 



Japanese Night Combat , compiled by a number of former officers 
of the Imperial Japanese Army, is presented in three parts. Part 1 
is a general discussion of the principles and accumulated experi- 
ences of the Japanese in night combat; Part 2, an appendix consist! og 
of appropriate excerpts from Japanese Aimy training manuals; and Part 
3 f a supplement containing a series of twelve examples of night combat 
engagements of the Japanese Amy. 

It will be noted that there is some variation in the style and 
composition of the several parts of the study* The different styles 
employed by the writers, the type of material, and the fact that the 
translated manuscripts were delivered to the Editor piecemeal, all 
combined to make standardization a virtual impossibility if undue 
delay in completion was to be avoided* 

Because of the time limitation and the mass of material this 
study was not intensively edited, although redundancy was eliminated 
wherever possible and efforts were made to make the text understanda- 
ble. Part 2, in particular, was handled with a minimum of re-writing 
in order to retain the spirit and style of the Japanese Field Manuals 
as completely as possible . 

Information contained in this stucfyv indicates that Japanese 
training in night combat was basically sound* Employed by thoroughly 
trained Japanese soldiers against Chinese forces, often of vastly 



i 



superior numerical strength, the prescribed methods were highly suc- 
cessful. The same tactics were eqially effective against the British 
and American troops in the early days of World War II. 

Later in the war the Japanese night combat tactics, in which 
surprise played a vital part, were less successful as the microphones 
and mechanical warning devices of the Americans were encountered* 
The established night combat tactics broke down entirely when well- 
trained Japanese troops were replaced by hastily trained recruits. 

One of the most important lessons learned by Japanese students 
of military affairs, if not by the field commanders, was that night 
attacks must employ a diversity of methods* Neither the Japanese 
soldier nor his officers were, apparently, trained to be versatile 
and were almost invariably inclined to repeat the same time-worn 
tactics in each attack* 

For their invaluable assistance in the preparation of Japanese 
Night Combat the Editor is indebted to Lt. Col* Kengoro Tanaka, former- 
ly a consultant with the Japanese Research Division and now a member 
of the Japanese Self Defense Force, and Mr. Hasataka Ida, a former 
lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Japanese Amy and presently a con- 
sultant with the Japanese Research Division of the Military History 
Section, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth 
United States Array. 

10 Hay 1955 



ii 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 

CHART I Introduction 

Section A« Basic Effect of Night on Combat 1 

Section B. Origin of Night Combat in Japan 5 

CHAPTER II Changes in Concept of Night Combat 1901* to 1938 

Section A« Night Attacks in the Russo-Japanese War 9 

Section B # Indecision After World War I 11 
Section C# Re- adoption of Night Attack Tactics and 

Employment in the Manchurian Incident 13 
Section D. Conception of Night Tactics Suitable 

Against Characteristic Soviet Positions 17 
Section E # , Night Attack Conducted During the China 

Incident and Establishment of the 

Principles of Night Combat 38 

CHAPTER III Basic Concept of the Principles of Night Combat 
in the Field Service Regulations for Operations 
and the Infantry Manual 

Section A* General h9 

Section B • General Concept of Night Attack h9 

Section C. Night Attack of the Infantry $h 

Section D« Attack at Early Dawn and Dusk 70 

Section £• Night Defense 71 

Section F. Other Night Operations 73 

CHAPTER IV Training in Night Combat 

Section A. General Training 79 

Section B. Training in Hearing and Noise Prevention 112" 
Section C. Distance Estimation and Utilization of 

Terrain Features and Objects llij. 

Section D» Orientation and Maintenance of Direction 115 

Section %. Movement Training 117 

Section F. Assault Training 121 

Section G« Training in Night Firing 122 

Section H. Night Training Mottoes 123 

Section I* Unit Training 125 

Section <J» Special Training 151 

Section K* Attacking Pillboxes 158 

Section L. Team Tactics 163 



iii 



CHAPTER V 



Experience in Night Operations During World 
War II 



Page 
165 



Figures 

No 1 General Concept of Soviet Defense 19 

No. 2 Defensive Disposition of a Soviet Division 21 

No 3 Defensive Dispostion of a Soviet Sniper 

Battalion 23 

No k Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper 25 
Battalion 

No 5 Soviet Division's Defense in Depth 29 

No 6 Construction of a Tochka with Machine Guns 39 

No 7 Organization of Special Type of Defensive 

Position of Sniper Battalion itl 

No 8A Infantry Battalion in Night Attack 57 

No 8B Infantry Battalion in Night Attack 59 

No 9 Company Approach Formation 63 

No 10 Company Assault Procedure 67 

No 11 Night Attack Training Problem 129-13l| 

No 12 Early Dawn Attack Problem 135-1^2 

No 13 Dusk Attack Training Problem 1^3-150 



iv 



Charts 

No 1 Program for Night Combat Training 8>87 
(First Period) 

No 2 Program for Night Combat Training 88-9U 
(Second Period) 

No 3 Program for Night Combat Training 95-100 
(Third Period) 

No h Visibility at Night 103-10li 

No 5 Visibility on Moonlight Nights 10^106 

No 6 Organization and Equipment of the Pillbox 

Assault Team 160-162 



Y 



CHAPTER I 
Introduction 

Section A. Basic Effects of Night on Combat 

1. Basic Mental and Physical Effects of the Night 

Although there may be a slight difference in the degree of 
darkness which may be tempered by the light of the moon and the 
stars, night darkness obviously limits man's visual acuity ♦ On the 
battlefield at night soldiers with their visibility restricted by 
darkness cannot learn accurately the movements of f riendly troops 
nor determine conditions of terrain and terrain features, let alone 
the enemy situation. Sometimes friend is confused with foe and dis- 
tance is difficult to estimate* A wood or a grove is often mistaken 
for high ground, and the darkness makes it exceedingly difficult to 
preserve control, execute movement, firing, maintenance of direction, 
reconnaissance, security, or mutual support. 

The sensitivity of the ear is greater at night than in the 
daytime, which may be attributed to the relative quietness of night 
and the natural tendency of man to offset limited visibility with 
audibility. However, this tendency toward increased sensibility 
sometimes adversely affects man ! s reaction to fire, light, or flashes 
observed at night. There are many instances in which a force closing 
in with the enemy at night lost the direction of advance under the 
effect of the report of guns, the flash of firing, or searchlight 



1 



beams from enemy flank positions. An example is recorded in the 
history of Japan when about 1180 a force of the Heike confronting a 
force of the Genji across the Fuji river (Shizuoka Prefecture) beat 
a hasty retreat one night due to mistaking the noise made by water 
fowl for sounds of the attacking Genji force ♦ 

Limited visibility and increased sensibility to sounds 
inevitably cause uneasiness in the human mind. Soldiers are never 
certain when or where they might encounter the enemy. When fired 
upon by the enemy it is very difficult to ascertain the origin of 
fire and to devise appropriate countermeasures. Constant vigilance 
must also be exercised for high and low ground as well as obstacles 
on the terrain the soldiers traverse. Thus in darkness man is seiz- 
ed with "fear of the unknown", a condition aptly described by the 
ancients as, "the doubtful mind pictures devils in the dark". Such 
a mental condition is frequently accompanied by a feeling of loneli- 
ness and helplessness and may be responsible for the development of 
tendencies to overestimate eneiny power or to be excessively pessi- 
mistic of the combat situation. 

Man has long regarded night as the time for rest. At night 
troops generally are prone to lack alertness except those on special 
duties such as sentry and patrol duties. Even those performing spe- 
cial duty have to combat the formidable foe called sleepiness. Com- 
bat activities conducted at night are against the natural habit of 
men to rest at night - and under the unfavorable conditions of limited 



2 



visibility and mental uneasiness, the physical and mental fatigue of 
troops -will inevitably increase. This tendency may be further aggra- 
vated by other factors such as hunger and cold. 

2. Basic Effects of Night on Attacks and Defense 

The night affects soldiers mentally and physically whether 
they are on defense or offense, making night combat more difficult 
than daylight combat • However, a knowledge of the extent and nature 
of difficulties and disadvantages encountered by combatants at night 
may make it possible for one side to profit by the difficulties and 
disadvantages of its opponent. 

The greatest advantage to the defense is the deadly effect 
of well-planned fire. Naturally, the limited visibility of defenders 
hampers the maximum application of fire power unless some special 
measures are taken to overcome the handicap. Restriction on effective 
employment of tanks and aircraft is another serious drawback for the 
defender. Moreover, the element of tenseness characteristic of the 
defender's psychology that exists even in daylight becomes accentu- 
ated -at night and is likely to develop into extreme uneasiness. 
Even so, the defender can derive advantages from darkness. A defend- 
ing force can utilize darkness to change dispositions, prepare for a 
shift to the offensive, or attack with a part of its strength to 
hinder enemy attack preparations. 

The attackers are also handicapped by great difficulty in 
the maximum use of fire power. The ordinary procedure of attack - 



3 



destroying an enemy position by artillery fire, tanks, and aircraft 
in support of an infantry assault - is in most cases difficult to 
adopts Also, since it is absolutely necessary for the attackers to 
approach the enemy before the assault, they are handicapped by many 
difficulties in movement and control, disadvantages which the de- 
fenders do not suffer. Moreover, because it is difficult at night 
to contact and destroy the enemy, the objective of the attack is in 
most cases limited to the occupation of a single point or position. 
These disadvantages will necessarily impose considerable restriction, 
on both the objective and scope of night attacks • On the other hand 
the attackers have a great advantage in exploiting the disadvantages 
of the defenders. The attackers can move secretly by taking advan- 
tage of the reduced visibility of the defenders. It is also possible 
for the attackers to operate when the enemy is unable to make the 
maximum use of his ground fire, armor, and aircraft. 

3» Comparison of Attack and Defense Advantages in Night Combat 
Assuming an army skilled in close combat, well trained in 
night movement, and with high morale, the night will be decidedly to 
its advantage. Such an army is capable of surmounting disadvantages 
and enjoying the advantages of a night attack. It is able to approach 
secretly, taking advantage of the reduced visibility and suddenly 
force the enemy to close combat ♦ To an army which is well trained 
and fully prepared, the night definitely affords opportunities of 
surprising the enemy. Considering these points it may be concluded 



4 



that while night conbat is difficult for both the attackers and 
defenders, the attacking side has greater opportunity to utilize 
the advantages and disadvantages than does the defending side* 

The Japanese Army concept concerning advantages and dis- 
advantages of night conbat is expressed most concisely in Article 
146, Part II, Field Service Regulations, Operation (Sakusen Yomurei). 

"The coordinated movement and control of units is difficult 
at night and errors are likely to be committed. On the other 
hand, it has advantages in that intentions can be concealed, 
loss can be minimized, obstruction from enemy air power can be 
minimized, and combat effectiveness can be displayed even with 
a shortage of ammunition. An army well trained in night move- 
ment can surmount the disadvantages and utilise advantages* 
Even if inferior in strength, such an amy can expect success 
in an attack against a numerically superior enemy" ♦ 

Section B. Origin of Night Conbat in Japan 

1* Night Attack. A time - honored tactic 

The advantages and disadvantages of darkness discussed in 
the preceding section are applicable to warfare as conducted since 
firearms came into use. But as far as Japan is concerned, the tac- 
tics of night attack were employed in the days before firearms were 
introduced. 

When the principal arms were swords, spears, bows, and 
arrows, the warrior's view of the basic effects of combat in dark- 
ness was virtually the same as that held after firearms were intro- 
duced* This was especially true because comparatively little techno- 
logical progress had been made in those days, and the mental uneasi- 
ness of the defender at night was far greater than today. In 



5 



addition, backwardness in the technical phases of night defense 
afforded the attackers greater chance of success than today. A 
further advantage to the attacker was that in fighting in which 
swords, arrows and spears were used as principal weapons, daylight 
combat preparations were not especially necessary for night combat. 
In Japan the night attack has long been a preferred form of combat 
known as "Touchi" or "Asagake". In the year 1180, at Kurikara Pass 
(near the present boundary between Ishikawa and Toyama Prefectures), 
Kiso Toshinaka, leader of the Qenji forces taking advantage of inade- 
quate security measures, carried out a night attack on the flank of 
the Heike forces and destroyed the bulk of the defending force. This 
historical attack is the most famous of many examples of night 
attacks recorded in the military annals of Japan. Centuries later, 
about the middle of the 16th century, the historic battle of 
Kawanakajima (in Nagano Prefecture) was opened with a night attack 
conducted by the forces of Uesugi Kenshin. Later in the period 
(circa 1590), yrhen Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent an expedition to Korea, 
the night attack is said to have been the favorite tactic employed 
by Kato Kiyomasa, who carried his army as far north as Chientao Pro- 
vince after overrunning the northeastern part of Korea* 
2. Adoption of Night Attack by the Japanese Army 

When Japan abandoned 300 years of isolationist policy and 
adopted the open-door policy, under the influence of Commodore Perry 
and other foreigners, the Imperial Army was founded in 1873 (the sixth 



6 



year of Meiji). The newly created Army, based on the conscription 
system, originally took the French Apny as its principal model, al- 
though later it adopted the pattern of the German Arajy. Firearms 
consisted mainly of rifles and mortars and accordingly stress was 
placed on combat utilizing the firepower of small arms. 

Western type rifles and powder had been introduced to Japan 
in 1543 > and firearms of this type were in use about the middle of 
the 16th century when the country was under the rule of Oda Nobunaga. 
However, the 300 years of peace and tranquillity during the Tokugawa 
period retarded the development of firearms with the result that 
swords, spears, bows and arrows still remained the principal arms . 
As the influence of the Tokugawa Shogunate waned toward the middle 
of the 19th century, feudal clans began importation of rifles, 
mortars, and other f ireams from countries abroad and these firearms 
were distributed among clan troops in considerable numbers. 

The superiority of firearms over swords was demonstrated in 
the civil war of 1877 (the so-called Southwestern Eebellions) which 
broke out only four years after the creation of the Imperial Army. 
In that war the Government forces composed of draftees armed mainly 
with rifles destroyed the Kagoshima Clan forces composed of Samurais 
using swords as their principal weapons. From then on Japan proceed- 
ed with the "firepower-first" principle, and organization, equipment 
and tactics of the Army were based on this principle. Nevertheless, 
Japanese respect for and attachment to swords and spears were 



7 



unshakable* The sword is one of the Three Sacred Treasures of the 
Imperial Household: The mirror symbolizes wisdom, the gem represents 
benevolence, and the sword is the symbol of valor. Wisdom, benevo- 
lence, and valor have long been regarded as the three major requisites 
for men of highly accomplished character in the Orient, and the sword 
and spear were the symbols of the warriors to whom valor was an in- 
dispensable moral requirement. The arts of f encixjg and spear exer- 
cise were recognized as the most noble martial arts, and training in 
these arts had reached high levels. In view of this attitude, it is 
not surprising that tactics of close combat with swords and bayonets 
were adopted by the Japanese Army created in the early days of the 
fMeiji Era (circa 1873) • These tactics called for assaults with swords 
wielded by the of ficers, and bayonets by the msn. Close combat was 
[considered the climax of infantry f ightirg and the art of fencing and 
payonet exercise, together with marching and firing, were the three 
Icey subjects of infantry training. 

I The concept of hand-to-hand fighting held by the Japanese 

fLnfantry called for continued employment of night attacks. Since 

Words and bayonets can be used most advantageously in darkness, the 

I 

|actics of surprise attacks were adopted as a primary berijb of infan- 
try training. 



8 



CHAPTER II 

Changes la Concept of Night Combat 
1904 to 1938 

Section A. Night Attacks in the Russo-Japanese War 

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905* several night 
attacks Were carried out against the Imperial Russian Army by Japa- 
nese units of division or brigade size. A night attack was conduct- 
ed by the 2d Division at Kung -Chang-Ling; by the 12th Division at 
Ht/ Han-P'o-Ling; by the 10th Division at Mt. San-Ku'ai-Shih; by the 
7th Division at Mt* Pei-Ling; by the 3d Division at Shou-Shan-Pu, 
and by the Shiiodasuki unit, led by Maj Gen Nakamura, at Port Arthur. 

A characteristic common to those night attacks was that they 
were almost invariably a mass assault leading to a decisive battle. 
As a result only the 2d Division was entirely successful, the 7th, 
10th and 12th Divisions barely succeeded, while the 3d Division and 
Maj Gen Nakamura* s Shirodasuki Unit failed. 

The reason for the f ailure of the night assaults was twofold. 
One was the stubborn resistance of the Russian Army. The night attack 
on Shou-Shan-Pu was conducted by the units of the 3d Division includ- 
ing a battalion 1b d by Lt Col Tachibana, who had the reputation of 
being the highest authority on night attacks in the Japanese Army. 
The attacking forces once seized the Shou-Shan-Pu hei^it but the 
attack ended in failure owing to fierce counterattacks by the Russian 
forces. Similarly, the do-or-die night attack on the fortress of Port 

9 




Arthur conducted by Maj Gen Nakamura's Shirodasuki unit failed be- 

fause of stubborn resistance by the Russian defenders. The second 
|sontributing factor was the difficulty of surprising the enemy when 

•ft : . . 

attacking with large units* The assault made on the Port Arthur 
fortress by the Shirodasuki unit lost the advantage of surprise in 
its early stages because a frontal attack method was used against 
the fortress. 

A description of the successful night attack on Kung-Chang-Ling 

' ' i 

carried out by the 2d Division is given as Example 1 in the Supple- 
ment. This attack has since been considered a classic example of 
night attack, but the success is ascribed mainly to the fact that 
preparations were comparatively well made, that the attack was aided 
by moonlight, that there were a number of excellent officers, and 
that the enemy resistance was relatively weak. However, the fact 
that the moonlight was considered an important factor in the success 
of the 2d Division indicates that the Army units of those days were 
not highly trained for movement under cover of darkness. At any rate 
after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, greater stress was 
placed on courage and bayonet practice in training for night combat, 
while tactically orderly movement in darkness and careful attack pre- 
parations were emphasized. 

It is strange that despite the stress placed on training for 
night combat immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, the value of 
night attack itself was rated less and less as the years passed* 



10 



During the Russo-Japanese War the night attack was invariably con- 
ducted with heavy loss of lives, notably those of of ficers and non- 
commissioned officers. This gravely affected the fighting power of 
units committed to night assault and made it difficult for them to 
continue the attack or to pursue the enemy. The 2d Division, which 1 
succeeded in the night attack, was ineffective on the following day, 1 
and it is said that the 10th Division which attacted San-Ku'ai-Shih- | 
Shan had to spend the whole of the following day regrouping. These / 
facts, together with the difficulty of achieving a surprise in a I 
night attack conducted by a large unit, gave rise to skepticism re- 1 
garding the advisability of conducting night attacks involving large/| 
units. The theory gained ground that it would be wiser to limit the; 
size of a unit committed in the night attack to approximately an 
infantry battalion and to limit its objective to seizing a vital 
point of the enemy position so as to facilitate an attack by the mai| 
body in a subsequent daylight attack. 
Section B. Indecision after World War I 

The skeptical attitude toward night attacks -which was manifested 
after the Russo-Japanese War became even more pronounced owing to the 
influence of World War I. During that conflict, with the exception of 
reducing the German fortress at Tsingtao, the Japanese Army did not 
conduct any large-scale operations. Because the tactics employed 
against the Tsingtao fortress were the orthodox method in which infan- 
try troops advanced under the support of artillery fire, the Japanese Army 



11 



did not encounter any major problem which would prove the merits of 
night attacks. (A patrol unit, taking advantage of the enemy's 
lack of adequate security measures, seized the central position 
when it reconnoitered the fort at night, but this isolated instance 
did not serve as a major example for the study of night attack prin- 
ciples. ) 

On the contrary, the great lesson gained, from observation of 
the European battle ground, was that the vital factor in winning a 
victory in modern warfare was to excel the enemy in material strength 
such as artillery, automatic weapons, tanks, etc. This lesson had 
a profound effect on the Japanese Array. The need for an increase in 
automatic weapons and artillery was argued strongly and to some ex- 
tent increases were made. Such a trend inevitably lessened the en- 
thusiasm for infantry assault in close combat and increased the 
skepticism in connection with night attack tactics. 

Although the army adopted the policy of increasing national com- 
bat strength with artillery, automatic weapons, tanks, and similar 
weapons, Japan's limited natural resources were not sufficient for 
full realization of the policy. Moreover, after World War I pacifism 
engulfed the world and a rapid succession of reductions in armaments 
was enforced by world powers. For these reasons it was impossible 
for the Japanese Ar^y to possess modern arms in sufficient quantities. 
In spite of armament limitations, no decision was made to adopt a 
doctrine placing importance on close combat and the situation in the 



12 



Far East was not sufficiently tense to force such a decision. The 
Soviet Union was still preoccupied in domestic reconstruction follow- 
ing the revolution, while China was deeply absorbed in civil wars. 
The attitude of the Japanese Army toward armaments, tactics, and 
night attacks strategy remained undetermined until the late 1920 f s. 

Section C. Re-adoption of Night Attack Tactics and Employment in 
the Manchurian Incident 

1, Re-adoption of Night Attack Tactics in the Late 1920' s 
Under the conditions prevailing in the latter part of the 
1920 ! s, the Japanese Army had no hope or confidence of defeating the 
army of any major power. In the meantime, the Soviet Union had made 
substantial progress in internal construction, and the possibility of 
her eventually becoming Japan 1 s potential enemy was realized. There- 
fore, those responsible for organization and training of the Army 
sought to devise tactics which would promise victory. However, the 
resources of Japan still were not adequate to permit satisfactory 
modernization of the Army. 

In 1928 the Army began compilation of its new Infantry Manual 
(Hohei Soten) and centered its studies on infantry tactics. The Army 
General Staff believed that central Manchuria would be the probable 
battlefield in the event of war with the Soviet Union. The terrain 
of central Manchuria is characterized by vast undulating areas with 
the distance between crests averaging six kilometers. It was assumed 
that such rolling terrain would make it difficult for the Japanese 
artillery to give adequate support to ground forces and would make 



13 



daylight attacks hazardous and difficult. On the other hand, the 
Soviet army was inadequately trained in night combat. For these 
reasons, Col Obata Toshishiro (later. Lt Gen), chief of the 2d Sec- 
„ tion (Operations) of the Array General Staff, and Capt Miyano 

i 

|Masatoshi (later Lt Gen), member of the Committee for Compilation of 
the Infantry Manual, stressed the need of adopting the night attack 
as one of the highly important infantry combat tactics, maintaining 
that the Japanese infantry would find the way to victory in the night 
attack. 

Their opinion was accepted and the tactical doctrine was 

established that an attack should be carried out by an augmented 

I 

ompany or battalion as a surprise involving no firing, with a limit- 
d objective relatively easy to approach. In view of the lessons 
learned in the Russo-Japanese War, restrictions were placed on night 
attacks to be conducted by a large unit, such as a division. The 
general provisions of the newly published Infantry Manual required 
that emphasis be placed on training for night combat. Gen Suzuki 
Soroku, then Chief of the Army General Staff, at a meeting of divi- 
sion commanders urged vigorous training in night combat as an opera- 
tional requirement. Thus, training in night combat was launched by 

i 
r 

; " the entire Japanese Army, and became the most characteristic tactic 
of the Japanese infantry. 

Of course, the army had no intention of depending, solely 
upon the effectiveness of close combat in darkness if Japan could 



14 



surpass the potential enemy in material combat strength as represent- 
ed by aircraft, tanks, artillery, and similar weapons. On the con- 
trary, efforts were being made to place material combat strength on 
a par with that of the potential enemy and there had also been train- 
ing in tactics in which material combat strength would be employed. 
Unfortunately there was no possibility that the material strength of 
Japan would be superior to that of the Soviet Union. Inferiority in 
material combat strength could be offset only by improved quality of 
equipment and weapons, adequate training, superior tactics and strate- 
gy, and the adoption of methods of combat which would utilize condi- 
tions which restricted the full use of the material combat strength 
of the foe. The restrictive effects of darkness, combined with such 
factors as the boldness, quickness, and diligence which are part of 
the traditional Japanese character, were thought to meet the necessary 
requirements. 

Such a change in military thinking encouraged a tendency in jj > 
some quarters of the Japanese k^rny to belittle material combat powerj ' 
but the major motive leading to the adoption of the night attack was! * 
the realization on the part of the Japanese Army of the impossibility 
of attaining material superiority. 

2. Night Attack in the Manchurian Incident 

The Manchurian Incident broke out in 1931/ soon after the 
Infantry Manual was issued. The numerical strength of the Japanese 
forces in Manchuria was estimated to be less than one-tenth that of 



15 



the Chinese forces in Manchuria, and Japan's artillery power was not 
adequate. Hence, the night attack v/as the favorite combat tactic 
Employed throughout that incident. The size of the forces committed 
In a night attack was usually small, units of less than battalion 

S trength, but all of them obtained excellent results. Among the rea- 

\ ' ■) 

sons for the success were the excellent fighting spirit of the Japa- 

i 

nese troops as opposed to the low fighting effectiveness of the 

I 

Qhinese forces, but at the same time, it was considered that success 
jjjjras largely due to skill in night assault, the result of intense 
training. 

The usual objective of night attacks in those days was to 
capture a single objective such as a village, a town or a hill, but 
the night, attack conducted by the 2d Battalion of the 17th Infantry 
Regiment in the vicinity of Nan-Tien-Men as recorded in Example 2 of 
the Supplement differs markedly from the rest. The objective of this 
night attack, selected before its execution, was similar to that of 
other night attacks, but actually the battalion broke through a strong 
enemy position of about two kilometers in depth. Moreover, the suc- 
cess attained by this battalion served as the immediate cause of 
greater success subsequently attained by a brigade attack. This bat- 
talion was the first to employ its companies in leapfrog fashion in 
night combat. These experiences later served as factors supporting 
adoption of the new method of night attacks to penetrate Soviet posi- 
tions prepared in depth* 



16 



Section D. Conception of Night Tactics Suitable Against Characteris- 
tic Soviet Positions 

1. As the Manchurian Incident progressed, the Japanese Army 
found itself confronted by the Soviet Army along the Soviet-Manchurian 
border. In the Soviet Union steady progress was being made and the 
build-up of the Red Army was especially conspicuous. Powerful ele- 
ments of that Army were being disposed aj-ong the Soviet-Manchurian 
border, enveloping Manchuria. 

2# The organization, strength, and equipment of the Soviet units, 
particularly their sniper force (infantry), excelled the Japanese Army 
especially in fire power. 

3» After the conclusion of the Manchurian Incident the main duty 
of the Japanese Array was to defend Manchuria. However, the border 
was extensive (approximately 4*000 kilometers) and the border region 
was mainly vast plains which made defense, by purely defensive opera- 
tions, very difficult. Consequently the Japanese Army conducted an 
exhaustive study of the offensive and defensive tactics of the Soviet 
Army and mapped out a general strategy calling for destruction, by 
offensive operations, of any invading Soviet force. 

The basic tactical concept of the Soviet Army was based on 
the Basic Field Manual of the Red Army issued in 1929. The main 
features of their defensive tactics were as follows: 

a. Stress was placed on conibat within the defensive position. 
The main components of a force defending a position were 



17 



a statiojaa-ajp^defense unit and a striking unit* The stationary de- 
fense unit was to strive to destroy the offensive power of the attack- 
ing enemy in front of the position and, should the enenjy penetrate 
into the position, throw him into" confusion by conducting limited 
counterattacks and raising fire barriers to facilitate a subsequent 
full-scale counterattack by the striking unit. The striking unit 
which was to be held separate from the reserve unit was to counter- 
attack the enemy, breaking through the position to eject him from the 
penetrated area. Usually the striking unit was from two-thirds to 
one-third of the strength of the defense unit. The reserve unit was 
to be organized only when circumstances required and its strength was 
generally limited to less than one-ninth of the total. 

The Soviet concept of defensive warfare was markedly dif- 
ferent from that of the Japanese Army which considered that the sole 
object of the defending force was to destroy the attacking enemy in 
front of a position, holding the battle position to 1 the last by means 
of fire power and counterattacks. 

b. Defensive positions were generally disposed in depth. 

The Soviet Ariqy's general concept of the disposition of 
defensive positions is illustrated in Figures 1 to 5- The tendency 
to dispose defensive positions in depth was considered closely con- 
nected with the placing of stress on combat within the position area. 

According to the Japanese concept of defense, the defend- 
ing force was to hold the battle position which was in effect a line 

18 



FIGURE NO. I 



GENERAL CONCEPT OF SOVIET DEFENSE 




DIRECTION 
OF ENEMY 



pArtif ical obstacles 
(Small advance units consisting of infantry 
and artillery are disposed here.) 



ABOUT 12 KM 



TO 3 KM 





12 TO 15 KM 




Combat out post 

'(The combat outposts, composed of sniper 
platoons detailed usually from each battalion 
holding a sector of the main line of 
resistance, are disposed here to protect the 
battle position against enemy surprise and 
observation. In some situations, a powerful 
unit may be disposed to deceive the enemy as 
to the true location of the battle position.) 



Battle position 

(Division's stationary defense unit. 
Division's striking unit.) 

Note: Contaminated areas may be established 
along a line about 500 meters forward of the 
main line of resistance. Other sectors also 
may be contaminated.) 



/Rear position 
(The corps 1 striking division or the division 
reserves may be disposed according to the 
defense plan of the corps commander.) 



19 



FIGURE NO. 2 



DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION OF A SOVIET DIVISION 



DIRECTION OF ENEMY 




REAR POSITION 



21 



FIGURE NO. 3 



DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION OF 
A SOVIET SNIPER BATTALION 



1,000 M 



Limit line of fire net in daytime 



Limit line of fire net at night 



500 M 



400 M 

Jf 




fH^ / 3( j oM 



600 M 



I. 








H03 



V 




1,500- 
2,000 M 



A 



—1,500- 2,500 M — 

LEGEND 

Jj Antitank gun 

Platoon defense sector 
$ Machine gun platoon 

{§) Supplemental machine gun position for night action 
KM Area on which concentrated artillery fire is directed 
@ Area on which concentrated machine gun fire is directed 
^ Area on which concentrated mortar fire is directed 
— x — Obstacles 



23 



FIGURE NO. 4 



Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion 
Along the Left Bank of the Naukam River 
19 August 



NWOODEN AREA TAL' 






LEGEND: 




"Machine gun of MG Company- 




Machine gun of sniper company 




Antiaircraft machine gun 


® 


Battalion ammunition supply point 




Battalion medical aid station 




Battalion commander's observation post 


M 


message center 



26 



Figure No* 4-a 



Defensive Disposition of a Sniper Battaion 



Situation 

1. The Sniper Regiment occupies a defensive position in the 
area south of Melo village along the left bank of the Naukam river 
on 19 August to check and delay the enemy advance eastwards from 
area (A). 

2. The 1st Sniper Battalion is disposed in the area extending 
from the vicinity of Melo village to the (A) - (B) road. 

Four regimental guns and the 2d Battalion of the Division's 
Artillery Regiment support the 1st Sniper Battalion directly. 

The 3d Cavalry Regiment is disposed in the wooded area Tal 
to cover the right flank of the 1st Sniper Battalion, The 3d Sniper 
Battalion is disposed on the left abreast of the 1st Sniper Batta- 
lion. 

Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion 

1. The 2d and 3d Companies are disposed on the main line of 
resistance and the 1st Company is support as shown in the sketch, 

2. Machine gun company: 

The 1st Machine Gun Platoon is with the 1st Company (a). 
One machine gun of the platoon directs flanking fire to the area 
north of Melo village. 

The 2d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed in rear of the 3d 
Company (b). One machine gun of the platoon is located to cover 
its flanking fire the gap between the 2d Infantry Company and the 3d 
Infantry Company. 

Half of the 3d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed at a point 
500 meters northeast of Sau village to fire at hostile aircraft. The 
other half is disposed on the hill northwest of Sau village. 

3. Antitank guns are disposed in rear of the 3d Company (c), to 
direct their fire at the area north of the junction of the Naukam 
river and the C river. (The area south of the junction is not sui- 
table for tank movement,) 

4. The regimental guns are disposed in the area south of Sau 
village as shown in the sketch. 

5* Artillery battalion: 

The 4th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area ( ? d) 
to support the 1st Infantry Company. T 



27 



Figure No* 4,-b 



The 5th Artillery Battery is disposed in the valley north- 
west of Hill 178 to support the 2d Infantry Company* 

The 6th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area 
(e) to support the 3d Infantry Company, 

6, The battalion headquarters is located in Sau village, the 
battalion commander's observation post on the hill northwest of 
Sau Village, and the message center at "c 11 * 

7. The 1st Sniper Battalion's ammunition train and the 2d 
Artillery Battalion's ammunition platoon are located in Oranui 
(about four kilometers east of Melo). 



Notes: 

It One machine gun of each sniper company and an element of 
the machine gun company are employed in short range firing. 

2. Most of the machine gun company is committed to long and 
medium range firing. 

3. The 1st Sniper Battalion is supported by four regimental 
guns and one artillery battalion. (Supporting guns are not attach- 
ed to the 1st Sniper Battalion.) Each artillery battery is 
assigned to directly support one infantry company. 



28 



Figure No. 4-a 



Defensive Disposition of a Sniper Battaion 



Situation 

1. The Sniper Regiment occupies a defensive position in the 
area south of Melo village along the left bank of the Naukam river 
on 19 August to check and delay the enemy advance eastwards from 
area (A), 

2. The 1st Sniper Battalion is disposed in the area extending 
from the vicinity of Melo village to the (A) - (B) road. 

Four regimental guns and the 2d Battalion of the Division's 
Artillery Regiment support the 1st Sniper Battalion directly. 

The 3d Cavalry Regiment is disposed in the wooded area Tal 
to cover the right flank of the 1st Sniper Battalion. The 3d Sniper 
Battalion is disposed on the left abreast of the 1st Sniper Batta- 
lion. 

Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion 

1. The 2d and 3d Companies are disposed on the main line of 
resistance and the 1st Company is support as shown in the sketch. 

2. Machine, gun company: 

The 1st Machine Gun Platoon is with the 1st Company (a). 
One machine gun of the platoon directs flanking fire to the area 
north of Melo village. 

The 2d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed in rear of the 3d 
Company (b). One machine gun of the platoon is located to cover 
its flanking fire the gap between the 2d Infantry Company and the 3d 
Infantry Company. 

Half of the 3d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed at a point 
500 meters northeast of Sau village to fire at hostile aircraft. The 
other half is disposed on the hill northwest of Sau village. 

3* Antitank guns are disposed in rear of the 3d Company (e), to 
direct their fire at the area north of the junction of the Naukam 
river and the C river. (The area south of the junction is not sui-* 
table for tank movement.) 

k* The regimental guns are disposed in the area south of Sau 
village as shown in the sketch. 

5* Artillery battalion: 

The 4th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area (d) 
to support the 1st Infantry Company. ■ 



27 



Figure No. 4-b 



The 5th Artillery Battery is disposed in the valley north- 
west of Hill 178 to support the 2d Infantry Company, 

The 6th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area 
(e) to support the 3d Infantry Company. 

6. The battalion headquarters is located in Sau village, the 
battalion commander's observation post on the hill northwest of 
Sau Village, and the message center at "c". 

7. The 1st Sniper Battalion's ammunition train and the 2d 
Artillery Battalion's ammunition platoon are located in Oranui 
(about four kilometers east of Melo). 



Notes: 

1, One machine gun of each sniper company and an element of 
the machine gun company are employed in short range firing* 

2* Most of the machine gun company is committed to long and 
medium range firing. 

3* The 1st Sniper Battalion is supported by four regimental 
guns and one artillery battalion. (Supporting guns are not attach- 
ed to the 1st Sniper Battalion.) Each artillery battery is 
assigned to directly support one infantry company. 



28 



FIGURE NO. 5 



SOVIET DIVISION'S DEFENSE IN DEPTH 

(FRONTAGE: 2,000 METERS) 




DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION USUALLY 
TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNITS 

FRONTAGE DEPTH 

DIV : ABOUT 10 KM ABOUT 6 KM 

REOT: 4 KM - 3 KM 

BNI 2 KM 1.7 KM 



TK UNIT ASGND 
DIR TO DIV CMOR 



PLATOONS ON MAIN LINE 
OF RESISTANCE 



> PLATOONS IN SUPPORT 



>• BATTALION RESERVE COMPANY 



s REGIMENTAL RESERVE BATTALION 
(REGIMENTS STRIKING UNIT) 



DISPOSITION OF OIVISION 

2&2 iiSaEl^f^'f^ 




s & « 4-»;p^3^] li 
2^,3 | AW $H»fW 



LEGEND 
SNIPER SOUAD 
MACHINE GUN 
>-*- ANTITANK GUN 
-=- REGIMENTAL GUN 
0-> MORTAR 
|>»| COVERED AT GUN EMPLACEMENT 
A ARTILLERY OBSERVATION POST 
XXXXX WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS 
ANTITANK DITCH 



JJATjt ANTITANK MINE FIELD 

Ba CONCENTRATED TROOPS 
wwi PRECIPICE 



29 



with a depth of from 100 to 200 meters connecting strong points com- 
posed of front line infantry platoons. This was in striking contrast 
to the Soviet battle position with a zone from 1,500 to 2,000 meters 
in depth formed by battalions disposed side by side, 

c. Cross fire and flanking fire were basic principles in 
the fire. plan. 

Both the Soviet and Japanese armies considered the com- 
bination of fire power and counterattack basic to the effective de- 
fense of a position. But while the Japanese Army used frontal, 
oblique, and flanking fires in daytime defense and concentrated on 
frontal fire at night as the basic fire plan, the Soviets used 
oblique and flanking fires in both day and night defense. 

d. Other features of the defensive tactics of the Red Army. 
{!) Special stress was placed on anti-tank defense. 

The defending force was required to establish anti-tank defense sec- 
tors by organizing the defense with guns, mines, obstacles, etc. 

(2) Stress was placed on means of concealing defensive 
positions. The defending force was required to avoid concentration 
of defensive positions and was required to use dummy positions and 
camouflage. 

(3) Each battalion sector was to be in4ependent and to 
continue defensive combat independently even if the neighboring sec- 
tor fell to the enemy. The enemy penetrating to the rear of a posi- 
tion after breaking through a battalion sector was to be dealt with 
by the striking unit* 



31 



(4) In addition to artillery, tanks and aircraft were 
to be employed mainly in defensive warfare as a striking force. 

4. As stated before, the Soviet Army of the 1930 f s had not 
emphasized training in night defense. Following are the main points 
of night defense as shown in their field manual of 1929: 

a* At night the defending force dispatches infantry recon- 
naissance units, concealed security units, and observation parties 
(provided with war dogs) to the foreground of the defensive position* 

b. At night it is advantageous to shift machine gun posi- 
tions so as to avoid hostile artillery fire prepared during the day. 
In case the distance between firing positions (squad positions) is 
more than 300 meters, machine guns are disposed between the intervals 
close to the front line. 

c. In preparing for night firing, the artillery makes pre- 
parations during the daytime by dividing the foreground of the posi- 
tion into smaller sectors (TN Grid reference system). The artillery 
opens fire on a pyrotechnic signal from the front line infantry unit 
facing the area being subjected to attack by enemy infantry. The. 
type of pyrotechnic signal is decided by the division commander. 

d. The rocket, flare, and searchlight are used for illumi- 
nation, to facilitate the firing of machine guns and other weapons. 
When effecting illumination, care must be taken not to expose friend- 
ly defensive dispositions. When using searchlights, cross and direct 
beams of light are projected jointly. 



32 



e. The striking unit counterattacks the enemy penetrating 
the friendly position before he consolidates the sector. For this 
purpose the striking unit is located comparatively close to the front 
line* 

5. After studying the defensive dispositions of the Soviet Army, 
the Japanese Army formed the following conclusions: 

a. Defensive positions of the Soviet Army are composed of 
firing positions (Usually a sniper squad position* When a firing 
position contains a heavy machine gun it is specifically called a 
machine gun position) which are dispersed and disposed in depth and 
width in a checkerboard pattern. Such a position lacks a key or 
vital point. 

b. The distance between the firing positions is usually 
about 300 meters. 

c. A penetration of a Soviet position to the depth of 1,000 
meters has no decisive effect. It is obvious that a penetration exe- 
cuted to such an extent will merely result in playing into the hands 
of the enemy striking unit and the attempt will end in failure. It 
is necessary for an attacking force penetrating a Soviet position to 
reach the rear of the battalion area. 

d. Should an infantry battalion with a frontage of 200 
meters penetrate a Soviet battalion defense area at night, to a depth 
of about 2,000 meters, the enemy positions the battalion will directly 
encounter number only about five. (Three firing and two machine gun 



33 



positions.) The number of enemy firing positions encountered would, 
of course, be less should the attacking battalion penetrate through 
a gap in the enenjy position or shorten its frontage, 

e. The night attack would be advantageous in nullifying 
the effect of the superior number of Soviet tanks and aircraft. 

6. As a result of studies of Soviet offensive and defensive 
tactics the Japanese Army issued a series of manuals on methods of 
combat against the Red Army. (These manuals were commonly called 
"Red Books" as they were classified and bound in red paper.) The 
Red Books, compiled mainly on the basis of studies conducted by the 
Infantry School, contained information on a wide variety of combat 
methods to be employed against the Soviet Army, including engagements, 
attapk on positions, defense and combat on special terrain. New 
methods of night attack were emphatically emphasized and intensive 
training conducted. 

The night attack as treated in the Red Books was designed 
for the infantry battalion as the attack unit, and is described in 
the jted Books as follows: 

a. The battalion conducting a night attack on the enemy 
position chooses a distant point within the enenjy position (usu- 
ally the rear limit of the battalion position) as the vital 
attack objective. This objective is not an enemy force but a 
vital point within the enemy position. 

b. The frontage of the attacking battalion is very narrow 
(usually a two company front with units advancing in parallel 
columns). Attacking troops advance boldly, proceeding normally 
at a speed of six kilometers an hour. The bold or daring advance 
method (KANI ZENSHIN) is a special rapid walk utilized to 
approach the desired objective in spite of difficult terrain and 



hostile fire. This manner of walking requires troops to lower 
their hips and lift their feet high so as not to stumble over 
low obstacles on the ground and at the same time increase their 
walking speed. 

c. During the advance enemy resistance which may be expect^ 
ed from firing positions and counterattack units is repulsed by 
several firing position attack units (KATEN KOGEKI BUTAl), each' 
composed of one or two squads, and counterattack repulsing units 
(GYAKUSHU HAIGEKI BUTAI) also composed of one or two squads, 
both units will be designated and organized before the attack. 
These units are under the immediate control of the battalion 
commander whose position, during the attack, is at the head of 
the battalion. As the occasion requires he employe these units 
to liquidate enemy resistance. 

d. Ordinarily no serious consideration is given to enemy 
fire from the front and flank. Of course, at a temporary halt, 
employment of the firing position attack unit and the use of a 
smoke screen is permitted, but as a rule, losses from enemy fire 
are to be minimized by an increase in the pace of advance. 

e. Protection of both flanks of the advancing battalion or 
exploitation of successes in areas along the flank is conducted 
by other units assigned by the regimental commander. 

While the adoption of such a bold method of night attack was 

primarily the result of studies of Soviet positions, reference was 

made to the night attack at Nan-Tien-Men in 1933 (Example 2) as an 

example proving the feasibility of the new method of night attacks. 

7. The Red Books also laid stress on special attack methods 

utilizing meteorological characteristics of high latitude districts 

(about 50 degrees north latitude) in northern Manchuria. These 

attack methods were known as early dawn attacks (REBEI KOGEKI ) and 

dusk attacks (HAKUBO KOGEKI ). 

A type of dawn attack (FUTSUGYO KOGEKI) was a nethod of 

attack which had been favored by the Japanese Army since the Russo- 



3* 



Japanese War. It called for an infantry attack immediately follow* 
ing a preparatory bombardment by the artillery, commencing at day- 
break and continuing for one or more hours. In northern Manchuria 
the Japanese Army discovered that the half-light of the early morn- 
ing continued for a comparatively long period. The early morning 
light normally permitted visibility up to several hundred meters but, 
did not afford that of several thousand meters, the distance required 
to permit the artillery to open fire. To the infantry of both sides 
the morning light was practically daytime, but as far as the artillery 
.was concerned, night conditions prevailed. The Japanese Army called 
; this period, "early dawn 11 (REBJEI). How long this early dawn would 
last depended on the latitude, the season, and weather conditions. 
It usually lasted from 30 to 60 minutes, although it frequently last- 
ed more than an hour* 

The old concept of a dawn attack as applied to northern Man- 
churia had an obvious disadvantage: If the infantry attack was to be 
preceded by artillery preparation, the period during which the infan- 
try stands by under enemy infantry fire would have to be extended 
until the end of the early dawn period. On the other hand, the 
earliest period of early dawn, a brief period of about ten minutes 
when visibility is limited to forty or fifty meters, was recognized 
to be a time of greatest advantage to the attacking infantry. This 
period meant night time visibility for distances over 100 meters for 
the defense, but it was possible for attacking infantry troops to 



36 



advance, since they required a shorter range of visibility. Thus it| 
was considered possible for infantry to advantageously employ night % 
combat tactics in the early dawn. Accordingly, a new concept of 1 
early dawn attack was initiated; An early dawn infantry attack, to 
be followed by the combined action of infantry, tanks, and artillery 
with the coming of full daylight. 

8. In northern Manchuria the periodr of dusk is also comparati- 
vely long, and a dusk attack was another application of night combat 
tactics. The infantry committed in a dusk attack starts action after 
sunset as visibility becomes progressively less, and penetrates the 
enemy position under the concealment of full dusk. It was considered 
possible for attacking infantry troops to approach enemy defense posi- 
tions without observation* 

The dusk attack method could be used advantageously in con- 
tinuing an attack to exploit successes gained in daylight attacks or 
in assaulting eneipy outposts. It could also be utilized as the ini- 
tial phase of a night attack which would require most of the night to 
complete. 

9. Importance was also attached to studying the possible effect 
of the superior air power of the Soviet Army. While studies were 
made in air strategy aimed at gaining air superiority over the Soviet- 
air force, training of ground forces was so conducted as to minimize 
the Soviet advantage of stronger air power. Emphasis was placed on 
the fullest possible use of the night, not only in combat but in all 



37 



military activities including movement of troops and transportation 
of supplies, as offering the greatest advantage for minimizing 
losses and concealment of intentions. 

10. One of the characteristic features of the Soviet defensive 
system were the tochkas, special pillboxes disposed in the fortified 
zone along the Soviet-Manchurian border, which constituted the back- 
bone of the frontier fortifications of the Red Array, The ground 
plan of a typical tochka is shown in Figures 6 and 7* (From the 
manual, "Soviet Army")* These pillboxes were constructed of con- 
crete and were designated as machine gun tochka or gun tochka accord- 
ing to the principal weapons they contained. Much time was devoted 
by the Japanese Army to studies on how to neutralize or seize these 
pillboxes in order to break through the frontier defensive positions 
of the Red Army. 

Night attack by infantry and engineers was seriously studied 
as was a variation that employed night attack principles. This latter 
attack method was characterized by the use of smoke to create night 
conditions for the enemy manning the tochka and to create conditions 
similar to dusk or dawn for the attacking force. Methods adopted for 
the use of smoke were shooting by artillery, projecting by hand pro- 
jectors, and spreading by wind. The smoke candle, to be discharged by 
the grenade thrower, was invented as a simple agent for producing 
screening smokes available to the infantry. 

Section E. Night Attack Conducted During the China Incident and 
Establishment of the Principles of Night Combat 



38 



FIGURE NO. 6 



CONSTRUCTION OF A TOCHKA WITH MACHINE GUNS 
PLAN VIEW 

10.0 h 

a firing slit 



FIRING SLIT 



PERISCOPE, 
DESK AND 
CHAIR 



10.0 



FIRING SLITS 
FOR RIFLE 



WINDOW- 




FIRING SLIT 




V ////«y777A 




.BOARD FLOOR 8 
SHINGLE ROOF 



B 



PEOHKA ] WlflD6w 

ENTRANCE TO 
ACCESS TUNNEL 



ELEVATION ALONG THE LINE A — B 




NOTE : 

1. AMMUNITION CHESTS ARE ON THE FLOOR. 

2. A MACHINE GUN IS MOUNTED IN EACH FIRING SLIT AT ALL TIMES. 

3. UNIT OF MEASUREMENT! METERS 



39 



FIGURE NO. 7 



ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL TYPE OF 
DEFENSIVE POSITION OF SNIPER BATTALION 



N 




Density of final protective fire: 

1. About 3 rounds per minute per meter of frontage west of the 
Tochka No, 11. 

2. About 2 rounds per minute per meter of frontage east of the 
Tochka No. 11. 

Legend: 

Q : Tochka with machine guns 
© : Tochka with guns 

: Sot (Tochka with disappearing machine guns) 

r=i : Tochka with guns, in which the commander is located. 

rrcri : Covered ammunition dump. 



Ul 



1. Some Amy tacticians, particularly students of war history, 
were very skeptical of the possibility of the success of the bold 
tactics advocated in the Bed Books . According to the Infantry Man- 
ual, the objective of a night attack was limited and contemplated 
relatively shallow penetration (400 to 500 meters). In view of this 
skepticism, the Infantry School began to study a new method of night 
attack to be conducted by infantry deployed in two successive assault 
echelons - a method which was a slight modification of that described 
in the Red Books. This method, like that mentioned in the Bed Books, 
was aitfed at penetrating deeply into the eneny defense area* Accord- 
ing to the new method, however, the depth to be penetrated by the 
first echelon (a company or battalion) was limited, and the second 
assault echelon was to leapfrog the first and penetrate to the desir- 
ed depth. While this method was considered more sound than that of 
the Red Books, in that it set a limit to the distance to be covered 
by one assault echelon, it created the difficulty of executing a 
leapfrog movement at night* 

2. Meanwhile, studies were commenced on the problem of firing 
during a night attack. 

Heretofore the loading and firing of weapons had been pro- 
hibited in night attacks for fear that firing might cause confusion 
among the attackers. This was justifiable in the days of the Russo- 
Japanese War where the eneroy defensive positions were shallow in 
depth and the final issue of an attack was often decided by the 



h3 



initial surprise. However, in breaking through the Soviet positions 
constructed in great depth, the initial surprise assault, even if 
successfully delivered, would disclose the attackers 1 intention, and 
subsequent assault efforts would be met by eneiqy fire. 

Thus the advantage of firing during the second or later 
assaults and for holding the occupied ground came to be realized, 
and studies were made along this, line. 

On the other hand, the modern armies of the world were tend- 
ing toward systematic security measures and defense reconnaissance, 
V with great strides being made in organizing defensive fires for night 
] ' combat. Consequently, it was generally agreed that a night attack 
depending solely on the element of surprise without first neutraliz- 
ing or destroying the enemy defensive fire network might prove too 
hazardous. To reduce such risks, studies were begun on assault with 
the combined initial employment of infantry, artillery, heavy weapons, 
tanks, and engineers. In connection with the use of supporting fires, 
some quarters expressed views favoring the adoption of the extended 
formation in addition to the mass formation in assaulting an enemy 
defensive position, 

3. In July 1937 "when the China Incident broke out, the new con- 
cepts of night attack, utilizing two assault echelons and attack by 
the use of supporting fires, were being developed in addition to the 
basic principles laid out in the old Combat Regulations, the old In- 
fantry Manual, and the Red Books. Consequently, various methods of 



hk 



night attacks were employed during the China Incident, Commanders 
of Japanese units made frequent use of night attacks, adopting tac- 
tics to suit their preference and the situation. 

The Japanese infantry usually resorted to night attack when- 
ever it was difficult to obtain artillery support, and most of those 
night attacks were highly successful. This was due in great measure 
to the thorough training of the Japanese troops and the inferiority 
of the Chinese troops. 

The night attack, as shown in Example 3, which was made by 
the 14th Division in the area north of Pao-Ting was an example of a 
night attack made by a large unit with the objective of achieving a 
decisive battle. The night break-through in depth, as illustrated 
in Example 4, which was conducted by the main body of the First Army 
in the initial phase (Hay 1941) of the Battle of Chung-Yuan was Con- 
ducted after the new Field Service Regulations and the new Infantry 
Manual were issued, but many of the concepts of the Red Books were 
employed. 

4« The Japanese Army employed a night attack against Soviet 
positions for the' first time during the series of disputes that took 
place near the Soviet-Manchuria border in 193#* 

The first, a night attack made by the 1st Battalion of the 
75th Infantry Regiment in Chang-Ku-Feng in the latter part of July 
1938, is described in detail in Example 5. The 1st Battalion carried 
out the attack generally according to the Infantry Manual of that 



time and succeeded in capturing firing positions arranged in several 
lines. The Soviet positions were only about 300 meters in depth, 
but the fact that several lines of firiig positions were captured 
was highly significant. Furthermore, it became clear that the Soviet 
positions, terrain permitting, were composed of an organized network 
of positions. It is important to note that the Soviet Amy began to 
stress night contoat training after that time. 

The second of the night attacks was made during the Nomonhan 
Incident in 1939. During that border incident which lasted from May 
to September, night attacks were nade to compensate for the Japanese 
weakness in artillery. The terrain in the Nomonhan area was flat and 
barren, the typical Soviet positions were deep, broad, and widely 
spaced and, since the strength of Japanese infantry battalions was 
depleted (200 to 300 men), the maximum capability of a battalion in 
a night attack was the capturirjg of one firing position on the front 
line of the Soviet positions. Moreover, in almost all cases, batta- 
lions that succeeded in capturiig a firing position ware forced to 
abandon it on the followirg morniijg in face of heavy counterattacks 
by enemy artillery and tanks. While such an outcome might have been 
expected from the study of the Soviet positions, the Nomonhan Inci- 
dent provided the proof. 

5. After the outbreak of the China Incident, serious studies 
were continued to improve the tactics of night attack. About that 
time, the Soviets showed a strorg tendency to intensify night conbat 



U6 



training and to change from extremely deep and broad defense posi- 
tions to a defense with on organized network of positions (collec- 
tion method)* 

After the outbreak of the Rus so-German War in 1941, the 
Soviet Army switched completely to the system of organised defense 
positions. 

Experiences in the early stage of the China Incident proved 
that the strict adherence to the tactical doctrine of the Red Books 
was not practical even against Chinese positions. These battle ex- 
periences demonstrated the advisability of the night attack by two 
assault echelons. The general principles of night attack contained 
in the new Field Service Regulations for Operations, issued in Sep- 
tember 193^, embodied the concept of the Red Books, the lessons 
gained in the early stages of the China Incident as well as experi- 
ences acquired since the Russo-Japanese War. Shortly thereafter, 
in February 1940, the Infantry Manual was revised and the general 
principles of night attack contained in the new Field Service Regu- 
lations, were given in detail in that manual. 

The Red Books were abolished after the new Field Service 
Regulations and the new Infantry Manual were issued. 



/ U7 



CHAPTER III 

Basic Concept of the Principles of Night Combat 
in the Field Service Regulations for Operations 
and the Infantry Manual 

Section A. General 

The Field Service Regulations for Operations, published in 193#> 
and the Infantry Manual, published in 1940, were the last field 
manuals on tactics issued hy the Japanese Army and maintained their 
positions as the final authority of the Japanese Army, being neither 
amended nor modified during the Pacific War, Both publications con- 
tained details of night movement and other types of maneuvers in ad- 
dition to combat, but they placed special emphasis upon positive 
utilization of the advantages inherent in offensive combat at night. 
The text of the tactical doctrine of night combat given in the Field 
Service Regulations for Operations and the Infantry Manual, are given 
in Appendices I and II. 

Section B. General Concept of Night Attack (From the Field Service 
Regulations and the Infantry Manual) 

1. The following conclusions are drawn concerning night attacks 

and the size of units. 

a. Small units will endeavor to take the enemy by surprise 
under cover of darkness, 

b. Large units will execute-* night attack under the follow- 
ing circumstances: 1) in case an attack is to be continued in order 
to exploit and complete gains obtained during a daylight attack, 2) 



U9 



if the situation requires it, or 3) when it is advantageous to take 
strong points of the enemy position to facilitate the attack of a 
larger unit on the following day. The foregoing, l) and 3) are self- 
explanatory. The phrase "the situation requires it" in 2) was pro- 
vided chiefly for cases when time was limited* It is also possible 
that the phrase was chosen to permit the application of the tactics 
stressed in the Red Books (i.e. deep penetration of the enemy posi- 
tion on a narrow frontage). 

Night attacks by small units were encouraged without reser- 
vation, but limited encouragement was given to the night attack by 
large units. Infantry units of regimental-size or larger did conduct 
night attacks in actual battle after the Field Service Regulations 
were issued, but generally speaking the Japanese Army considered the 
infantry battalion the unit of the most suitable size to conduct a 
night attack. 

2. Seizure of key positions, capturing hills ^ or hamlets within 
the enemy defense area or other specific tactical positions where 
hostile strong points are situated, as well as penetration in depth 
were recognized as the objects of a night attack. While the Red 
Books had placed the primary objective of night attack upon penetra- 
tion in depth rather than on seizure of key positions, in view of the 
characteristics of Soviet positions, the tfield Service Regulations 
approved both the capture of key positions and penetration in depth 
as objectives of night attacks. 



£0 



3. The changes in the types of Soviet positions and the lessons 
learned during the early phase of the China Incident made it advisable 
to adopt a two-echelon system as being less hazardous for penetration' 
in depth by night attack. After the first assault echelon occupied 
the preliminary objective, the second echelon would leapfrog the first 
and become the front line unit, penetrating deep into the enemy posi- 
tion, 

4. Preference was shown for surprise attack without supporting 
fire rather than sudden attack with artillery support, although the 
latter was also approved. While it was recognized that supporting 
fires might warn the enemy of an impending attack in actual practice, . 
support for an infantry assault with artillery and infantry weapon 
fire was often provided, even in cases in which surprise was intended. 

The employment of tanks was also approved for the purpose of 
destroying enemy wire or neutralizing heavy weapons, especially flank 
defense weapons, providing that there were no other suitable means 
available and that the maintenance of secrecy was not essential. 

In all concjepts of night attack methods, the infantry com- 
panies remained the primary components of night attacks, although 
participation by machine guns, artillery, tanks, and other weapons 
was approved under certain circumstances. 

5. Preference was given to a concentrated attack formation as . 
opposed to an extended formation, since a concentrated formation was 
decidedly advantageous from the standpoint of control and movement 

51 



in darkness. Also, the infantry assault is more effective in applying 
pressure against the enemy and maintaining the morale of attacking 
troops -when conducted in concentrated formation. It is impossible 
to ignore the adverse effects the extended assault formation may pro- 
duce in the minds of individual soldiers. When an extended formation 
is used at night each officer and man is freed from the eyes of his 
commanders, subordinates, and fellow-soldiers, and because his deeds, 
whetner merited or otherwise, are not observed by others, troops tend 
to become less aggressive in action. However, minimization of losses 
must also be an important consideration in selecting an assault for- 
mation and for this reason the employment of extended formation was 
not precluded entirely in the Infantry Manual. 

6. The need for completely familiarizing the assault unit with 
the terrain and hostile positions and the need for making thorough 
attack preparations were stressed as factors essential to a success- 
ful night attack. 

7. Takirig advantage of the enemy's lack of security was emphasiz- 
ed in choosing the time of attack* 

Also recognized was the greater possibility of gaining the 
initiative when the attack against the enemy was launched just after 
dark as well as the advantage of early dawn attack in which gains 
could be exploited in the subsequent daylight attack. 

B* In selecting the assault point, preference was given to the 
location offering ease of attack maneuver, but directing the assault 



£2 



against a soft spot in the enemy position was also approved. 

9. The importance of adopting the simplest dispositions in 
the night attack and avoiding intricate dispositions was emphasized. 
However, night attacks in modern warfare generally require 
complex organization. Consequently, the Field Service Regulations, 
required the commander to formulate detailed plans for night attacks 
and to thoroughly familiarize his subordinate units with his plans. 
The manual also stressed the necessity for support units to make 
adequate attack preparations during daylight, if the attack is to be 
supported by fire. 

10. The inf antiy taking part in the night attack was required 
to seek decisive conbat by suddenly closing with the enemy and fight- 
ing hand to hand. For this purpose, the infantry approaching the 
enemy position was required to place in the first assault echelon 
strength sufficient for decisive combat and then rush the attack 
objective rapidly and resolutely with an assault formation as com- 
pact as practicable. Company commanders as well as platoon leaders 
were especially enjoins d to maintain firm control of subordinates 
and to lead their units in the final assault. 

Since it has been proven that the success of an attack by 
the infantry is dependent largely on the valor of the company com- 
manders and platoon leaders, platoon leaders were required to be at 
the head of their men even in daylight assault, although company 
commanders were required to lead only in night attacks. 



53 



11. Emphasis was placed on measures for holding occupied ground 
after a night attack had succeeded. 

The need for holding measures was emphasized on the basis 
of the lessons gained from the unsuccessful ni^ht attacks against 
Shou-3han-Pu during the Russo-Japanese War and from the studies con- 
ducted after the failure of the night attacks against Soviet posi- 
tions in the Nomonhan Incident, 

12. Provision was made in the Field Service Regulations for 
the allotment of targets between the artillery and infantry heavy 
weapons in night attacks executed under supporting fire. 

As a general rule, the artillery fired on pre-determined 
objectives, whereas the infantry weapons fired on targets of oppor- 
tunity. 

The Infantry Manual prohibited the firing of rifles and 

light machine guns even when the night attack was conducted under 

supporting fire/ presumably because the unaimed fire of small arms 

is seldom effective at night and to avoid confusion resulting from 

wild firing under the psychological influences of darkness. 

Section C. Night Attack of the Infantry (From the Infantry Training 
Manual) 

1. Since units of battalion or company size were most commonly 
used in night attacks by the infantry, the Infantry Manual was devot- 
ed mainly to battalion and company training* 

At the beginning of the section on Company Tactics in Night 
Combat, the Infantry Manual stressed the need for thorough preparation 

9x 



and resolute execution of the assault with the company commander and 
all his men firmly convinced of victory, and taught that a high of- 
fensive spirit and a firm unity among officers and men were of the 
utmost necessity in the conduct of night attacks. 

Likewise, at the beginning of the section on battalion tac- 
tics in night combat, the Infantry Manual stressed the fact that the 
night attack provided an opportunity for the infantry to display its 
special characteristics to the utmost, that the battalion size infan- 
try unit was best suited for executing an independent night attack, 
and that the battalion commander must always be willing to plan night 
attacks and have the courage to execute them resolutely* 

2. When the decision to carry out a night attack was made, the 
battalion commander was required to immediately inform the subordi- 
nate company commanders of his intentions, specifying the time of 
attack, objectives, and other necessary information, so that the 
assault units would have sufficient time to prepare for' the attack, 

3* Commanders were required to assemble their subordinate com- 
manders during daylight near the scene of the scheduled attack and 
issue detailed orders based on the night attack plan* 

Normally, in a night attack, a company had no reserve, but 
a battalion was divided into a front line echelon and a reserve. If 
deep penetration of the enemy position was desired, the battalion was 
divided into two assault echelons and a reserve. The machine gun and 
infantry gun units moved with the reserve. The formation of a batta- 



lion in a night attack is shown in Figure 8, 

4* Prior to the advance of the main body in a night attack, 
the battalion commander normally dispatched minor elements to occupy 
key points along the route of advance or in the foreground of the 
hostile position in order to cover the advance of the main body and 
facilitate attack preparations. In the normal situation, the main 
body of the battalion approached up to a certain designated point in 
a closed formation, and from there front line companies moved forward 
in column to their respective attack positions. 

5* Maintenance of direction at night is a matter of great im- 
portance. To maintain direction in darkness, the battalion was not 
only required to depend on a compass, as well as the moon and stars, 
but also to: 1) establish natural objects as reference points; 2) 
install markers; 3) place men at intervals; 4) use picked patrols as 
guides and 5) employ star shells. The manual also stressed the ne- 
cessity of individual soldiers knowing their own location in relation 
to the enemy position by measuring the distance of advance by rope or 
pace. 

6. During the approach march for a night attack, each company 
advanced in a formation that offered ease of maneuver. The company 
commander directed the troops at the head of his company with baton, 
marking flag, white cloth* or similar means, with the direction of 
advance maintained by keeping contact with the battalion commander. 
When subjected to hostile searchlights or effective fire, short halts 



56 



FIGURE IM0.8A 



INFANTRY BATTALION IN NIGHT ATTACK 



When the capture of a front line eneiny position is desired. 



200 

METERS 




r 



_ Leadirjg Element 

hq£><3 

3 [><ri z f>^\ — Front Line Companies 
4E><) Reserve 



s? 



FIGURE N0.8B 



INFANTRY BATTALION IN NIGHT ATTACK 



When a deep penetration of the enemy position is desire d« 




4 (5^1 



HQ 
I 



(XI Leadii^g Element 



-First Assault Echelon 

3 [>^1 2 p>^l — Second Assault Echelon 



4 IXJ -- Reserve 



59 



were authorized. Even when small eneiny elements, sentries or dogs, 
were encountered the main body of the company continued the approach 
march. Ordinarily such enemy obstructions were eliminated before- 
hand by the security patrols but, if necessary, the company command- 
er might employ an element under his command to eliminate them. The 
company approach formation is shown in Figure 9. 

7* Clearing away obstacles in the foreground of the enemy posi- 
tion was planned to be completed well before front line companies 
reached their assault position. 

Obstacles were cleared either by the battalion or by each 
front line company acting independently. In the latter case, the 
battalion commander designated the time of dispatching obstacle clear- 
ing parties, methods of protection, points and method of clearing, 
time of completion, and other pertinent matters. 

8. The attack position of the front line company was ordinarily 
selected about 200 to 300 meters in front of the enemy position. 

Upon arrival at this point, the front line company immediately contact- 
ed its obstacle clearing parties and advance guards in the forward 
areas. These groups provided information on the enemy situation, the 
terrain and the condition of cleared lanes through obstacles. The 
company commander then determined the company assault dispositions, 
familiarized his subordinates with those dispositions, and completed 
preparations for attack. 

9. The battalion commander ordered the assault as soon as the 



61 



FIGURE NO. 9 



COMPANY APPROACH FORMATION 



-ABOUT 30M- 

t 



o 
o 
6 
o 
o 

LEFT FLANK 
PATROL 



(I) 2 



ADVANCE PATROL 



30 TO 50M 



- ABOUT 20M- 
I 

6 



(i) 



6 



e3i 



ABOUT 

"3.5 M 



-1 


2 


-2 


1 


• • • i 

-1 


SOD 




SOD 




SOD 



HQ 



(1)2 



REAR GUARD 



RIGHT FRONT- 
LINE CO. 



I 




CO IN 2nd ASSAULT 
ECHELON OR BN RESERVES 

LEGEND: 

6 CO CMDR 

8 PLAT LEADER 

Q N CO 



63 



front line company had completed attack preparations* 

The assault formation of the company depended on the situa- 
tion but was invariably one which assured the maxi mum degree of con- 
trol with a minimum of loss. 

Company assault procedure is illustrated in Figure 10. 

10. The company commander, immediately upon taking the assign- 
ed objective, regrouped the company, dispatched elements to recon- 
noiter the enemy situation and terrain, established contact with the 
battalion commander and adjacent units, prepared close -range fires, 
ordered construction of necessary defenses, enforced strict security 
measures against enemy counterattack, and prepared the company for 
the next action. The battalion commander, likewise disposed the bat- 
talion to meet possible enemy counterattack and prepared for the sub- 
sequent action. 

11. When a battalion conducted a night attack in two assault 
echelons, the strength of each echelon was determined in considera- 
tion of the depth and condition of the enemy position to be attacked. 

The battalion commander committed the first assault echelon 
to seize the enemy front line position prior to penetration by the 
battalion 1 s main body. The width of the enemy position to be captur- 
ed by the first echelon was determined by the terrain and the manner 
in which the enemy fire was organized. 

The battalion commander, after determining the degree of 
success of the first assault echelon, personally commanded the second 



6? 



FIGURE NO. 10 



COMPANY ASSAULT PROCEDURE 



Assault objective 




Remarks : 

1. In this example, three lanes are cleared for the company 
assault ♦ 

2. Just prior to the assault, each squad of the platoons changes 
from column formation to line formation (close interval) w_th 
the squad leader in the center • 



67 



echelon and the reserve. After placing the obstacle clearing squads 
and other necessary elements at the head, he executed a leapfrog 
movement to pass the first assault echelon in order to continue to 
assault the enemy position and capture their key points. The leap- 
frog movement was made as soon as possible after the initial assault 
to avoid giving the eneiqy time to rally. 

12. Normally the second assault echelon adopted attack disposi- 
tions from the outset and advanced in a formation suitable for the 
attack. However, to avoid confusion during the leapfrog, the second 
assault echelon closed its formation and returned to the attack for- 
mation after the first assault echelon had been passed. 

13. When tanks joined the infantry in a night attack, they were 
employed chiefly for destroying wire entanglements of the enemy front 
line positions, his known heavy weapons and flanking fires. In tank- 
infantry employment, the battalion commander usually distributed tanks 
to each front line company and regulated the time of their joining the 
attack. 

14« The company was required to take every possible measure for 
concealment in order to make the night attack successful. The company 
commander was required to exercise the strictest security measures, 
enforce thoroughgoing sound and light control, prohibit loading of 
firearms and refrain from using verbal orders except when ordering 
the final rush. 

15. Maintenance of contact during the night attack was stressed 



69 



as being of vital importance. 

The battalion commander was required to make his position 
known with markers or some special means of identification, and to 
keep his subordinates always under his control • 

Section D. Attack at Early Dawn and Dusk (From the Infantry Train- 
ing Manual Published by the Infantry School and the Field 
Service Regulations for Operations) 

1. The "early dawn attack", previously described as a combina- 
tion of the ordinary dawn attack and a night attack, is infantry as- 
sault conducted during the period shortly before dawn. Combat orga- 
nization for an attack of this type can be obtained by proper modi- 
fication of dawn and night attacks, with a rapid switching over to 
the coordinated attack of the infantry, tank and artillery after day- 
break. 

2. In order to take advantage of the night to approach the 
enemy, to reach the attack position and to make the assault at dawn, 
reconnaissance and other attack preparations should be made during 
the daylight hours whenever possible ♦ 

3. In the battalion advance to the assault position for an 
early dawn attack procedures for the night attack are followed. 

4* As in the case of the night attack, the company sometimes 
assaults a single objective with its entire strength concentrated in 
a close formation, but usually in the early dawn attack the company 
assigns attack objectives to its front line platoons and allows them 



70 



to assault individually using methods similar to the daylight attack 
procedures. In the latter case, the intervals between platoons are 
kept greater than in a night attack and the company usually holds 
some reserve strength. 

5* In the early dawn attack, tanks are usually committed to 
the action after the front line infantry has penetrated the enemy 
position* However, depending on the conditions of enemy obstacles, 
it is sometimes advantageous to employ a part or the whole of the 
tank strength from the start* 

6* The artillery is, in principle, required to render the ful- 
lest possible support to the infantry, particularly at daybreak. 
However, when it is possible to complete preparations for action in 
advance, the artillery opens fire at early dawn and supports the 
infantry assault, although it is advisable for the artillery to delay 
opening fire until after the first infantry assault in order to con- 
ceal the attack. 

Section E. Night Defense (From the Infantry Trainirjg Manual publish- 
ed by the Infantry School and the Field Service Regulation 
for Operations) 

1. The defensive doctrine of the Japanese Army required that 
the front line infantry positions, be defended to the last and the 
enemy attack stopped before the line* 

The requirements of night defense took into consideration 
both the Japanese Army's defensive doctrine and the fundamental 
effect which night has upon combat. Consideration was given to the 



71 



fact that redisposition of troops under hostile fire at night results 
in confusion and that, in view of the difficulties of cooperation by- 
adjacent units or reinforcement from troops in the rear at nighty 
simplicity was required in defense assignments. 

2. Generally speaking, at night patrols and more stringent 
security measures were used to detect the enemy approach, contact 
between security detachments was strengthened and a sentiy line orga- 
nized in front of each platoon position. Also, if available, search- 
lights were prepared to illuminate the ground in front of the defen- 
sive position. 

3» If necessary for defense at night, the battalion commander 
disposed elements where the gaps between companies were great or 
where terrain conditions made it necessary, and dispatched elements 
to reinforce companies in critical areas. He also moved the reserve 
close up to the front line. 

4. The company commander usually increased the strength at his 
strong points dispatched reserve elements to occupy other points and 
to organize new strong points. 

5. In night defense, the infantry company organized its fires 
to deliver frontal fire at a close range. Machine guns attached to 
the companies and those under direct control of the battalion com- 
mander were employed for frontal fire to cover important sectors in 
the immediate foreground of the defensive position. 



72 



6* If the enemy succeeded in closing with the defensive posi- 
tion, defenders of each strong point subjected them to heavy fire or 
engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. As soon as the enemy was thrown 
into confusion> or if he had penetrated the company position, the 
company commander led the reserve in a counterattack. The battalion 
commander likewise counterattacked with his reserve. However, the 
performance of the original mission of defending the assigned posi- 
tion was not be jeopardized by counterattacking too hastily* 
Section P # Other Night Operations 

1, The Japanese A^my, regarded the pursuit as the means to 
complete the victory and required commanders of all echelons to carjry 
out pursuit actions • Because an enemy attempting to withdraw usually 
takes advantage of darkness, the necessity of combat units carrying 
out the pursuit at night was particularly stressed. 

2. Before executing a night withdrawal, preparations must be 
made so as to facilitate the retrograde movement by secretly sending 
to the rear, during daytime, the sick and wounded as well as excess 
ammunition. 

The common procedure in the daylight withdrawal is to post 
a covering force (SHUIO BUTAI) in a suitable position behind the front 
line in order to cover the assembly and withdrawal of the front line 
force. No covering force is used in the night withdrawal, although it 



73 



is commonly protected by small screenirjg detachments (ZANCHI BUTAI) 
left at key points along the front line. Detachments are disposed 
so as not to arouse in the enecoy any suspicion of withdrawal intentions. 
It may be advisable to deceive the enemy by makiig a nigfrt attack- 
with elerasnts of the screenixig force. 

3, Darkness should be utilized in amphibious landing and river 
crossing operations, as secrecy and surprise are vital elements in 
such operations. Having the invasion convoy approach the landing 
beach under cover of darkness will often have the advantage of tak- 
ing the defending force by surprise and since the approach to the 
landing point will be concealed, may permit the debarkation of the 
entire main body without detection by the enemy. 

In river crossing operations all efforts must be made not 
to betray the time and place of crossing. Darkness can be used to 
excellent advantage to conceal the progress of operational prepara- 
tions from enemy air and ground observation. Actual crossing by the 
combat elements gains advantages similar to those of night attack. 
In order not to betray the crossing attempt by the sound of exgine 
powered pontons, the normal procedure is to take the first wave 
across by rowirig, unless the width of the river renders such a method 
impractical. However, the element of surprise is seldom attained 
along- the entire crossing sector in river crossing operations. In most 
cases prior preparations for forced crossing under support of artil- 
lery and heavy infantry weapons must be made, as it may be necessary 



Ik 



to change from a surprise crossing to a forced crossing. The comr- 
bination of surprise attack and all-out assault was called sudden 
attack (KYUSHU) by the Japanese Army, 

In both river crossing and amphibious operations, carry- 
ing across or putting ashore the bulk of the coiibat force before 
daybreak is highly desirable. Moonlight nights should be avoided 
in amphibious operations. 

k. There are numerous other cases in which utilization of 
darkness is recommended by the Japanese Army. To outflank the enemy 
position secretly during the night and attack the flank or rear at 
daybreak or to carry out supply transport and troop movements in 
rear areas in order to avoid enemy observation and hostile air attack 
are typical examples of the utilization of darkness. The movement 
of a large force over a long distance, including the assembly, march, 
and deployment with the operation extended over several nights has 
been used to good advantage in some instances. The strategic sur- 
prise achieved by the First Army in the battle of Chung-Yuan describ- 
ed in Example No. 4 was accomplished mainly through application of 

■» 

this method* The night was also utilized in assaulting pillboxes 
and in clearing artificial barriers by infantry and engineers* 



75 



Author* s Note: 

The fundamental rules for assaulting pillboxes were described in 
Part 4 of the Field Service Regulations for Operations, Unfortuna- 
tely, this document is not available, as it was destroyed at the time 
of the surrender.^ The methods described, although seemingly elemen- 
tary, were actually very effective. As an illustration of their 
effectiveness, the following story is told about Part 4 and its author, 
ex-Major General Miyano; 

n The substance of Part 4, including the section on assaulting 
pillboxes, was originally conceived by Major General Miyano in 1933, 
but the methods advocated were not accepted by the General Staff on 
the grounds that they were too elementary. When Major General Miyano 
visited Germany, later in 1933, he was asked by the German General 
Staff for suggestions on how to penetrate the Maginot Line. At that 
time he recommended the assault tactics he had conceived earlier. The 
German General Staff adopted his recommendations and succeeded in 
breaking thro u#v the Maginot Line in 1940. When this news reached 
Japan, the Japanese General Staff adopted the assault methods cone eiv- 
ed by Major General Miyano and made them Part 4 of the Field Service 
Regulations for Operations. H 

1. Editor's Note: 

Although reported to have been destroyed, a copy of Part 4 of 
the Field Service Regulations was located by research consultants 
employed by the Japanese Research Division. Translation is included 
as Appendix V* 



76 



The methods advocated in Part 4 called for a dawn or dusk sur*- 
prise attack, with penetration in depth, by a battalion* Tochkas 
were by-passed and the attacking and neutralizing of those pillboxes 
were accomplished by specially trained and equipped Tochka Attack 
Units, composed of 30 to 40 infantrymen and engineers. 

The assault tactics of the Tochka Attack Units and its component 
groups were divided into four phases: 

a. Neutralization firing directed against pillbox firing 
slits by the Support Group (snipers and light machine guns) and light 
artillery* 

b* Demolition of obstacles by Obstacle Demolition Group 
(wire cutters and clearers as well as demolition teams). Heavy artil- 
lery was also employed to clear obstacles and soften up tochkas, 

c. Placement of demolition charges on and in tochkas by 
Assault Group. 

d. Mop-up of personnel inside tochkas by Assault or Beserve 

Group. 

Flame throwing tanks ("SO**) operated by special engineer groups 
("KI*) were also employed against tochkas. The use of regular assault 
tanks in lieu of light artillery in firing on slits was contemplated, 
although normal employment called for their use in support of the 
break-through of the main body* 



77 



CHAPTER IV 
Training in Night Combat 
Section A. General Training 

1. Reference materials used for writing this chapter are: 
Infantry Manual 

Night Movement Training Manual 
(Yakan Kodo Kyoiku no Sanko) 
(Published in May 1936 by the Infantry School) 

Infantry Training Manual (Volume IV) 
(Hohei Kyoren no Sanko) 

(Published in June 1941 by the Infantry School) 

Individual Combat Training Manual 
(Sento Kakko Kyoren no Sanko) 

(Published in December 1937 by the Infantry School) 

Night Attack Manual 
(Yakan Kogeki no Sanko) 

(Published in September 1944 by the Inspectorate General 
of Military Training) 

Maneuver Guide 
(Enshu Binran) 

(Published in February 1944 by the Military Academy) 

Night Observation Training Manual 

(Yakan Shiryoku Zoshin Kunren no Sanko) 
(Published in March 1944 by the Inspectorate General of 
Military Training) 

Infantry Position Construction Manual (Volumes I & II) 
(Hohei Chikujo) 

(Published in August 1941 by the Infantry School) 

Field Fortification Manual (Volumes I & II) 
(Yasen Chikujo Kyohan) 

(Published in March 1944 by ttye Inspectorate General of 
Military Training) 

Field Fortification Manual (Volume I, Supplement) 
(Yasen Chikujo Kyohan) 

(Published in October 1944 by the Inspectorate General 
of Military Training) 



79 



2. That training in night combat in the Japanese Army occupied 
a very important part of the training program is evident from the 
emphasis placed on it in the Infantry Manual. The manual stressed 
that "The infantrymen must be especially proficient in night combat. 
For this reason the infantrymen must attain a degree of proficiency 
equal to daylight combat through repeated training and exercises. 
Mastery of taking advantage of the dawn and dusk is also vital. n The 
phrase "especially proficient" is the strongest of all expressions of 
this sort, and the phrase "the proficiency equal to the daylight com- 
bat' 1 means to attach to night combat training equal importance with 
daylight combat training. In other branches, too, considerable stress 
was placed on training for night action, although not so much as in 
the infantry. 

3. In the night combat training of infantry, the emphasis was 
laid on offensive action, with the surprise attack being stressed. 
The reason for the emphasis probably stemmed from the fact that the 
basic concept of night attacks invariably contemplated a surprise 
attack followed by close combat, fire power being considered of 
secondary significance - although both the Field Service Regulations 
for Operations and the Infantry Manual approved the night attack with 
use of fire power. 

Therefore, in combat training much effort was exerted in 
how to attack the enemy by surprise under concealment of darkness. 
Such measures as sound prevention, blackouts, silent marches, silent 



80 



orders, and silent assault are all designed to take the enemy by sur- 
prise, concealing our intention and movements. 

Great efforts were put into the basic training to overcome 
the disadvantages of the night. Training eyes and ears, finding 
bearings and maintaining direction in darkness, movement in various 
terrain at night, assault firing, and maintaining control at night 
were included in the training program. 

Mental conditioning for the night attack was centered on an 
undaunted fighting spirit, firm unity, boldness and a strong sense 
of responsibility* 

4. Night combat training by the Japanese Army in peacetime was 
conducted parallel to the daylight combat training. The progress 
attained in the daylight training was utilized in the night combat / 
training, sometimes conducted intensively by designating a "night 
combat training week." Generally, however, it was conducted progres- 
sively with daylight training during the training year* ^^^^ 

The training year of the Japanese Army began in December and 
ended in November of the following year. This training year 'was divid- 
ed into three periods: The first period (December to March), the 
second period (April to July), and the third period (August to Novem- 
ber)* (The training year system was formulated by taking into con- 
sideration the mobilization plan, which began from April of each year. 
The recruits who completed the training of the first period in March 
were listed in the mobilization plan as combat ready soldiers.) 



81 



The company commander in charge of the training of recruits prepared 
the training program for each period based on the Military Training 
Guide. The examples of night combat training during each period of a 
typical training year for the rifle company of an infantry regiment 
Is given in Chart Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 

The number of hours allotted to the night combat training of 
the infantry throughout the training year was approximately one-fourth 
of the total hours for training, although training for daylight com-* 
bat was applicable to night combat to a considerable extent. 

5. Special equipment used by the infantry in training and actual 
combat at night were as follows: 

a. For maintenance of direction and course marking: Luminous 
compass , route marker, lime, tape, rope, and marker light. 

b. For control, contact, and sign: Small white flag, 
luminous watch, whistle, contact rope, luminous marker (used by com- 
mander), white sash, white belt, white cloth, position marker light, 
blinder light, flashlight, and signal cartridge. 

c. For reading maps an<4 documents: Dim light, flashlight, 
and luminous mirror. 

d. For sound prevention: Cloth, straw, or other material 
for wrapping the metal p^rts of the bayonet, canteen, mess kit, saber, 
shovel, pick, and hobnail of shoes. 

e. For use in attack: Smoke candle, self projecting smoke 
candle, wire cutter, sandbag, movable barrier, and individual camou- 
flage net. 

82 



Chart No. 1-a 



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83 



Chart No. 1-b 



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to 


13th Week 
(23 Feb-1 Mar) 


Route marking 

1. Road markers 

2. Other markers 
Silent march 

1. Movement by signal. 
2» Action to be taken 
vfaen exposed to light. 
3» Action to be taken 
when exposed to fire. 


March 

Runners and 
connecting files 






Hrs 











12th Week 
(16-S2 Feb) 


Orientation 

Maintenance of direction 
1* By celestial bodies 
2. By compass 
3* By terrain objects 
and features 








Hrs 










A* "2" 

©fa 


Distance estimation 

1. By pace 

2. By eye 

3. By sound 








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8U 



Chart No. 1-e 



Notes : 

1. Special attention will be given to the following matters to ob- 
tain better results in the training for night combat. 

a. Accomplishments in daylight training will be utilized in 
night training to the fullest extent. 

b. Proficiency in training for night combat will be improved 
through simulated night conditions. 

c. In general, no training will be scheduled for the afternoon 
preceding and the morning following night training in order 
to achieve a high degree of proficiency in the night train- 
iJig. 

2. The mental state essential for night training will be developed 
along with combat training. Bayonet exercise will be encouraged 
during off duty hours to improve skill and develop a strong 
fighting spirit. 

3. In order to further improve the combat efficiency of individual 
soldiers, each squad will repeat night training during unschedul- 
ed time*. 

4. The Period 1 Inspection will be conducted in the early part of 
April. 

* Periods allotted on KTG for review and extra training. 
N. B. 

Charts were prepared by the following ex-officers who were train- 
ing officers in the 15th Infantry Regiment about 1935. 

Ex-Lt Col Tokunagsij Hachiro 

Ex-Lt Col Maruyama, Yoshiharu 

Ex-Lt Col Matsushita, Sansei 



87 



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Chart No* 2-b 



Hrs 










7th Week 
(11-17 May) 


Occupation of defensive 
position and defensive 
combat by a platoon 

■ 








Hrs 




to 




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6th Week 
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in patrol 
patrol 








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Training 

duties 






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Assault after clearing 
obstacles (switching 
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secrecy) 


Outguards i 
Training in sentry 
duties 






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Chart No, 2- d 



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(22-28 Jun) 




Outpost training 
Measures to be t 
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gas 








Hrs 










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12th Week 
(15-21 Jun) 






Dummy thrusting 
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Hrs 


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Attack against weak 
position 


Outpost reserve 

Training in conversion 
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(Field maneuver and 
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91 



Chart No. 2-e 



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92 



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Chart No* 2-g 



Notes: 

1. Special emphasis will be placed on the following points to obtain 
better results in the training for night, 

a. The accomplishments of daylight training will be utilized in 
night training as much as possible ♦ 

b. Night training will be facilitated by preliminary training in 
the daylight, 

c. Depending on the nature of the night training, no training 
should be scheduled on the afternoon preceding and the morn- 
ing following night training in order to achieve a high 
degree of proficiency in the night. 

2. The mental state essential for the efficient soldiers in night 
combat will be developed along with combat training. Bayonet 
exercise will be encouraged during off duty hours to improve skill 
and develop a strong fighting spirit, 

3. Efforts will be made to schedule the training so that the night 
training can be conducted on the company drill day (normally 
every Tuesday and Friday). 

4. The Period 2 Inspection will be conducted at the maneuver ground; 
the company exercise (security, reconnaissance and others 
included) in the latter part of May and the battalion exercise 
(security, reconnaissance and others included) around middle of 
June. 



9h 



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(21-27 Sep) 


Joint maneuver 
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• 




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8th Week 
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Company early 

daim attack 
Conversion 
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light attack 








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(7-13 Sep) 






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Joint maneuver 
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Training 
Hours 



96 



Chart No* 3-c 



Hrs 




13th Week 
(19-25 Oct) 




Hrs 




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12th Week 
(12-18 Oct) 




Forced march and 
village bivouac 






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to 






CO 


11th Week 
(5-11 Oct) 


Battalion night 

attack 

Attack by a 
unit disposed 
in assault 
echelons 








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10th Week 
(28 Sep-4 Oct) 




March with 
military 

precautions ! 






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97 



Chart No* 3-d 



Hrs 










17th Week 
(16-22 Nov) 






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98 



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Chart No. 3-f 



Notes: 

1. Special emphasis will be placed on the following points to obtain 
better results in the training for night. 

a. The accomplishments in the daylight training will be utilized 
in the night training as much as possible. 

b. The night trainiJig will be facilitated by the preliminary 
training in the daylight for the night training. 

c. Depending on the nature of the night training, the afternoon 
preceding and the morning following the night -training should 
not be used for the daylight training in order to achieve a 
high degree of proficiency in the night training. 

2. The mental state essential for the efficient soldiers in night 
combat will be developed along with the combat training. Especial- 
ly the bayonet exercise wilL be encouraged during the off duty 
hours to improve the skill and a strong fighting spirit. 

3. Efforts will be made to schedule the training so that the night 
training can be conducted on the company drill day (normally every 
Thesday and Friday). 

4. The training during the division's autumn maneuver will be con- 
ducted according to the maneuver schedule of the division. Any 
part of the training found to be unsatisfactory during the maneu- 
vers will be corrected in the supplementary training which will be* 
conducted before the expiration of the current training period* 



100 



f . For use in defense: Searchlight , flare and movable 

barrier. 

g. For elementary training: Dark eyeglasses. 

Individual Training, General 
The object of night training for the individual is to make the 
night combat training of units possible. 

The Infantry Manual gives the following points as vital object- 
ives of night training. 

{!) To train soldiers in the ability to discover the 
eneipy quickly and to estimate their strength, distance and movements. 

(2) To develop soldiers in the ability to correctly 
identify terrain features and objects and to make the best possible 
use of them. 

(3) To train soldiers in orientation and the ability 
to reach the desired point by maintaining direction through the aid 

of conspicuous landmarks or other terrain features and objects observ- 
ed during the daytime, 

(4) To train soldiers in the method of silent march, 
noise prevention, movement by signals, and the action to be taken 
when exposed to light. 

(5) To train soldiers in movement in various situations 
and terrains, by crawling or rapid and daring advance. 

(6) To train soldiers in bold and silent assault at 
night and in the throwing hand grenades. 



101 



(7) To train soldiers in preparing for night firing and 
in effective night firing even when there is no advance preparation, 

1. Vision Training and Camouflage 

In training eyesight at night, it is essential to adapt the 
eyes to darkness . Experiments indicated that the eyes adjust gradual- 
ly to the darkness, with the maximum night sight of a person general- 
ly being reached in about 30 minutes to an hour. It was also deter- 
mined that the maximum night sight of individuals can be developed to 
a considerable extent by constant training. 

The next step is to adapt the eyes of the trainee to the 
appearance of various objects at night and to enable them to correctly 
identify the objects. Groves of small pine trees are often mistaken 
for enemy patrols and a low bank is sometimes taken for an enemy 
column. Small natural objects unnoticed during the daytime are some- 
times mistaken for enemy soldiers. 

2. The second phase of training vision at night was concerned 
with moonlight - the variations of visibility according to the age 
and slant of the moon, the relative position of the moon, the object 
and the observer, the weather, particularly the cloud conditions, the 
background and condition of the objects. 

The results of experiments conducted on the Visibility Range 
by well trained soldiers at the Infantry School are shown in Chart 
Nos 4 and 5- Noteworthy in Chart No. 5 is that the visible range 
differs greatly according to whether the observer faces the moon or 
has the moon behind him. 

102 



Chart No. 4-: 



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Chart No. 5 



Visibility on Moonlight Nights 

i 


Object 


Single Solider 


Unit 




Halted 


Facing moon 


190 meters 


264 meters 


Standing 
Position 


With moon behind 


115 11 


113 


11 


In motion 


Facing moon 


223 w 


310 


n 




With moon behind 


121 n 


151 


ct 




Halted 


Facing moon 


128 » 


171 


n 


Kneeling 
Position 


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69 11 


102 


11 


In motion 


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184 


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With moon behind 


75 » 


76 


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Halted 


Facing moon 


79 n 


127 


ft 


Prone 


With moon behind 


41 n 


56 


ft 


Position 


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Facing moon 


83 M 


131 


ft 




With moon behind 


45 11 


59 


if 


Notes: 












1. Soldiers employed in the experiment were equipped with full 
pack and camouflaged. 

The unit was approximately a squad in extended order. 


2. 16th day of the moon (Full Moon), position 60 degrees from 
the ground, no background. Ground covered with grass 30 
centimeters high. There was no haze, but a high percentage 
of humidity. 


3. Visibility vfaen the observer faces the moon is half as great 
as when the observer has the moon behind him. 


4. It is almost impossible to determine colours even in bright 
moonlight. Recognition except at very close range is by 
silhouette or outline. 



105 




B. When the moon is behind the observer 



Moon 




Observer 



106 



3. The third phase of vision training at night is the applica- 
tion of training acquired in the first and second phases in approach- 
ing the enemy without being discovered, care to be exercised in the 
reconnaissance mission, and utilization of terrain features and ob^- 
jects and selection of direction in carrying out a successful assault. 

In this phase of training the soldier learned that the use 
of lights and smoking at night are undesirable, not only for the con- 
cealment but for adaptation of eyesight. The importance of covering 
the metal parts of swords, steel helmets, rifles, and bayonets with 
cloth or other materials in order to prevent reflection in the moon- 
light or enemy illumination was also taught. 

In scanning for enemy soldiers, it is advisable to look up- 
ward from a lower position in order to silhouette them against the 
sky. Men on patrol should occasionally lie down on the ground and 
scan all directions for suspicious objects. 

4. Camouflage is used at night to prevent reflection of moon- 
light and to disguise the silhouette of the figure to make identifica- 
tion more difficult. 

5. The "Night Observation Training Manual" published in March 
1944, was based on studies undertaken at the Army Medical School and 
experiments at the Toyama Army School. Although this manual was not 
widely used in the night training of Army units, it contained valuable 
data. The principal object of this manual was training in off-center 
vision. The manual admitted that the night vision can be improved by 



107 



The Japanese Research Division does not guarantee the medical 
accuracy of the following optical discussion* 



108 



training other than the off-center vision method, but it stressed that 
by following this method, night vision can be increased from two to 
six times. 

Off-center vision is using that portion of the retina where 
the red cells (rods) which enable the eye to see objects in the dark 
are in the greatest number. In light, the central part of the fundus 
of the retina (where cones are in the largest number) performs the 
chief visual function, but in the dark the part surrounding the central 
part of the fundus of the retina performs the visual function. This 
is illustrated in the following diagram. 

Diagram of Eyeball 




i 



L - - Retina 
Fundus of Eyeball 




Yellow spot 

Greater number of cones 



\ Greater number of rods 



109 



In order to achieve the maximum vision at night, one should not 
look directly at the object, fixing the center line of sight directly 
as in the daytime, but look at an angle to the object. This angle 
depends on the amount of light, in full moon the angle should be 
about 7.5 degrees whereas on a starlight night the angle should be 
about 10 degrees off center. Off-center vision is not effective when 
it is lighter than 0*02 luces. The comparison between the visual 
power (the visual power of the central part of the fundus of the 
retina) in direct vision and the visual power (the visual power of the 
part surrounding central part of the fundus of the retina) in the off- 
center vision in various degrees of illumination, and the angles of 
proper off-center vision are shown in the following chart. 



^•s. Illumination 
(luces) 

Vision 


0.02 


0.01 


0.005 


0.002 
(Full 
Moon) 


0.001 


0.0002 
(Star- 
lit 
Night) 


0.0001 


0.00002 


Visual Power of 
Direct Vision 


0.11 


0.048 


0.03 


0.017 


0.009 


0.0046 


0.0032 


0.0022 


Off-center 
Vision 


Off-center 

Angle 

(degrees) 


3.5 


5 


6 


7.5 


9.0 


10.0 


12.0 


13.0 


Visual 
Power 


0.12 


0.09 


0.07 


0.052 


0.035 


0.024 


0.018 


0.013 


Ratio of the Visual 
Power ©f Off-center 
Vision to Direct 
Vision 


1.1 


1.9 


2.3 


3.05 


3.9 


5.0 


5.8 


6.0 



110 



In an experiment conducted at the Toyama Army School, several 
officers and non-commissioned officers underwent off-center vision 
training for two hours every night for one week, and it was found 
that their visual power on a starlit night had nearly doubled. 

The manual also gives the following results of experiments on 
dark adaptation, and states that for practical purposes one hour is 
required to adapt the eyes to darkness. 



Sensitivity of the Retina 
to the Light in Dark Adaptation 



Sensitivity 
10,000 

1,000 
100 
10 



■B 



CO 
0) 



8 



<0 

13 



o 



CO 
0) 



TO 

o 



.8 



Q O 

































f i i i i r 







to 
u 

CM 



CO 

u 
d 
o 



Remarks: Point (a) indicates that the sensitivity to light is 
increased by 10,000 times after 20 minutes of dark 
adaptation. 



Ill 



The manual stresses the importance of taking into consideration 
the time required in dark adaptation in preparing schedules for sentry 
and patrol duties. It also points out that special caution must be 
exercised in using lights at night because eyes adapted to darkness 
•would immediately return to their original condition when exposed to 
light, even for a short time, and would require about one hour to 
adapt to darkness again. 

Section B. Training in Hearing and Noise Prevention 

1. The main purpose of training in hearing is to familiarize 
soldiers with battlefield sounds so that they may correctly judge its 
cause, direction and distance. The footsteps of a single soldier or 
a group of soldiers, the sounds made by handling individual arms and 
equipment by soldiers on the march or starting the march must all be 
identified. The noises incident to constructing positions and ob- 
stacles, the sounds of voices in conversation, characteristic sounds 
of various weapons when fired, airplane, tank and truck noises, and 
the sounds of communication apparatus must be demonstrated and sol- 
diers adequentLy trained to identify them correctly. 

2. Sounds of footsteps and engines in the distance can easily 
be caught by placing the ear to the ground. WelL -trained soldiers 
should be able to estimate the number of enemy soldiers by the sound 
of footsteps, although this method may often result in overestimation. 

Attention must be paid also to the resulting of leaves, 
animal noises, and the sound of the wind. Barking dogs may indicate 



112 



troops passing through a village and the sudden stopping of insects' 
singing may indicate an approaching enemy. 

When the wind is strong, it is especially difficult to hear 
sounds in forests or koaliang fields and sounds do not carry in dense 
fog. Men on guard duty must be particularly vigilant under these con- 
ditions. 

3. Soldiers moving at night must take every care to prevent 
making noise. They must: 

a. Secure equipment firmly. 

b. Prevent rattling of articles in the pack by wrapping 
them with cloth and bind mess gear securely with cloth or straw around 
the handle. 

c. Put the mess gear in the holdall or haversack when the- 
pack is not carried. Separate the wood and netal parts of the shovel 
and secure them under the belt separately. 

d. Completely fill the canteen to prevent noise. 

e. Stuff ammunition pouches and chests with paper in order 
to prevent rattling. Wrap the bayonet sheath with cloth or enclose 
the sheath in a cloth bag. 

f. Refrain from needless conversation and coughing; signs and 
gestures should be used at night. Orders, information, or reports 
which must be given orally should be in a whisper. 

g. When marching over a hard-surfaced road, step lightly in 
order to prevent noise. Walk on the soft shoulder of the road, if 



113 



possible and, if necessary, muffle noise by covering the shoes with 
straw rope or cloth. 

Section C. Distance Estimation and Utilization of Terrain Features and 
Objects 

1. Estimating distance is difficult at night , but is necessary 
on memy occasions. For instance, in approaching the enemy position 
at night, one must know his position in relation to the enemy and for 
this purpose the direction and distance of advance from the startirg 
point are often estimated and the position oriented on the map. The 
distance from the starting point is usually measured by pace, which 
is fairly accurate even at night, although the margin of error great- 
ly increases when the terrain is rough or sloped and overestimation 
of distance may result. 

2. Great distances cannot be estimated by the eye, at night, 
but the ability to accurately estimate a short distance is vital. 
For instance, the distance to weapons being fired, to the enemy or 
position to be assaulted, for throwing hand grenades and the distance 
to the counterattacking enemy force must often be determined at a 
glance. 

Distance to or from flash and illumination is likely to be 
underestimated, at night whereas the distance to or size of obstacles 
and terrain features are likely to be overestimated. Estimating dis- 
tance or measuring at night also varies greatly according to the 
degree of darkness and the posture of the individual. Consequently 

11U 



training must be conducted in various degrees of darkness and in dif- 
ferent postures, especially the prone position. 

3. Training must be given in estimating distance by sound as 
well as by vision. When a single shot is fired at a considerable dis- 
tance, estimation may be made by measurii^g the time required for the 
sound of the shot to be heard after the flash is observed. 

4. Proper appreciation of the differences between the night and 
daylight in the utilization of terrain features and objects is vital. 

Movement over flat and open ground is restricted by enemy 
fire during daylight but becomes comparatively easy at night. High 
ground commanding an excellent view in daylight may become an unfavor- 
able spot at night because movement may be silhouetted against the 
sky. In many cases, the objects conspicuous in the daytime, particu- 
larly if distinguished because of color, become inconspicuous at night 
and can no longer be utilized. Grass and bushes, utilized for conceal- 
ment in the daytime, sometimes becomes a hindrance at night and, impede 
maintenance of secrecy. 

At night, a break in the ground or a river becomes a greater 
obstacle and movement through woods and some types of terrain, which 
offer excellent concealment during the daytime, becomes very difficult. 

Section D. Orientation and Maintenance of Direction 

1. All officers and men must acquire the ability to orient them- 
selves and maintain direction. The heavenly bodies, compass, route 



115 



markers (Keiroki), and other aids are used in orientation training, 

a. The principal heavenly bodies used in orientation are 
the moon, the North Star, and familiar constellations. 

b. When a compass is used, particular stress must be placed 
on correcting the variation. The route marker is used for recording 
the .direction and distance covered. (The route marker is used only 

bjf guide patrols and others havirjg a specific mission as special train- 
ing is required for its use.) 

c. In the Northern Hemisphere, houses and trees generally 
face south and the ridges and furrows in the fields are usually made 
in the east-west direction. When there is a snowfall, north can be 
determined by observing the manner in which the snow melts. Direction 
can be also determined when the prevailing wind is known. However, 
all these vary considerably according to the theater of operations, 
and it is essential to give troops training in conditions peculiar to 
the theater before commencing operations. 

2. Direction can be maintained at night by the methods describ- 
ed, but the following points are important. 

a* Daytime preparation is vital. When the compass is used, 
the angle between the direction of advance and the magnetic north 
must be studied and memorized. It will be particularly advantageous 
to bear in mind the destination in relation to some easily recogniz- 
able terrain objects such as a mountain top, a single tree, or iso- 
lated house. Maintaining direction would be further facilitated by 



116 



memorizing the location and directions of roads, railroads, electric 
wires, streams, openings in the ground, and other objects which would 
be encountered en route to the destination. 

b. Direction is likely to be lest when bypassing obstalces 
and, because of the psychologies! effect, when subjected to enemy fire 
or flares. 

Section E. Movement Training 

1. Since night movement is vital to a successful night assault, 
the training in silent marching, crawling, daring advance, movement 
through difficult ground, and actions to be taken when caught in 
flares is important* 

2* The following points must be stressed in silent movement 
training. 

a. The strict observance of noise prevention. 

b. Control by signals . 

Night movements are usually controlled by ara-^and-hand 
signals and each soldier must be trained to make all movements on 
signal* Each man must constantly watch the commander and the man 
next to him for relayed signals. 

3. At night, crawling is the most suitable method for advancing 
silently to reconnoiter the enemy or to dear enemy obstacles, and 
for advancing under enemy fire or flares. Soldiers must be trained 
in four methods of crawling. 



117 



a. Method 1: 

A method of moving forward bearing the weight on the 
left leg, below the knee, and the p&lm of the left hand. While this 
is the fastest method, because the position of the body is high and 
because noise is more likely to be made, this method is used at a 
comparatively long distance from the enemy position. 

b. Method 2: 

In this method the body is moved forward carrying the 
weight on the left elbow and right toe, with the left hip touching 
the ground. The advantages of this method are virtually the same as 
in Method 1. 

c. Method 3: 

In this method the body is moved forward with the weight 
on the left elbow and right toe, with the stomach touching the ground. 
This method "is quiet and is used when advancing close to the enemy. 

d. Method 4: 

In this method the body is moved forward on both elbows 
and both toes, with the body flat on the ground. The body may be 
propelled by using both elbows and both toes simultaneously or using 
the left elbow and toes and the right elbow and toes alternately. 
This is the slowest method and is used by obstacle clearing teams and 
others when silence is most vital. 

In the first three methods, the rifle is held with the 
right hand but in the fourth method it is cradled in both arms or 
held horizontally with both hands. 



118 



4. "Daring Advance" is a rapid and resolute advance. This new 
method was originated especially f or the rapid movement required in 
night attacks when shifting from a surprise attack to a forced attack, 
when advancing immediately before rushing, or when advancing within 
the enemy position. 

The daring advance resembles the rapid walk in most respects. 
However, speed is increased by lowering the center of gravity of the 
body, by taking slightly longer steps, and by swinging the left arm 
harder. Pressure is applied to the lower abdomen and the hip is pulled 
forward. The eyes are fixed on the head gear of the soldier ahead and 
never at the ground. 

The rifle is held with the right hand just forward of the 

i 

balance with the wrist pressed lightly against the hip* Although the 
rate of advance varies with the ground, it should be 7 to 8 kilometers 
an hour. Developing the spirit to advance resolutely should be stres- 
sed in the daring advance training. 

5. Gene rally speaking, double time is inadvisable at night be- 
cause the soldiers are likely to stumble and break formation, making 
noise. However, double time for short distances is used in rushing 
the enemy. For this reason the training in double time at night is 
conducted in conjunction with night assault training. 

In double time at night, the leg muscles should be relaxed, 
and the feet lifted a little higher and brought down on the ground 
toe first. 



119 



6. In night movement training, special emphasis should be 
placed on walking through difficult terrain. 

a. In rough or rocky ground, the foot is brought down gently, 
heel first, and then the body weight is gradually placed on the out- 
side of the foot in order to avoid stumbling and making any sound. 

b. In a silent walk over grassy land, it is better to lift 
the forward foot higher, reduce the pace, and take longer steps. 

c. In a silent walk through kaoliang fields or shrub- 
covered fields, the kaoliang or shrubs must be held aside to avoid 
noise. 

However, the darirjg advance through a kaoliang field or 
a shrub-covered area must be made resolutely, ignoring obstacles. 

d. Silent night movement across or over a ground openirjg, 
small streams, ditches, embankments, or other natural obstacles is 
comparatively easy, but the formation is likely to be broken. Conse- 
quently, cooperation between men is especially vital. 

e. Gaps in enemy wire must be passed with the greatest pos- 
sible speed. Training in passing over the enemy wire quickly by lay- 
ing boards or other material over it is essential. 

f. Training in ascending and descending mountains, fording 
rivers, and passing through forests is also necessaiy. 

7. Actions of the individual caught in the light of a flare are 
also taught. 

a. When caught in a flare, soldiers will halt and drop to 



120 



the ground only when the signal is given by the commander. 

b. Dropping to the ground must be done silently* Soldiers 
must not move while lying prone , but must watch the commander and 
the direction of the enemy with the head to the ground while care- 
fully protecting the eyes. 

c. When caught in a strong flare, soldiers must not look 
at it directly because of the blinding effect. If possible, they 
should wear smoked glasses or cover their eyes, 

d. When caught in a flare at a short distance from the 
eneiry, the soldiers should assault without delay. 

Section F. Assault Trainirjg 

1.. Assault training is particularly essential for developing 
confidence in night combat and is conducted in close conjunction 
with bayonet drill. 

2. Two methods of rushing, silent or forced, may be used. 

a. Silent rushing is conducted following a silent and cau- 
tious approach, with the rifle held in readiness and the enemy being 
rushed from close proximity. 

The method of rushing is employed by a single soldier, 
a patrol, or other small body in surprising an enemy sentry or guard. 

b. Force rushing is conducted following the daring advance, 
with the rifle held in readiness and the enemy being rushed on the 
double. This method is commonly used in assault by a unit of platoon 
or company size. 



121 



c. When assaulting searchlights, covered machine gun em* 
placements, or when counterattacking, it is often advantageous to 
rush the enemy after checking him by throwing hand grenades. In 
assault training of this type, emphasis is placed on tiie proper judge- 
ment of throwing distance and in rushing immediately after the ex- 
plosion of the grenade. 

3. Training in hand-to-hand combat at night should be conducted 
in close conjunction with bayonet exercise and should be given on 
rough ground as well as flat terrain. It should also include hand-to- 
hand combat against several men, and bayonetirg while advancing. It 
must be remembered that in dose quarters combat at night the distance 
to the enemy soldier is likely to be underestimated and that stabs are 
likely to be made from too far a. distance. 

Section G. Training in Night Firing 

Japanese infantrymen were trained in night firing mainly for 
general defense and for holding newly captured ground following a 
night assault. Although the Japanese Army believed that night firing 
was far less effective than daylight firing, it was aware of the great 
effectiveness of close range night firing when properly conducted. 

Two methods were stressed in the infantry night firing. One was 
plotting the fire to cover a special target or a target area by fixing 
the rifle before dark. The other was to fire parallel to the ground 
when firing was necessary immediately after a night assault or in 
similar instances. These methods are not peculiar to the Japanese 



122 



Army, but are common to the modern armies of the world and will not 
be discussed in detail. 

Although the general rule was that the infantry did not fire 
during a night assault, the Toyama Army School in Tokyo did experi- 
ment with firing in close combat and firing from the hip in daylight 
assault, but the method was not adopted for night assault. 

Section H. Night Training Mottoes 

The Japanese Army believed that the memorizing and frequent re- 
ference to mottoes, not only aided in teaching, bub was also an im- 
portant morale factor. 

1. Mottoes for night combat: 

"The night is one million reinforcements. 11 (Emphasis on 
the advantage of night.) 

"Firing in the dark is sure to miss." (Encouragement of 
boldness and calmness.) 

"Suspicion will create a bugbear." (Caution against fear.) 

"A dog bays the moon and a thousand curs follow suit." 
(Caution against panic at night.) 

"Don't hear the enemy in every leaf that rustles." 
(Caution against panic at night.) 

"Don't rely on your bullets, rely on your bayonet." 
(Emphasis on the effectiveness of hand-to-hand combat.) 

"Untrained comrades are more to be feared than the enemy." 
(Emphasis on military training.) 



123 



2. Mottoes concerning mental attitudes of commanders and men: 
"Lead at the van or from a prominent place." (Leadership 

encouragement. ) 

"When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." (Caution 
against panic. ) 

"One man's carelessness is the whole array's loss." (Stress 
on sense of responsibility.) 

3. Mottoes concerning night movement: 

"Move onward regardless of fallen comrades." (Emphasis on 
boldness. ) 

"Heed the enemy flares, but ignore the enemy fire." 
(Emphasis on secrecy and daring*) 

"Lower your hip and bring your feet down vertically. 11 (The 
method of moving through rough ground.) 

"Don't glance aside during the daring advance." (Emphasis 
on boldness.) 

"No sudden halt or sudden advance." (Prevention of confu- 
sion. ) 

"Time is a vital factor in movement." (Emphasis on import- 
ance of synchronizing timing.) 

4. Others 

"Be cautious of the direction in which no enenqy can be seen," 
(Stress on the importance of exercising caution in all directions.) 

"Moving objects are often overestimated in number." (Cau- 
tion against overestimating enemy strength.) 



12U 



"Fire and light appear close at night." (Caution against 
underestimating distance at night. ) 

"When lost among the enenjy, wait until dawn." (Caution 
against panic. ) 

"It is easy to get lost in a forest or village." (Stress 
the importance of selecting a proper route of advance.) 

"Prepare for night before dark and prepare for daylight be- 
fore dawn." (Emphasis on the importance of adecjiate preparations.) 

"Hold on to your gun and equipment." (Caution against loss.) 

"Don't leave articles, clean the place before leaving." 
(Caution against the loss of articles and the betrayal of intentions 
to enemy intelligence.) 

Section I* Unit Training 

1. In general, the basic combat training of the Japanese infan- 
try was completed at company level. Unit training on battalion level 
or above was conducted primarily in cooperation with infantry heavy 
weapons, or the units of other branches. 

This general rule also applied to night combat and in the 
night assault when, the company attacked independently or as an ele- 
ment of a battalion, it was believed that the success of the attack 
depended on how well the company was trained. Squad training was be- 
gun when individual training had progressed satisfactorily. The 
squad training then progressed through platoon training to company 
training ♦ 



125 



2. The unit training on company level was based primarily on 
the Infantry "Training Manual, but details of the training were also 
drawn from the manuals published by the Infantry School. The follow- 
ing excerpts from the section on company training in the Infantry 
Training Manual concerning reconnaissance of the enemy situation and 
terrain as a preparation for a night attack will illustrate to what 
detail the training was conducted. 



tion of the attack objective in relation to it's surroundings, location 
and size and type of obstacles and flank defenses, the terrain in 
front of and within the enemy position, routes of approach, existence 
of contaminated areas. 



a. Reconnaissance objectives: Enemy disposition, the loca- 



b. 



Reconnaissance methods: 



(i) 



Personal observation by the company commander. 



(2) 



Continuous observation by the company command sec- 



tion. 



(3) 



Observation by subordinate platoons. 



(4) 



Dispatch of patrols. 



(5) 



Forward observation points. 



(6) 



Contact with the observation organization of other 



units, particularly heavy weapons and artillery. 



c. The following points are important in reconnaissance. 



(l) The company commander must conduct coordinated re- 



connaissance. 



126 



(2) Frontal reconnaissance will be made whenever possi- 
ble* However, observation of the target from several directions is 
also essential. 

(3) Because the situation in the enemy position is often 
revealed when the enemy opens fire on observation patrols > such op- 
portunities may be used to reconnoiter the enemy, 

(4) When the location of the enemy has been reconnoiter- 
ed, the distance and the angle from a clearly defined terrain features 
(reference points) must be measured as accurately as possible, 

(5) Information obtained from various means of reconnais- 
sance must be entered on maps, sketches, and photomaps as obtained, 

(6) In long range observation, in undulating terrain, 
caution must be exercised since valleys, ravines, and openings in the 
foreground cannot be seen and distance is likely to be underestimated 
and frontage overestimated, 

(7) Caution must be exercised not to betray intentions 
through careless movements and open use of glasses or range finding 
instruments, 

3, The main objects of company night combat training were the 
control and the maintenance of direction and guidance by the company 
commander as well as the assault made under the company commander's 
leadership. 

The Japanese stressed that the company was the basic spiri- 
tual unit and should be a family whose head is the company commander. 



127 



It was said that a glance at a company training in night attack was 
enough to see whether the unity in the company was firm. 

4. In night attack, the battalion commander normally approached 
the eneiny directly commanding the main body of his unit, but in train- 
ing it was more convenient to train the company independently. Figure 
11 indicates the manner in which a battalion commander directs the 
company training. 

5. Figure 12 illustrates training conducted to push through an 
enemy position, taking advantage of the early dawn, and Figure 13 
shows training in a dusk attack following a daylight attack* 



128 



FIGURE NO. II 



COMPANY TRAINING PLAN 




129 



Figure No, 11-a 



Niglit Attack Training Problem 

(Attack by the First Assault Echelon of 
a Battalion Planning Penetration in Depth) 

1. Objects of Training 

a. Preparations for attack. 

b. Rapid advance to a given objective with attack intentions 
concealed from the enemy. 

c. Holding a captured position. 

2. Situation 

At 1500 hours, 23 December, the 2d Company of the 1st Battaliori 
of the South Army is preparing for a nigjit attack in the disposi- 
tion shown in the sketch. The gist of the battalion order received 
by the company commander, at that time, is as follows: 

a. The 1st Battalion (plus one infantry engineer platoon) will 
attack the enemy position V, W and Y to capture Y Hill. The. 2d 
Battalion is to occupy Z Hill. 

b. The 1st Company (plus one infantry engineer squad) on the 1 
right will capture V, and the 2d Company (plus one infantry engineer 
squad) on the left will, capture W. 

c. The 3d Company (plus two Infantry engineer squads) in the 
second assault echelon will prepare to capture Y Hill. The 4th 
Company will be the support. 

d. The 1st and 2d Companies are 'Scheduled to launch the attack 
at 2200 hours, but the formal attack order will be issued separate- 
ly. The 1st and 2d Companies will secretly open paths through wire 
by 2100 hours. 

e. At dusk the 1st Company will employ an element to drive out 
the enemy security element disposed at point (2), and the 2d r Com- 
pany will use an element to expel the enemy from point (3). The 
time of attack against the enemy security elements is scheduled at = 
1700 hours, but the formal order will be issued separately • 

f. Machine guns and battalion guns will remain in the position, 
they presently occupy and prepare to support the attack against the 
enemy security elements. 

g. Each unit will assemble after sunset as follows. J 

(1) The 1st and 2d Companies will commence movement after 
1800 hours and assemble in the proximity of their present position 
by 1900 hours. 



130 



FIGURE NO. Il-b 



(2). The main body of the battalion will commence 
movement after 1800 hours and will assenible in the area west of 
the place where the battalion headquarters is now located by 
1900 hours. 




■:csi- 



131 



Figure No. 11-c 



3. Company Training Plan 

(I) Attack Preparations: 

1. Procedure 

a. The company is disposed as ordered by 1430 hours. 
The oral battalion order is issued at a point from which the ter- 
rain can be pointed out. The exercise is then commenced. 

b. The. enemy disposed at points (a), (b) and (e) 
deliver sporadic fire. 

c. Enemy artillery bursts are simulated by exploding 
practice charges. 

d. The enemy at point (a) retire when the company be- 
gins advance. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Prompt and clear communication of the company com- 
mander's decision to his subordinates. 

b. Reconnaissance of the enemy situation and the ter- 
rain. 

c. Thorough knowledge of the terrain and the eneuy dis- 
position. 

d. Issuance of orders. 

e. Repulse of enemy security elements. 

f. Disposition for cutting lanes through wire. 

g. Maintenance of direction. 

(II) Approach: 

1. Procedure 

a. Advance is ordered. 

b. Flares are fired from time to time while the company 
is advancing. 

c. Surprise enemy counterattack is made in the (j) area. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Approach disposition and approach march. 



132 



Figure No. 11-d 



b. Action to be taken against enemy illumination and 
counterattack. 


(Ill) Preparations for Assault: 




1. Procedure 




a* Two lanes are considered to 
through wire by 2100 hours. 


be successfully cut 


2. Training objectives 




a. Contact with an advance element. 


b. Assault disposition. 












1 

2 XT HQ 






2l^1(-) 




AUTOMATIC 
GUN 






Notes: 

(1) The 3d Platoon (less two squads), which was dispatch- 
ed for cutting lanes through the enemy wire, return to the company 
when the company approaches the lanes. 


(2) One squad each from the 1st and 3d Platoons, in 
advance security, are prepared to lay smoke, screens to cover the 
company in passing through the lanes. 



133 



Figure No. 11-e 



c . Measures to be taken to support the troops in passing 
through lanes. 

(IV) Assault: 

1. Procedure 

a. The assault is ordered. 

b. Enemy machine gun fire opens from positions (b), (c), 
(d) and (f). 

c. When, the assaulting unit captures position (c), the 
enemy machine gun at position (i) opens fire and counterattack is 
made from (g) area. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Passing through lanes in wire. 

b. Assault. 

c. Action to be taken against the enemy attempting to 
obstruct the penetration. 

d. Maintenance of direction, and estimation of advanced 

distance. 

(V) Holdirig a Captured Position: 

1. Procedure 

a. When the position (d) is captured, fire is opened 
from the position (e) and counterattack is made from (h) area* 

b. The exercise is ended after the enejpy counterattack 
from (h) area is repulsed and platoons are disposed in defensive 
positions . 

2. Training objectives 

a. Occupation of a given attack objective. 

b. Holding a captured position. 

c. Action to be taken against toemy counterattacks. 

d. Contact with the battalion commander and other units. 

e. Reconnaissance and mopping up of the area through 
which the 3d Company is to pass in a leapfrog movement* 



13U 



Figure No. 12-a 



Early Dawn Attack Problem 

1* Objects of Training 
a* Attack position* 

b. Assault preparations and assault* 

c. Cooperation between infantry and artillery immediately 
after daybreak* 

2. Situation 

a. The 2d Battalion, assigned the mission to attack the enemy 
which occupied a position near Komatsugahara several days earlier, 
is preparing for an early dawn attack on the following morning, 
the 3d. The enemy situation around 1600 hours of the 2d, and the 
outline of the battalion 1 s attack plan is as shown in sketch. 

b. The commander of the 6th Company is assigned the mission 
to attack X and the company is making the attack preparations* 



i 

135 



FIGURE NO. 12-b 



EARLY DAWN ATTACK PROBLEM 

M0 NAN R. 




- Penetration will continue in 
cooperation between the infantry 
and the artillery. 



I V I KOMATSUGAHARA ( \ 




Legend: 



Assault will be made at 0500 
hours. The success will be 
exploited during early dawn. 



-Wire-cutting: 

Each company will cut lanes 
through wire by 0400 hours. 



* Attack position: 
Attack preparations will be 
completed by 0400 hours. 

Early dawn attack will be made 
by an element under support of 
machine guns and one infant ry 
platoon at 1500 hours of the 2d. 
Reconnaissance of the enemy 
situation will also be conducted. 



At 2400 hours, the main body of 
the 2d Battalion will begin to 
advance under the direct command 
of the battalion commander. 



}j< Regimental gun l|l Battalion gun ))J Antitank gun 



137 



FIGURE NO. 12 



C 



COMPANY DAWN ATTACK TRAINING PLAN 




139 



Figure No. 12-c 



3. Company Dawn Attack Training Plan 

(I) Attack Preparations: 

1. Procedure 

a. Attack preparation is ordered. 

b. Fire is received from enemy artillery and security 

units. 

c. Information is received from the battalion commander. 

d. The assault is ordered. 

e. ' A counterattack is made by a small enemy unit. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Formation and disposition of the raiding unit to be 
employed against hostile security unit, 

b. Reconnaissance of contaminated areas, and measures to 

be taken. 

c. Employment of the attached infantry engineer squad. 

d. Occupation of attack position, including reconnais- 
sance for selection of position, markings for maintenance of direc- 
tion, selection of platoon release point, and maintenance of 
contact. 

e. Constant observation of the enfengr situation, 

f. Occupation of the obstacle clearing support point, 
and support measures. 

(II) Assault and E a rly Dawn Combat 

1. Procedure 

a. Caught in enemy searchlight beam. 

b. Exposed to sudden enemy flankirg fire. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Selection of assault formation. 

b. Assault by surprise. 

c. Contact with battalion commander and heavy weapons 

unit. 

no. 



Figure No. 12-d 



(III) Early Dawn Combat within Position 
1* Procedure 

a. Heavy fire received from enemy machine gun position- 
on the right. 

b. Counterattack by enemy. 

c. Artillery support delievered against Y. 
2. Training objectives 

a. Change in assault formation as visibility increases. 

b. Preparation to use smoke candles to prolong early 
dawn light oonditions. 

c • Measures taken against counterattack. 

d. Use of heavy weapons after daybreak. 



LEGEND 





Wire Entanglement 


i 


Automatic Gun 


1 


Light Machine Gun 


\ 


Heavy Machine Gun 




Searchlight 


t 


Regimental Gun 


f 


Battalion Gun 


* 


Antitank Gun 



lh2 



Figure No. 13 -a 



Dusk Attack Training Problem 

1. Objects of Training 

a. Attack disposition of the assault company. 

b. Approach and assault taking advantage of dusk. 

c. Holding the captured position. N 

2. Situation 

a. For past few days the battalion has been attacking an enemy 
disposed in the area south of the Norm river. This evening the 
battalion, taking advantage of dusk, intends to advance rapidly to 
the left bank of the river. The disposition of the battalion at 
1500 hours and the enemy situation are as shown in sketch. 

b. The gist of the battalion order issued to the commander of 
the 2d Company at 1500 hours is as follows. 

(1) The battalion will assault W, X and Y positions at 
dusk this evening and attack Z and penetrate to the left bank of 
the Norm River. 

The first assault echelon companies, the 2d &nd 4th, 
will be employed to capture and hold W and X respectively, but the 
main attack emphasis will be placed on the left company. 

The second assault echelon will be committed to attack 
T e~d Z positions after leapfroging the first assault echelon in 
the Twin Mound $rea. 

(2) The 2d Oompany will have as its objectives W, and a 
machine gun position located near the Twin Mound. 

Limit of advance: Rear limits of X position. 

Time of attack: The attack is scheduled to be 

launched at 1700 hours, but the 
formal order will be issued 
separately. 

Passing obstacles: Using lanes already made in wire, 

and clearir^g lanes by demolition. 



1U3 



FIGURE NO. 13- b 



DUSK ATTACK TRAINING PROGRAM 




Bn GUN 

MAIN BODY 



FIGURE NO. 13 C 



COMPANY DUSK ATTACK TRAINING PROBLEM 




)|l INFANTRY BATTALION GUN N ^ 
; a. 



Figure No. 13 -c 

3« Company Dusk Attack Training Problem 

(I) Attack Preparations 

1. Procedure 

a. Issuance of the battalion attack order. 

b. Situation 

(1) Enemy air attack, 

(2) Heavy eneiny fire. The battalion has suffered 
20 per cent casualties by this time. 

2, Training objectives 

a. Issuance of the company order. 

b. Concealment of intentions. 

c. Measures to be taken against enemy aircraft. 

d. Cooperation with heavy weapons. 

(II) Approach 

1. Procedure 

a. Change in the enemy disposition. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Selection of pace and formation. 

. b-. Maintenance of contact, ■ 

c. Advancing security elements to reconnoiter change in 
the enemy disposition. 

(III) Assault 

1. Procedure 

a. Obstruction by a small enenQr unit. 

b. Part of the enemy machine guns disposed in the rear 
are moved forward. 

2. Training objectives 

a. Passing obstacles (demolition by infantry engineers 

unit). 

1U9 



Figure No. 13-d 



b. Feint and surprise against the enengr. 

c. Assault under eneuiy fire* 
(IV) Holding a Captured Position 

1. Procedure 

a. Enemy counterattack from the right flank is made be- 
fore assault company is reorganized. 

b. Heavy firing by enemy machine guns accompanied by 
searchlight illumination* 

2. Training objectives 

a. Reorganization and reconnaissance, 

b. Contact with the lower and higher echelons and adja- 
cent units, 

c. Disposition for holding the captured position, 

d. Construction of defense works. 

e. Employment of machine guns. 



150 



Section J # Special Training 

Maintenance of direction, (including instruction on the use of 
route and road markers, and the training of guide patrols), the fir- 
ing of heavy weapons, methods of fighting in teams, the clearing of 
paths through obstacles, and attacks against pillboxes, were taught 
either as part of the general training for night attack or in dose 
conjunction with it . 

Clearing paths through obstacles requires careful planning com- 
bined with bold and quick action. Consequently, extra effort was 
exerted and training in this field was extensive. Methods of clear- 
ings differed according to the type of obstacles and also for varying 
general conditions at the time of clearing. 

The smallest unit for clearing obstacles was usually called an 
obstacle clearing team (Hakai Garni), This team was assigned to make 
one passageway through one obstacle. Organization and equipment of 



typical teams is shown in the following chart: 





Equipment for Clearing 
with Wire Cutter 


Equipment for Clearing 
with Demolition Tube 


Leader 


Markers, contacting rope, 
and two smoke candles 


Markers, contacting rope, 
and two smoke candles 


Clearer 
(One or 
several 
men) 


One wire cutter, one smoke 
candle, and a pair of 
leather gloves for each 
member 


One wire cutter and one 
smoke candle for each 
member. One demolition 
tube per team 


Reserve 
members 
(One or 
several 
men) 


One wire cutter, one smoke 
candle, a pair of leather 
gloves for each member of 
the team, and a few 
markers 




Remarks: 


Each team member will carry one or two hand grenades. 
When required, screen, sand bag, or shield will also 
be carried. 



151 



In the training a number of obstacle clearing teams were organiz- 
ed into an obstacle clearing party (Hakai Han), and an additional 
number into an obstacle clearing unit (Hakai Tai). Each party or 
unit usually had a necessary number of reserve or support teams and 
were equipped with defense equipment such as movable barriers. 

The commander of the unit prescribed the number of paths to be 
cleared, their location and direction, the extent of clearing, the 
method to be employed, and the time of execution. The clearing in 
preparation for the night attack was usually conducted in secrecy. 

Even in preparation for a supported night attack, it was advan- 
tageous to effect the clearing in secrecy, although forced clearings 
were sometimes used* In an attack to seize an enemy position after 
a penetration had been made, a forced clearing was generally employed, 
for speed was then the major consideration. 

The clearing unit, after careful preparation, approached the 
enemy wire entanglement by night and set up a clearing support point 
(Hakai Kyoten). Clearing teams were released at the clearing support 
point. Under certain circumstances clearing teams set up their own 
clearing support point. 

All movement was accomplished with strict concealment of inten- 
tions with the last stage of the approach usually made entirely by 
crawling. An example of the team's approach is shown in the follow- 
ing diagram. 



152 



Wire Entanglement 



During clearing operation, 
Reserve Man is charged with 
security to the flanks and 
to the rear. 



Contacting Rope 



Reserve Man 



Leader 

6 



6 



During movement. Reserve Man 
is charged with security to 
the front and to the left. 



^ Clearer 



DuriJTg movement, Clearer is 
charged with security to the 
front and to the right. 



Obstacle Clearing Support Point 



153 



When one man is assigned to cut wire without an assistant, he 
first searches for an alarm wire and determines how it is connected, 
and after removing the alarm he begins cutting. Wire will be cut 
about 30 cm from posts and will not be done in one snipping. Wire 
will first be notched by the cutter, and then will be grasped by- on 
both sides of the notch and the shorter portion bent quietly back and 
forth several times until the wire is broken. The loose ends of the 
broken wire will be thrust into the earth to prevent loose ends from 
making a noise by striking other wire. Vtfhen the work is done by two 
men, the assistant will hold the wire at both sides of the cut as 



shown in the following sketch. 




Wire is usually cut as indicated below, 
a. Net-type wire 




b. Double-apron type wire 




For clearing a path in a short space of time only the lower wires 
of the net or double-apron type entanglements will be cut, a path 
being made for crawling under the wire. Wire three meters in width 
can be cleared in about three and a half minutes by one man, although 
much more time is generally allotted. Time required is shown on the 
following chart: 



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In a forced clearing using a wire cutter, cutting will be done 
openly in the kneeling or standing position, ignoring the enemy fire, 
giving primary consideration to speed. Direction of cutting will be 
the same as in clearing in secrecy in the case of net-type wire, but 
with double-apron type wire, a right-angled clearing will be prefer- 
able to an oblique one. The work will be nade very much easier if 
an assistant wearing white gloves is employed to grasp the wire. A 
skilled man can clear a path through a six meter net-type wire in 
about one minute. 

Clearing with a demolition tube may be necessary in the event 
of a forced clearing. The standard demolition tube is an iron tube 
filled with explosive, about seven centimeters in diameter and about 
two and a half meters in length. It is threaded at each end so that 
tubes may be extended to the width of the obstacle. When the standard 
tube is not available, a bamboo or metal pipe my be used as an ex- 
pedient. 

As circumstances may necessitate changing over from a secret 
clearing to a forced clearing in the middle of path clearing opera- 
tions, the demolition tube must be included in the equipment of the 
obstacle clearing team. It is also necessary for the obstacle clear- 
ing team to maintain contact with the party or unit commander by 
signaling with contacting rope or other suitable device. In the 
case of a forced clearing, the obstacle clearing team usually ope- 
rates under supporting fire and uses smoke to conceal its operations. 



157 



When the path is cleared, the obstacle clearing team reports 
the fact together with the width and height of the clearing to the 
party or unit commander, and will attach markers to indicate the 
cleared path* 

In training, the technique of secret clearing was emphasized, 
as well as the keeping of cleared paths open and the maintaining 
of contact with troops waiting to begin th attack. 

At the completion of training each company had four or five 
trained obstacle clearing parties. 

Section K» Attacking Pillboxes 

Methods of close quarter assault against pillboxes by the 
infantry and engineers included throwing an exploding armor piercing 
charge, demolition tube, or hand grenade into a pillbox through its 
firing-slits , demolishing the entrance or overhead cover with an 
explosive charge, or attacking the firing-slit with a flame thrower. 
Since it was often necessary to make the assault in the teeth of 
strong enemy resistance, it was considered best to nake a surprise 
assault at night. In all methods of assault, taking advantage of 
the vulnerable dead space of the pillbox was strongly urged. 

The number of men to be employed in assaulting a pillbox varies 
according to circumstances, but for maneuverability and surprise it 
is advisable to make it as small a group as possible. Although care 
must be exercised to provide for possible casualties lest the death 



158 



of one man make the accomplishment of the assault mission impossible. 

Examples of the organization and equipment of pillbox assault 
parties are shown in Chart No* 6. 

Thorough preparatory reconnaissance is a very essential factor 
in successful pillbox assault. 

Reconnaissance is conducted to ascertain: (l) Strength, shape, 
and the internal construction of pillboxes. (2) Number, direction 
and aboveground height of firing slits. (3) Kind and nunber of 
weapons housed in pillboxes. (4) Position and construction of en- 
trances. (5) Ventilation, water supply, illumination, and periscope 
installation. (6) Communication trenches. (7) Mutually supportirjg 
fires between pillboxes and other fire positions. (8) Terrain fea- 
tures, location of natural cover and pillbox dead spaces. (9) Type 
and size of artificial obstacles, existence of mines and electrical- 
ly charged wire. 

Means of reconnaissance included continuous observation, send- 
ing out reconnaissance and combat patrols, taking prisoners, and 
other means coordinated with the application of military knowledge. 

When artificial obstacles surround enemy pillboxes, a path is 
secretly cleared through the obstacles, the assault party stealthily 
approaches the pillbox and then begins the assault. The order for 
the charge is usually given at a point about 10 meters from the pill- 
box. 

When f irirg slits are protected against hand grenades by wire 



159 



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162 



netting or canopies, it is necessary to destioy ttese protective 
nets and canopies with hand grenades or a demolition tube prior to 
attacking the firing slit. 

When discovered by the enemy during the assault , soldiers must 
move to dead space at the side of the firing slit, taking advantage 
of intervals in enanjy fire, terrain features, and natural cover be- 
fore throwing in explosive charges. Smoke may be used to conceal 
movements. 

Upon throwijng in the explosive charge, the thrower must take 
shelter to avoid injury from the explosion. He should keep clear 
of the entrance or firing slits, and drop to a prone position, uti- 
lizing a natural cover or nearby trench, if available. 

When an armor piercirg charge is used, it is necessary to attach 
it to the object to be demolished. While a 400 gram charge would 
suffice to disable the enemy in the pillbox, for demolition purposes 
even a light wooden shelter would require a bundled charge of about 
five kilograms. Against a pillbox with unknown streigth, an explo- 
sive charge of one or two kilograms is used first for the purpose of 
neutralizing the enemy within the pillbox. Under certain circums- 
tances, explosive charge is attached to the end of a wooden pole to 
assist in handling or placing* 

Section L. Team Tactics 

The concept of fightirjg team formation was developed about 1936 



163 



when the new organization which equipped each infantry squad with a 
light machine gun was conceived and adopted, A team method, design- 
ed to seize enemy positions by infiltration, was developed by 
Lt. Gen, Ishihara, Kanji, commanding general of the 16th Division. 
As one of the principal features of this tactic an infantry squad 
was divided into a support team (two or three soldiers with a light 
machine gun), a sniper team (two or three good marksmen) and two 
assault teams (about three men to each team). Assault teams approach- 
ed the enemy pillbox by crawling and attacked it from its side or 
rear, under the covering fire of the support and sniper teams. The 
basic consideration underlying this tactic was the belief that a 
Russian pillbox could be captured by an assault conducted by seven 
to nine men instead of requiring an entire infantry squad, previous- 
ly considered necessary. 

The system of close quarter combat in pairs was taught in all 
infantry regiments and was put into practice in many night engage- 
ments. Later, the method of fighting teams was adopted by the 16th 
Division and other units followed suit. Although attempts were made 
to have this tactic adopted by the Infantry Manual, it was not ac- 
cepted until near the end of .WWII. However, in the Night Attack 
Manual published in 19UU, the 16th Division method was recommended 
as the most common attack formation of the infantry squad. The 
manual recommended also that the supporting and sniper teams be made 
into assault teams under certain circumstances. 



16U 



CHAPTER V 

Experience in Night Operations During World War II 

When the Greater East Asia War started in December 1941 > the 
Japanese Army successfully displayed in its initial operations the 
results of its night combat training. 

In launching the War, special importance was attached to sur- 
prise attack and nearly all initial invasions commenced with night 
operations and landings. Among these were the landing operations in 
Malaya and at Lingayen Gulf, Lamon Bay and Davao in the Philippines, 
In accordance with the principle of tactical surprise, the attack on 
the British force on the Kowloon Peninsula started with a night 
attack, as did the operations against Horigkong, Singapore, Borneo, 
Java, Ambon, Guam, Wake and Rabaul. In Kowloon, Hongkong and Ambon, 
there were also night attacks against enejqy pillboxes by infantry 
and engineer unit's. 

All the initial night attacks were highly successful, except 
the first attack against Wake Island, which was carried out by a 
naval force, alone. While successes were attributed to the superior 
training and morale of the Japanese forces, the advantages gained 
by advance preparation and the achievement of tactical surprise 
cannot be discounted as they were vital factors in gaining and 
holding the initiative. In addition, the Japanese Air Force and 
Navy were generally superior to that of their enemies and not only 



165 



enabled the concentration and movement of troops to be concealed 
from the eneiqy but facilitated transportation and landing operations. 

The initial combat successes did not long continue, as in less 
than a year from the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese Army suf- 
fered serious setbacks. Significant among the reverses were the 
night attacks carried out by the Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d 
Division against the American beachhead on Guadalcanal during Septem- 
ber and October 1942. (See Examples 9 and 10 of Suppleirent . ) 

Great prestige was at stake in these attacks which, carried out 
with the purpose of recapturing Guadalcanal Island, employed the 
traditional night attack tactics in which the Japanese Army was proud- 
ly confident. The failure v of the attacks not only dealt a severe 
blow to the confidence of the Japanese Army in the efficacy of its 
night attack tactics, ^ut marked the turning point in the overall 
situation of the war between Japan and America. The causes of 
failure, were attributed to the fact that the Americans possessed 
air superiority over Guadalcanal Island and its vicinity. America 
also possessed superior surface strength most of the time, although 
it was occasionally regained by the Japanese. The Kawaguchi Detach- 
ment and the 2d Division had to be transported at night to Guadalcanal 
by Navy destroyers and as it was impossible to supply sufficient 
quantities of materiel essential for ground action, the equipment of 
both units was totally inadequate and even their food supplies were 
dangerously low. 



166 



The Guadalcanal Operation occurred at an unexpected timg and at 
an unexpected place and operational preparations were generally in- 
adequate . The Army was unfamiliar with the local topographical con- 
ditions and no accurate, detailed maps were available. 

The difficulties presented by the jungles and rugged terrain of 
Guadalcanal also contributed to the Japanese defeat. Both the 
Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d Division carried out night attacks 
after having moved great distances through jungles and over mountains. 
The movements, although chosen to avoid the enemy air force, were 
physically exhausting and adversely affected the night attacks. In 
addition, neither unit had been adequately trained for jungle fight- 
ing and the units lacked the perfection of the initial Japanese anny 
operations insofar as preparation, disposition, and enforcement of 
attack are concerned. 

As the strategical initiative was in American hands, the Japa- 
nese were required to change their plans frequently. Unlike tte 
American troops who had fought in the Philippines in the initial 
phase of the war, those on Guadalcanal Island were well trained and 
equipped and geared for counterattack, while the Japanese lacked the 
high morale which they possessed during their advances in the earlier 
phase of the war* 

Intense ground and air fire were important contributions to the 
defense, but the trip-wire warning system which the Japanese encounter- 
ed for the first time, in these attacks, was also most effective. 



167 



Japanese attacking units sustained heavier losses than had been 
anticipated and were prevented from making a silent approach for a 
surprise attack. The attacks v/e re doomed to failure when the troops 
of the Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d Division started their opera- 
tion by losing most of their equipment due to American air raids, 
then experienced difficulties in the jungles during the tropical 
nights, and finally became victims of the American defensive f ire. 

In December 1942 when the situation on Guadalcanal was becoming 
more and more unfavorable, the Japanese forces began to adopt a new 
method of ( night fighting, later referred to as "surprise raiding 
tactics" (Teishin Kishu Sempo). Earlier, the groups using this 
tactic were called "raiding parties" (Teifchin Tai), "raiding attack 
parties" (Teishin Kogeki Tai), "infiltration raiding parties" (Teishin 
Sennyu Kogeki Tai), "close-quarter attack parties" (Nikuhaku Kogeki 
Tai), "marauding parties" (Kirikomi Tai) or "suicide parties" (Kesshi 
Tai). 

Night raiding tactics were simultaneously adopted by units under 
the command of the Eighteenth Amy in the Buna sector and the units 
on Guadalcanal. In both areas, raiding was carried out to offset 
inferior air and artilleiy strength and, at first, the attacks -were 
directed against enemy aircraft and artillery positions. Later, 
the enemy headquarters, billets and warehouses were added to the list 
of attack targets. The raiding parties, each consisting of a maximum 
of 20 men, approached through the jungle under cover of darkness, in 



168 



many instances spending several nights in the approach. As this type 
of action was considered to be very hazardous, they were generally 
regarded as suicide parties. 

Among the new ideas of night operations developed was "stepped- 
up debarkation" (Tansetsu Yoriku), in which various methods were 
adopted to improve debarkation efficiency under cover of darkness, 

A second formula was the so-called "rat transportation" (Nezumi 
Yuso) which was night transportation by high-speed destroyers. In 
order to minimize the time for debarkation from the destroyers, a 
method was employed whereby materiel packed in oil drums was re- 
leased at sea and floated ashore. 

A third method was night transportation by large landijqg barges. 
In connection with the debarkation system, bases to conceal boats 
during the day were established about 60 to 100 kilometers apart — 
the distance that the barges could travel in one night. This was 
nicknamed "ant transportation" (Ari Yuso). 

The general practice of night movement, as a count ermeasure to 
thwart the enemy air force, was widespread during this period. 
Virtually all large troop movements were undertaken at night. Cook- 
ing and transport in the rear was also carried out under cover of 
darkness. 

As a result of the failure of the night attacks on Guadalcanal, 
studies were hurriedly made to establish methods of coping with the 
superior enemy fire, securing and occupying a position after succeed- 



169 



ing in an attack and dealing with the enemy's trip-wire warning net- 
work. Part cf the stu<$r made by the Amy Infantry School in February 
1943 concerning the first two of these problems is summarized from 
"A Stucjy on Night Attack" which appeared in the June 1943 issue of 
the Monthly Report of the Infantry School Research Department: 

a. There is no change in the basic principles of either attack 
by surprise or attack by force, but it is imperative that in both 
types the enemy fire power be neutralized. Therefore, even when 
attacking by surprise, prior preparations must be made to permit change 
to an attack which utilizes fire power to neutralize that of the enemy. 

b. It is necessary for both battalions and companies to deploy 
in width when they attack. The drawbacks attending the adoption of 
such a formation must be eliminated by training. An example of the 
deployed attack formation of a company is shown in the following 
diagram: 



170 



Formation of a Company in a Night Attack 




Demolition Unit 
(Haigeki Butai) 



Unit to take up the 




15^1 Remaining element of 
command section 



Legend: 

Heavy machine gun 
Grenade thrower 

Automatic gun (light antitank gun) 



171 



Remarks: 

(1) Squads advance in one or two columns with -three paces 
between men* 

(2) Distance between squads varies between 10 and 30 meters, 
according to the degree of darkness . 

(3) The company commander keeps an element of the Command 
Section with him. 

(4) The demolition unit (Haigeki Butai) is composed of men 
who are particularly courageous and reliable. 

(5) Squads at the flank are responsible for security. 

(6) It is advisable to have the third platoon commander 
follow in the rear of the company to pick up stragglers. 

(7) ; This diagram gives only one example , formations may 
differ greatly according to the situation and the terrain. 



c. In executing night attacks, utilizing the power of firearms, 
it must be recognized that illuininatio n should be provided by the 
attacking unit to facilitate accurate firing. 

d. In night attacks in which the element of surprise is para- 
mount, it is advantageous to dispatch raiding parties into the enemy 
position for the prior neutralization and destruction of the enemy 
command post, positions of principal weapons, observation posts, etc. 

e. Action to be taken when fired upon by the enemy while ad- 
vancing should be based on the principles prescribed in the Infantry 
Manual, but consideration must be given to minimize losses. A reck- 
less advance should be avoided. 

f. The mass attack principle whereby a company assaults in one 
body with its commander in the lead should be adhered to, but, there 
may often be cases in which it will be more advantageous and will 
reduce losses, to have an element of a company seize the company's 
objective first and temporarily hold the position until the main body 
which follows closely can adequately secure the captured position. 

g. Effective use of conibat team tactics is to be recommended. 
Men to be assigned as members of a raiding party with such special 
duties as the destruction of enemy fire positions and the command 



172 



system should be trained, by organizing them into combat teams. In 
executing night attacks, combat teams are formed by temporarily 
combining courageous and cowardly soldiers. (Sic) 

h. The attack of a battalion formed in two assault echelons 
can be carried out even against a position defended by American 
forces. 

i. Measures to secure a captured position are extremely imr- 
portant. For this purpose, attention must be paid to the following 
points: 

(1) In establishing the hour of attack sufficient time 
must be allotted for the construction of defenses within the occupied 
position so that the task may be completed before dawn, 

(2) In deciding on the attack disposition consideration 
must be given to a formation which will enable units to move readily 
into defense positions after succeeding in the attack. 

(3) On succeeding in the night attack a unit must immediate- 
ly make preparations for daylight defense and construct positions. 
Attention must be given to defense, against heavy artillery and air 
bombardment and persistent counterattacks by enemy ground troops and 
tanks after daybreak. In establishing the defense disposition, flank 
support must be given to friendly troops and communication routes 
leading to the rear must be maintained. 

(4) Defensive positions must be dispersed, and battalion 
and company commanders must personally direct the occupation of posi- 
tions . 

j. Preparations for a night attack on a position as strongly 
organized as an American beachhead require at least two days and a 
night. 

k. The area of a strongly organized beachhead which an infantry 
battalion is capable of breaking through and securing is approximate- 
ly 600 meters in frontage and 300 to 400 meters in depth. 

In connection with the studies on the trip wire warning system 

of the American forces, the following items were extracted from the 

"Night Attack Manual" issued in September 1944* by the Inspectorate 

General of Military Training: 



173 



a. The Japanese Army has no information on the type of trip 
wire warning system employed by the Allied forces. However, the 
use of telephones by rovirg or stationary patrols for reporting to 
the rear was encountered on Guadalcanal Island, Information on the 
use of microphones indicates that one method calls for the strategic 
distribution of microphones alone, and the other uses microphones 

in connection with lookouts. From this, the Japanese Amy concludes 
that the Aire ri can forces will, in the future, adopt defense methods 
using radio, ultra short wave and infra-red rays, etc, 

b. The method of destroying the trip wire warning system 
differs greatly according to the type of trip wire warnirg system 
in use. For example, the type using telephones as relays can be 
decomissioned by cutting the wires, but the type using radio must be 
destroyed or the signals .jammed to render them ineffectual, 

c The destruction of the trip wire warning system must be 
executed prior to the demolition of ordinary obstacles. The demo- 
lition teams may be charged with the mission of searching and des- 
troying tripwires prior to demolishing other obstacles, 

d. Since the destruction of the trip wire warning system will 
eventually be discovered by the enemy it cannot be limited to a 
narrow front as in the demolition of obstacles. In order to conceal 
the exact location of attack, destruction extending over a wide front 
is necessary. 

After the operations on Guadalcanal, defensive combat was fought 
more frequently than before and large-scale night attacks aimed at 
a decisive battle became rare. Although the night attack which was 
a traditional tactic of the Japanese Aimy was abandoned, there are 
many examples of night attacks executed as counterattacks, by units 
smaller than an infantry battalion, in each theater of operations. 
Some of these units achieved considerable success, particularly in 
the defense of Biak, from May to June 1944. There are also several 
examples of night attacks carried put by large units. Night 
counterattacks were executed by units of division size in 



17k 



Saipan and Guam, but they all ended in failure due to the defensive 
fires of the American forces. 

Combat Examples Nos. 11 and 12 illustrate night attacks execut- 
ed by the units of the Eighteenth Army in eastern New Guinea during 
1944. In No. 11 the Nakai Detachment achieved brilliant success 
against the Australian force in the sector south of Madang, while in 
No. 12, the main body of the Eighteenth Army barely succeeded in 
achieving success against an American force in a night river crossing 
operation on the Driniumor river. The success of the Nakai Detach- 
ment in its night attack was due mainly to the use of perfect sur- 
prise attack tactics, and the moderate success which the main body 
of the Eighteenth Army gained in the night attacks, on the Driniumor 
river must be attributed to the fanatic offensive spirit of officers 
and men. At that stage of the war, the adoption of some hew tactic 
or a fanatical display of offensive spirit was the only way to break 
the impasse; mere repetition of conventional night attacks invariab- 
ly ended in failure ♦ 

After the operations of Guadalcanal Island the conception of 
night attacks underwent a change which had a bearing upon the ori- 
ginal motive for adopting night attacks. Formerly, emphasis was 
placed on offsetting an inferiority in ground fire power by the 
advantages gained in a surprise attack under cover of darkness. 
After Guadalcanal, emphasis was shifted to executing attacks at night 
to offset the effects of enexqy air power. While the effect of air 



175 



power had been considered in the training manuals and during the 
operations on Guadalcanal, it appeared that air power had not been 
given sufficient consideration, and in 1943 > as the difference in 
air power between the Japanese and American forces became more mark- 
ed, daylight attacks of ground troops became virtually impossible 
due to interference by the American air force. 

Also in 1943 > In the Burma area, the balance of air power be- 
gan to turn against Japan, forcing the army to attach greater im- 
portance to night attacks by force as had been done in the Pacific 
area. 

Against the Wingate airborne raiding force which landed in 
March 1944* near Mawlu in northern Burma, the Japanese forces car- 
ried out a series of night attacks with a unit composed of the 24th 
Independent Mixed Brigade, reinforced by troops absorbed from other 
units, but the attacks ended in failure. There is little doubt that 
the failures were attributable to the shortcomings of the Japanese 
force itself, since attack preparations were inadequate and units 
were composed of troops whose training was not up to par. The net 
of fire carefully and skilfully organized in the jungle by the 
Wingate force was a surprise to the attacking units, and as a result 
the brigade not only failed in its night attacks but also suffered 
heavy losses. From the failure the Japanese forces in the Burma 
area learned that the neutralization or destruction of enemy fire 
power is the prime requisite to successful night attacks on enemy- 
positions defended with modern weapons and facilities. 



176 



In mid-May 1944, when the Imphal operation was under way, the 
necessity of neutralizing enemy fire power was further substantiated 
by the success of the night attack which was carried out by units of 
the Fifteenth Army in the vicinity of Torbung (south of Bishenpur). 
Japanese night attacks had failed repeatedly for the first few days, 
but finally succeeded on the night of May 19th when they resorted to 
the neutralizing of enemy fire by the use of artillery and tanks. 
Other night attacks were carried out by units of battalion strength, 
without fire support, but they were not successful* 

At that time Allied forces had command of the air over the 
entire Imphal area and Japanese front line units were suffering from 
an acute shortage of weapons and ammunition as well as food, but in 
accordance with the desire' of the Commander of the Fifteenth Army to 
continue offensive action, night attacks were attempted as a last 
resort. The attacks failed when the Japanese, seeking to engage in 
hand to hand combat, encountered the powerful defensive fire networks 
of the Allied forces. 

Although the regular night attacks of the Japanese Army gained 
no satisfactory results either in the Pacific theater or the Burma 
area, the raiding combat tactics which were developed during the 
operations on Guadalcanal Island and in Buna were used throughout 
the entire army, during and after 1943 , with many variations beirjg 
added. 

The Eighteenth Army, after suffering a serious setback in the 



177 



Buna operation, was. the first major command to improvise and use 
raiding tactics, which they continued to utilize until the termina- 
tion of the war. (See Combat Example No. 13 ) 

The Kwantung Army, in Manchuria, had earlier planned to carry 
out raids on important targets in the Soviet territory surrounding 
Manchuria in the event, of an outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet 
Union and. had, since 1941, kept one mobile regiment under its com- 
mand. In the summer of 1944 the 1st Mobile Brigade was organized 
with the mobile regiment as a nucleus. At the time of organization, 
the primary purpose of the brigade was to carry out attacks on tar- 
gets in Soviet territory, but with the change in the operations 
policy of the Kwantung Army, in the Fall of 1944, the mission of the 
1st Mobile Brigade was also changed. Under the new delaying action 
defense concept, the brigade would remain in the rear of Soviet 
forces invading Uanchurian territory, throw the Soviet rear organi- 
zation into confusion and facilitate the overall delaying action of 
the Kwantung Army. In 1945, one additional raiding battalion, with 
a mission similar to that of the brigade, was assigned to each of 
the divisions in Manchuria. 

The central authorities of the Army acknowledged the advantage 
of raiding tactics and took measures to recommend their adoption. 
In 1944, they organized units which specialized in raiding tactics 
and disseminated information to all commands. A first step was the 
organization, in early 1944, of the 1st Raiding Unit Headquarters 



178 



and ten raiding companies which were dispatched to the Second Area 
Army (region north of Australia), Later, other similar units were 
dispatched to other southern areas, includirg Burma. 

In July 1944* the Inspectorate General of Military Training 
issued a training manual titled: "Raiding Combat Manual" as a guide 
for the training and combat of units in general as well as specializ- 
ed raiding units. Another manual titled "Night Combat Training" was 
published in May 1945* 

The two training manuals acknowledge in principle the advantages 
of surprise attack in night combat and state that at least the ini- 
tial action must be an attack by surprise even in instances where an 
attack in force is the eventual aim. Further, front line units must 
endeavor to carry out diversionary small scale surprise attacks even 
during a general attack in force. 

However, both manuals stress the need for night attacks in force 
by admitting that night attacks by surprise had become more difficult 
to achieve due to the battlefield illumination, obstacles and trip 
wire warning systems increasingly employed by the American and Bri- 
tish forces to forestall surprise attacks. One of the raost important 
concepts underlying the two training .manuals was that although a sur- 
prise attack was desirable, it was not permissible to depend entirely 
upon them. Training and planning were to be based on the principle 
of ensuring the success of n^ght attacks by means of attacks in force 
and that the advantages of surprise attacks should be sought when the 



179 



situation permitted. 

In relation to the concept of attaching primary importance to 
the attack by force in night attack, the two training manuals ap- 
proved and encouraged use of day combat methods at night. For 
example , they emphasized that: 

a. Infantry battalions and companies should attack in an open 
formation, practically the same as used in daytinB attacks. 

b. Firing of light machine guns and rifles by infantry, would 
be permitted under certain conditions. 

c. As in day combat, the necessity of cooperation between 
infantry, tanks, artillery and engineers was stressed. The fire 
power of infantry and artillery should be used freely to prepare for 
and support attacks and assaults and in securing captured points. 

The team combat method was adopted and close order assaults 

abolished in accordance with the following instructions in the 

manuals: 

a. With the exception of special instances, the assault of an 
infantry company should be carried out by its elite platoon with the 
main body of the company following to secure the occupied area. 

b. The infantry platoon or squad will not use its entire 
strength to carry out close order assault. Siqgle enemy firing posi- 
tions will be neutralized by the squad assault team. Other squads, 
grenade dischargers or the heavy machine guns assigned to the com- 
pany may be used to neutralize the enemy force at points other than 
the penetration point. 

c. An example of the procedure of the squad's assault on an 
ordinary pillbox is shown on the following sketch. 



180 



Procedure of the Squad's Assault 
on a Pillbox 




Note: Enemy machine guns and mortars will be neutralized 
by heavy weapons and artillery. 



181 



A characteristic common to both manuals was the stress placed 
on the importance of raiding. The mission of a raidijng unit was 
described as facilitating the attack of the main body by destroyiJTg 
or neutralizing enemy tanks, artillery, command posts, important 
pillboxes and searchlights. The manuals laid down the following 
principles governing raiding units: 

a. The time of action and the objectives of raiding units will 
be planned by a high echelon commander so that their activities will 
be coordinated with the general attack. 

b. The front line forces (battalions or less) will dispatch 
raiding units against objectives in their zone of action, a higher 
echelon commander will dispatch raiding units under his direct con- 
trol against important objectives located deeper in enemy territory* 

c. If the situation warrants, an entire infantry battalion may 
be used as a raiding unit. 

d. First line force will dispatch a raiding unit prior to the 
commencement of an attack or immediately after the capture of the 
enemy first line. 

e. Raiding units not able to approach objectives by stealth, 
may at times be forced to break through the enemy's first line posi- 
tion and then take up duties as a raidirjg unit. 

The two manuals considered it possible to effect penetration in 
depth of an enenjy position by attacking in two echelons. However, 
they expressed the opinion that only an assault made by a company 
with a limited objective can be reasonably certain of success in a 
night attack. They proposed the following plan for the organization 
of an attack designed for the progressive occupation in depth, of an 
enemy defense position. 

a* The enemy first line company position will be captured in a 



182 



night attack by the first echelon attacking company* Attack will be 
started as early in the night as possible. 

b. The defense positions of the enemy battalion and regimental 
reserve will be captured by the second echelon coaqpany. This attack 
will be started at daybreak the following day or early the following 
night. 

Cw The defense positions of the enemy division reserve will be 
captured by the second echelon battalion. The time for this attack 
will be determined in accordance with the prevailing situation. 

Importance was also attached to active and passive antibombard- 

ment and antitank measures, action to be taken when coming within 

close range of the enemy position and the conduct of warfare within 

the enenjy position. In this connection, the manuals stressed the 

following points: 

a. Assault positions will be prepared by digging cover trenches 
in open formation a short distance from the enemy, 

b. Following the capture of the attack objective there will be 
a prompt shift to daytime defense disposition in order to secure the 
position. 

c. Preparation for antitank defense by rapidly moving up anti- 
tank weapons and materials. 

The manuals also stressed the necessity of careful preparation 
for attack and explained the essential points. 

The new concept of night attack revolutionized the old theories 
of the Japanese Amy in many respects. After the issuance of the 
new manuals, training was conducted in accordance with their prin- 
ciples but, after the Fall of 1944* there were no opportunities to 
carry out large-scale night attacks against American or British 
forces and the war ended feaf ore the new concepts could be evaluated 
by actual use in combat. 



183 



Some military authorities expressed doubt as to the practicabi- 
lity of the new concept and questions were raised concerning the 
difficulties of control of troops in extended formations as well as 
the possibility of confusion which might arise as a result of the 
employment of complicated tactics and fire plans in a night time 
operation. The only answers to these questions were that Allied 
air power had made night combat a necessity and that the manuals 
gave the only practical solution to the problem. 

The operations of the Kwantung Army against Soviet Russia open- 
ed on 9 August 1945 and ended in about a week or ten days. Through- 
out this period the Japanese forces were engaged principally in 
defense actions and withdrawals and, as the Soviet forces seldom 
carried out any night attacks, the Japanese had few opportunities 
to conduct night attacks (sic) . Of course, withdrawals and occupa- 
tion of positions were often carried out at ni^ht and night counter- 
attacks were conducted several times by small units, but there were 
no night attacks by large units. 

Because the period of the operation was limited and because the 
battle fronts of both sides shifted too rapidly, the Mobile Brigade, 
organized within the Kwantung Amy, and the raiding battalions in 
each division, did riot achieve the expected results. Night raiding 
was carried out against the rear of the Soviet mechanised units on 
the eastern front, but it is not known to what extent the advance 
of the Soviet forces was delayed by those actions. 



1BU 



m 



JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT 



Lirt 



JAN 9' 1956 



ACCESSION NO_ 
eu ^ui4iii — 



PART 2 OF 3 PARTS 



EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE 
TRAINING MANUALS 



Special 

355.422 

U56j 

pt2 

cl 



HEADQUARTERS 
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

AND 

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY ^ 
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION ^ 
JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION 



JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT 



Part 2 of 3 Parts 

APPENDIX: 

EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE 
TRAINING MANUALS 



HEADQUARTERS 
UNITED STATES ARM! FORCES, FAR 
and 

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY 
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION 
Japanese Research Division 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



APPENDIX- I 

APPENDIX II 

APPENDIX III 
APPENDIX IV 

APPENDIX V 



Extracts of Items Relative to Night Combat 
from Part II, of the Field Service Regulations 
for Operations, Established in September 1938 

Extract of Items Relative to Night Combat 
from the Infantry Manual Established in 
February 1940 

Extracts from "Raiding Combat Manual" 

Extracts from "Night Attack Manual" Published 
in September 1944 

Field Service Regulations, Part IV Attack 
Against Special Defensive Zone 



185 



APPENDIX I 

Extracts of Items Relative to Night Combat 
from Part II of the Field Service Regulations 
for Operations, Established in September 1938 



187 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 
BOOK II Attack 



CHAPTER II Meeting Engagement 

CHAPTER III Attack on Positions 
CHAPTER IV. Night Attack 

BOOK III Defense 
CHAPTER II Defensive Action 

BOOK IV Pursuit and Retreat 
CHAPTER I Pursuit 
CHAPTER II Withdrawal 



189 



BOOK II Attack 

CHAPTER II 
Meeting Engagement 

103 • In cases where night comes in the course of an attack, decision 
as to whether the attack should be continued or whether it should be 
resumed at dawn the next day under a new disposition depends upon the 
general situation, especially the prevailing battle situation* If 
the attack is not to be carried out immediately, it is important for 
each unit to take adequate measures for reconnaissance and security 
at nightfall and, if necessary, charge to a column formation, thereby 
prepare for employment in a subsequent new mission and be alerted 
against enemy attempts during the night. In this case, it is impor- 
tant and usual for tanks to assemble in the rear, recover their fight- 
ing power and prepare for subsequent actions. 

Under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
the division commander must promptly inform subordinate commanders of 
his plans and direct them to make necessary preparations as quickly, 
as possible. Also, the commanders of various units must take the 
initiative to report data necessary for the decisions of the division 
commander. 

104 • It sometimes is advantageous to maneuver at night and launch an 
attack against the enemy at dawn. In this case, it is necessary to 
make various preparations duriiig the previous day, insofar as possible, 



191 



especially conduct thorough reconnaissance and observe the movements 
of the enemy's main body, and at night , assemble troops at a suitable 
time by secret maneuver, dispose them for attack, direct the various 
units to complete necessary preparations by dawn and then resolutely 
strike the enemy. 

In order to cariy out the attack mentioned in the preceding para- 
graph, it is necessary to maintain control over subordinate troops at 
all times and prevent the general plan from going awry by the energy's 
harassing actions. 



192 



CHAPTER III 
Attack on Positions 



125 , It is often advantageous to approach the enemy and reach the 
attack positions under cover of night and start the attack at dawn* 
In this case, it is necessary to effect reconnaissance and various 
preparations during the preceding day insofar as possible and at the 
same time, attempt to conceal our plans from the enemy; especially, 
it is important to continue reconnaissance of the enemy situation at 
all times in view of the possible change of enemy disposition during 
the night. Although it is advantageous to locate the attack position, 
which must be occupied at dawn, as near the enemy as possible, in 
consideration of the eneipy situation, the terrain and the existence 
of contaminated areas, discretion must be exercised to prevent un- 
expected fighting. 

In order to set up attack positions at the shortest possible 
distance from the eneicy front, it is sometimes necessary to advance 
the units for more than two nights. 

The time to leave the position held at nightfall depends upon 
the situation, but must be based on the plan to enable various units 
to establish contact, perform necessary construction and complete 
attack preparations by dawn, at the latest. It is advantageous to 
occupy key-points in the advancii^g area beforehand to facilitate the 
advance after dark. 



193 



Tanks must establish their starting position as near the front 
line as possible, maintain contact with necessary units and prepare 
for the attack to follow. In this case, they must refrain from ap- 
proaching too close to the eneny lest our plans be exposed. 

The artillery must, insofar as possible, make preparations 
during the day for combat action to be carried out after dawn and 
deploy or advance its position under cover of night so as to be able 
to cooperate effectively with the infantry after dawn. 

The engineers will perform such duties as reconnoitering the 
terrain, especially the enemy's demolition work, remove obstacles 
and repair and mark the advancing routes. 

It is advisable to decontaminate contaminated areas secretly 
at night. 

126 . When attacking at dawn, assaults are at times carried out by 
taking advantage of daybreak from the attack position established at 
the shortest possible distance from the enemy front. In this case, 
it is most important to keep our plans in strict secrecy, and, in 
launching the assault, take the eneny by surprise. Decisions as to 
the action of the infantry and the time and method of participation 
in combat by tanks and artillery must be based on this consideration. 

In case of assault by taking advantage of daybreak, the infan- 
try, tanks and artillery must cooperate closely in carrying out com- 
bat within the enemy position, especially the fighting immediately 
after daybreak. Therefore, the disposition and movements of each 



194 



unit must be established as long before as practical and possible. 

The attack position must be located as near the enemy position 
as possible so that careful preparations may be made subsequently 
and the assault delivered swiftly and readily. It is most advanta- 
geous to start the advance for the assault directly from this posi- 
tion. 

As for tanks, it is usually advantageous to utilize them so 
that they may effectively enter combat after the penetration of the 
hostile position by the first line infantry. Depending upon the 
situation, especially the conditions of eneiqy obstacles, it is some- 
times advantageous to commit part or all of the tanks to cooperate 
in the assault of the infantry from the beginning. 

The artillery will make various preparations so as to be able 
to cooperate as closely as possible with the infantry, particularly 
at dawn. When it makes preparations as adequately as those for night 
firing the artillery can commence firing at dawn and cooperate in 
the assault of the infantry to no small degree by direct support fir- 
ing, interdiction firing and neutralization of enemy artillery. In 
this case, too, firing must not commence before the infantry charges 
into the enemy position in order to conceal our movement as long as 
possible. 

128# When troops attempt to approach the eneiqy under cover -of dark- 
ness in order to occupy the attack preparation position from which to 
launch an attack at daybreak, or gradually move the attack position 



195 



forward toward the stroijg enemy position, each unit must make prepar- 
ations as adequately as possible in daylight and, if the situation 
permits, it must plunge forward. However, when the enexay enforces 
a strict lookout or our attempt must be concealed, small units are 
sometimes pushed forward in a surprise move to cover the advance of 
the main body. In this case, the inf antiy and artillery should, as 
occasion demands, make preparations to neutralize the enemy obstruct- 
ing our approach. 

When troops reach the scheduled position at night, they will 
immediately engage in the construction of positions. The artillery 
must make careful preparations for firing, and, if possible, adequate- 
ly push forward its position ur*ier cover of darrkness before the front 
line troops occupy the final attack position so that it may provide 
adequate support to the assault of the infantry. 

143 * The time to start from the attack preparation position to carry 
out an assault by taking advantage of pre-dawn darkness will depend 
upon the situation, especially, our plan, the manner of subsequent 
advance, the length of dawn and the distance between the attack pre- 
paration position and the enemy position, but it must be selected in 
the early period of dawn so that it may not be too late. 

When the front line infantry rushes the enemy position and 
seizes his foremost defense line, the commanders at various levels 
must exploit the success insofar as possible by taking advantage of 
pre-dawn darkness, and, at the same time firmly control their troops 



196 



so that they can carry out combat after daybreak in a normal manner. 

In case tanks are employed from the beginning to support the 
assault of infantry, they will start from the starting position so 
that they may pass over the infantry 1 s first line before the infan- 
try launches the assault, and usually such limited missions as the 
destruction of obstacles, or the neutralization of heavy weapons in 
the vicinity of the first line are assigned to them. When tanks are 
employed in combat in the enemy position, they will usually depart 
from the startix^g position after the front line infantry rushes the 
enemy position, they are then committed to combat as occasion demands 
or ordered to participate in combat 'after assembling behind the front 
line infantry* 



197 



CHAPTER IV 
Night Attack 

146 « Night has such disadvantages as difficulty of coordinated ac- 
tion and direction and greater possibility of committirig errors, 
v/hereas it has such advantages as concealment of plans, prevention 
of losses, freedom from various interferences wrought by enemy air- 
craft and tanks, and an opportunity to display combat strength even 
without ammunition. And highly trained troops which are accustomed 
to night movement can often overcome these disadvantages and achieve 
success, especially, they can lead an attack to success by destroy- 
ing an enemy superior in number. 

A large unit may continue the attack to complete a success 
gained during a daylight engagement or execute night attacks with 
jin element to seize some key points in the enemy position needed to 
facilitate the attack to be launched the following day. A small 
unit will often attack the enemy by surprise under* cover of darkness. 

If the situation demands, night attacks may be executed by a 
large unit or sometimes local night attacks may be launched to de- 
ceive the enemy or to conceal the activities of friendly forces. 
147 * Night attacks are executed mainly by the inf antzy, but, depend- 
ing upon the situation, the artillery and other arms may cooperate 
in the attack. 

148 . In troop disposition for night attacks, minute and complex de- 
tails must be avoided and positive performance of action, must be 



199 



stressed. A thorough knowledge of the terrain of the area to be 
attacked and condition of enemy positions and adequacy of prepara- 
tions on the part of troops are indispensable prerequisites to the 
success of an attack. 

149 * The hours for executing night attacks may vary depending upon 
the general situation, especially, according to the mission of our 
force, but they must be selected after thorough study of the enemy 
situation so as to enable the attacker to take advantage of energy 
unpreparedness. An attack launched immediately after dark may often 
enable an attacker to take the initiative and preclude the energy's 
night movement, and an attack commenced shortly before dawn may en- 
able him to take advantage immediately of the effect of the attack 
and thereby exploit the success of the attack. 

150 « The targets of a night attack must be selected based on the 
attack mission and also the situation, especially the condition of 
enemy position, but its depth is usually limited in comparison to 
that of a daylight attack. 

In designating attack targets, it is important to clearly 
indicate the line or point to be reached. 

In an attack by a large unit, the clearly defined individual 
attack objectives must be pointed out to each unit. And the coordi- 
nation of various front line units will usually be limited to the 
extent expected to be attainable from th.e viewpoint of the selection 
of objectives assigned to each unit and the decision of the hour of 
attack. 

200 



151 * In night attacks, the commander will formulate a detailed plan, 
issue an order to commanders of various units by assembling them in 
daylight, if practicable, and issue orders for necessary preparations ♦ 
In this order, attack objectives of each infantry unit, zone of ad- 
vance or advance route, method of mutual liaison and identification 
and measures to be taken after the success of an attack must be indi- 
cated. In case the movement is launched from a distance or the ter- 
rain is such as to render movement difficult, an intermediate point 
and the hour of arrival thereat should be indicated to regi^late the 
movement of various units* 

In night attacks, strict precautions must be taken against gas 
and gas-contaminated areas must be avoided by detouring or neutraliz- 
ed by adequate disinfecting measures. Yfire entanglements, heavy 
weapons and, especially, flank defense weapons must be destroyed or 
neutralized swiftly, and tanks may be used when there are no other 
adequate means and the employment of tante does not hamper the con- 
cealment of plans. In this case, a small unit is assigned to the 
infantry and its mission must be limited. 

In order to effect coordination of the artillery with the attack 
of the infantry, the division commander will clearly indicate the 
mission of the artillery, especially, matters necessary for infantry- 
artillery coordination and the objectives or areas to come under fire 
and the time to fire as occasion demands. 

The commanders of various units, if the situation requires, must 



201 



conduct attacks by taking every possible measure even when he does 
not make thorough preparations in daylight. 

In night attacks, it is often preferable to study the measures 
to.be taken when the situation does not develop as scheduled -and 
instruct the necessary commanders thereon in advance. 
152 * The infantry assigned to night attack will usually be divided 
into the first line unit and the reserve force. And in case the 
energy position is to be occupied by attacking in depth, a second line 
attacking unit is often organized. Even in this case, a reserve 
force will be organized if necessary. 

The point which the first line unit should 'penetrate at night 
differs in accordance with the purpose of the attack, but it is 
usually desirable to select a point where the enemy defense, espe- 
cially obstacles, are weak or a point which is near the friendly 
force and can easily be attacked. As regards a salient in the eneiiQr 
position, it is sometimes desirable to attack the rear thereof and. 
penetrate into the position so as to cut off the route of retreat of 
the troops in that sector. Also, it is sometimes desirable to break 
through a gap in the enenjy position and attack the enemy from the 
rear. In these cases, it is especially necessary to exercise extreme 
precaution to avoid clashes between friendly forces. 

If obstacles must be destroyed beforehand, the time and method 
of such destruction will be decided according to the prevailing situa- 
tion. 



202 



153* The infantry assigned to night attack must make careful pre- 
parations and engage the enemy swiftly in hand to hand combat to 
win a decisive battle. 

When the infantry assigned to njght attack has approached the 
enemy> a strength necessary for a decisive battle must be disposed 
on the front line and all units must enter into as close formation 
as possible. Although the reserve force will disposed as near to 
the front line as possible, care most be taken not to throw it into 
the vortex of battle too soon. 

Night assault must be launched from the shortest possible dis- 
tance and the commanding officers at all levels will secure control 
of their subordinates and rush this objectives of attack swiftly and 
fiercely. If the force has succeeded in the assault and advanced to 
the designated line or point, it will mop up the remaining enemy. 
At the same time, it will promptly restore order, enforce strict 
security and if necessary, cariy out necessary construction and there- 
by prepare for the etiejuy's attack aimed at recapturing the lost posi- 
tion. Furthermore, it will establish liaison with adjacent units, 
ipaintain contact with the eneiny and make preparations for subsequent 
actions . 

154. If there are attacking units in tw> lines, the first line attack- 
ing unit will restore order promptly, enforce strict security measures 
against eneipy counterattack as soon as it captures the designated lire 
or point. The second line attackirjg unit will enter into dose forma- 



203 



tion at an appropriate moment and follow the first line attacking 
unit. As soon as the first line attacking unit captures its ob- 
jective, the second line attacking unit will readily move ahead of 
the first line attacking unit at the flank and advance toward the 
designated objective. In this case, utmost precaution should be 
exercised to avoid such errors apt to occur at night as fighting 
between friendly forces and confusion of troops. 
155 * When night attack must be carried out by utilizing effective 
fire power, the artillery normally neutralizes the enejqy position 
which is the target of attack and cuts off the enenp front line force 
from his rear echelons, and, if necessary, neutralizes the enemy 
troops likely to hinder our attack* The infantiy forces will cut 
off the enengr position from other positions by destroying or neutral- 
izing the eneipy's automatic weapons, illuminating equipment, etc. 
with their heayy weapons or by checking the enemy counterattack 
force. And in case of firing in order to secure the point where the 
attack has succeeded, the artillery will maintain close contact with 
the infantiy, and fire against key points at a suitable time in order 
to check the eneipy's counterattack. The use of firearms is apt to ; 
expose our plan, cause discrepancies and inflict damage on the fri- 
endly force. Therefore, the infantry and artillery commanders who 
are to cooperate will meet during daylight and make careful arrange- 
ments at the actual site as regards such necessary matters as the 
action of the infantiy force, the artillery firing related to this 



20A 



action, the relation between the artillery firing and the infant ry 
firing of heavy weapons and the firing for securing the point where 
the attack has succeeded. Furthermore, all units will make adequate 
preparation during daylight and, in fighting, they will maintain 
close contact with each other to prevent any error. 
15 6 . Because an attempt to divert the enemy's attention through the 
action of a unit, artillery firing or illumination, etc, with the 
object of facilitating night attack will sometimes have the adverse 
effect of alerting the enemy and defeat our general plan, careful 
consideration and thorough preparation will be especially necessary 
for such attempt. 

157 « If a night attack has succeeded, the infantry commander will 
secure control over his force, advance the heavy weapons and various 
other attached units at suitable moments, ensure liaison with the 
units concerned and gradually shift to daytime formation to secure 
advantage in the battle from daybreak. The divisional commander must 
ensure the successful execution of the subsequent combat action by 
promptly estimating the general situation, assigning necessary units 
to the front line infantry and advancing the artillery and reserve 
force. In the meantime, commanders at all levels must promptly re- 
connoiter the enemy situation* 



205 



BOOK III Defense 



CHAPTER II 
Defensive Action 

208+ At nigjit, the units on the defensive must prevent an enemy ap- 
proach by taking various means such as maintaining especially strict 
guard, carrying out thorough reconnaissance or illuminating the fore- 
ground and check the enemy from carrying out its attempt. 

Depending upon the situation, particularly the terrain condi- 
tions, the occupation beforehand of important points on the "fore- 
ground will sometimes prove to be advantageous to check the attack 
attempt of the enemy. 

New dispositions of troops after beirjg attacked at night will 
end in confusion in most cases. Therefore, commanding officers at 
aH levels must increase the first line troops as required, fill up 
gaps in troop disposition, dispose the reserve unit near the front, 
station it at several points, if necessary, and take other measures 
to speedily reinforce the front. 

Troops holding the positions must establish necessary facili- 
ties for night firing beforehand and the artillery must make careful 
arrangements vdth the infantry so that they can effect timely firing. 

If it has become known by reconnaissance that the enemy has 
approached our positions and is engaging in fortification work or 
moving to prepare for such work, the first line units must obstruct 



207 



it by the sortie of small groups or by taking various other means and 
if the enemy is discovered destroying our obstacles, he must be re- 
pulsed. 

209 . In night defense, cooperation of adjacent units and support of 
rear units at proper moment cannot be expected. Therefore, each unit 
must hold its position with firm determination, the artillery must 
maintain close liaison v/ith the infantry and fire when occasion de- 
mands and troops at the foremost line must pour heavy fire upon the 
enemy troops or hurl hand grenades against them as they approach our 
positions and annihilate them with bayonetted rifles at the moment 
the enemy ranks v/aver. In such instance, even a single small unit 
must endeavor to attack the flank and rear of the enen$r. 

If enemy troops have penetrated our position, the commander of 
that sector must immediately launch a counterattack and endeavor to 
recapture the position. 

210. In night defense, fightijTg takes place usually in various loca- 
lities. Therefore, commanding officers at all levels must secure 
their positions by taking various means such as estimatirg the situa- 
tion calmly, directing the combat v/ith firm will and, if necessary, 
reinforcing the first line with the reserve force at the appropriate 
time or using the reserve force in a counterattack,. 



208 



BOOK IV Pursuit and Retreat 

CHAPTER I 
Pursuit 

218 , The enemy which attempts to retreat usually takes advantage 
of the darkness of night. Therefore, our forces must carry out pur- 
suit insofar as possible even at night* 

At night the opportunity to pursue the enemy is apt to be lost. 
Therefore, commanding officers at all levels must always maintain 
close contact with the enemy, carry out night attacks with an element 
of their respective units depending upon the situation and detect the 
enemy plans by taking every conceivable means such as taking prison- 
ers or using intelligence agents. 

When the enemy retreat at night has been detected, commanding 
officers at all levels must immediately destroy the remainirig hostile 
troops and carry out pursuit* In this instance, if even a single 
small unit succeeds in penetrating deep into the enemy position by 
dint of intrepid action, the eneiqy will be thrown into utter confu- 
sion and great results will be obtained. 

It is particularly important for the division commander to dis- 
pose his troops speedily to carry out night pursuit and he must as- 
sign necessary units to the various lines of advance and use them in 
close pursuit of the enemy. If enemy resistance is encountered and 
an engagement results, it is very important not to commit large troops 



209 



in the engagement but attempt mobile pursuit insofar as possible. 

In night pursuit, it is especially important for the command- 
ing officers to endeavor to control their units and maintain liaison. 



210 



CHAPTER II 
Withdrawal 

223* The time to start withdrawal must be fixed depending upon the 
enemy situation and the situation of the friendly forces, our plans 
and the terrain conditions, etc, but withdrawal must be carried out 
under cover of darkness so long as the situation permits. 
230 + Jn carrying out withdrawal at night, all preparations must be 
made beforehand during the day insofar as possible in such manner 
as to avoid detection by the enemy; especially necessary preparations 
in the real 1 must be completed at the appropriate tjjue to ensure 
smooth execution of withdrawal under cover of darkness. 

In order to conceal preparations for and execution of with- 
drawal at night, it is usually necessary for each unit, if it is 
located near the enemy, to leave a small element of its strength at 
important points on the first line so t.hat the enemy may not per- 
ceive the change in the existing situation and thereby cover the 
withdrawal of the main strength. Sometimes, it is desirable to car- 
ry out night attack on the enemy with an element of the unit to con- 
ceal our attempt or deceive the eneiiQTv 

It is advantageous to assemble the units, which withdrew from 
the first line, in the immediate rear of the battle front, promptly 
secure their control, move them gradually to the designated routes 
of withdrawal and organize them into march columns. It is highly 



211 



necessary to assign the withdrawal sectors with this consideration* 
231 . The time of vdthdrawal of the units which are left behind when 
withdrawing at night will be fixed usually by order of the division 
commander in consideration of the situation, especially the relative 
difficulty of withdrawal and the subsequent plans. 

The remaining unit must check the pursuit by the enemy, throw 
the enemy into confusion by launching an intrepid counterattack if 
the situation requires it, and attempt to break away from the enenjy 
by seizing that opportunity. In such instance, all members of the 
units from the commanding officer down to the men, must act especial- 
ly in a self-composed and bold manner. In case the withdrawal is 
carried into the morning of the followirg day, a covering force will 
be established specially for the remaining units, if necessary. In 
this instance, it is desirable to use as mobile a unit as possible* 



212 



APPENDIX II 



Extract of Items 
Combat from the 
Established in 



Relative to Night 
Infantry Manual 
February 1940 



213 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Preface 

General Principles 

BOOK I Individual Training 
CHAPTER II Combat 
CHAPTER III Night Actions 

BOOK II Company Training 

CHAPTER III Night Combat 

BOOK III Machine Gun and Automatic Gun 
Training 

CHAPTER IV Night Combat 

BOOK IV Infantry Gun Training 
CHAPTER IV Night Combat 

BOOK V Battalion Training 
CHAPTER II Combat 
CHAPTER III Night Combat 

BOOK VII Regimental Training 
CHAPTER III Night Combat 



215 



Preface 

11, Infantry is the nucleus of the army. As the pivotal force for 
cooperation among various arms, it always performs the principal 
mission in the field of battle and deals the final, decisive blow in 
combat . 

The primary mission of the infantry is to carry out combat 
irrespective of terrain conditions and time elements and annihilate 
the enemy by shock action. Moreover, the infantry must carry out 
combat single-handedly even if no cooperation is forthcoming from 
other arms. 

The infantry Tdll handle weapons carefully at all times, econo- 
mize on ammunition and materials and treat horses with due kindness. 

General Principles 
6. The infantry must be skilled especially in night actions. There- 
fore, it will conduct training at night repeatedly as in the day to 
attain consummate skill in night actions. Total familiarity in the 
utilization of dawn and dusk is also indispensable. 



217 



BOOK I Individual Training 

CHAPTER II 
Conibai 

68 . Among the actions of troops, the assault is especially impor- 
tant. The men must have implicit faith in the superiority of fri- 
endly forces in hand to hand combat, charge the energy -with intre- 
pidity at the risk of their lives and overwhelm and annihilate the 
hostile force. They must never fall behind their commanding officer 
or fellow soldiers in the assault. 

The men will fix their bayonets freely when they have approach- 
ed the enemy and the time to launch the assault has drawn near. 



219 



CHAPTER III 
Night Actions 

71 , The men must become accustomed to the darkness of night , espe- 
cially in using their ears and eyes effectively and in acting with 
presence of mind and a daring spirit. For this purpose, it is es- 
sential to be thoroughly proficient in night actions, especially in 
the advance and assault in undulating or fortified areas and be capa- 
ble of negotiating steep terrains, 

72 . The men must be trained to develop their capacity to detect the 
enemy swiftly, and estimate its strength, distance and activities at 
night. They must also be trained in distinguishing terrain features 
and natural objects as well as the change in their utility and ac- 
tions while wearing gas masks. 

At night, it is necessary to maintain direction and reach the 
scheduled point without fail. For this purpose, the men will be 
trained not only in developing their capacity to determine directions 
but also to accustom them to maintain direction with the aid of con- 
spicuous marks of the terrain features or natural objects they memo- 
rized in the day. 

22* 1^ is necessary to train men thoroughly in the essentials of 
marchixjg in stealth to conceal plans at night, measures for the pre- 
vention of noise caused by body-strapped equipage and the handling 
of weapons, actions to be taken in response to signals and actions 



221 



to be taken in illuminations. Develop in them the habit of avoidirjg 
unnecessary utterance and train them in quick and resolute advance 
and crawling advance under various conditions and through various 
terrains. 

74 . Night assault must be carried out resolutely without being 
restrained by terrain conditions and natural objects. Trainirg in 
hurling hand grenades is also necessary. Do not raise a battle cry 
when carrying out a night assault. 

75 « The men must be capable of makirig at their discretion the pre- 
paration for night firing and rendering accurate fire. Even if no 
facilities are available, riflemen, light machine gunners and gre- 
nade discharger operators must be able to render effective fire 
against the enemy at the shortest range, the former two by holdirjg 
the rifles or light machine guns parallel, with the ground and in 
correct firirg positions, the latter by holding the grenade dis- 
chargers in the proper position. 



222 



BOOK II Company Training 



CHAPTER III 
Night Conbat 

Section A. Attack 

207 * Night attack must be carried oat after making especially 
thorough preparations, with all company personnel from the company 
commander down to the men belie vijqg firmly in certain victory. A 
well-trained company full of aggressive spirit and with- stror^g unity 
is able to succeed in night attack by overcomii^; all difficulties, 
208. Upon receipt of orders on night attack, the company commander 
mil disclose hi? plan to the platoon leaders, reconnoiter the enemy 
situation and terrain conditions > have his subordinates memorize the 
terrain features and natural objects as thoroughly as possible, in- 
form them in detail of the condition of enemy positions and if the 
situation permits, conduct preliminary exercises by using similar 
terrains and natural objects. 

209 * When attempting night attacks, the company commander will 
gather the platoon leaders during the day insofar as possible, issue 
precise orders at the actual site and instruct them to laake various 
preparations. As mentioned in the precedir^ paragraph he will indi- 
cate necessary matters such as the situation, the company commander's 
plans, especially the targets of attack of the company, the procedure 
to carry out the combat, the disposition for advance and assault, the 



223 



methods to maintain direction and of destroying obstacles, security, 
liaison and the measures to be taken after enemy positions, are 
seized. 

Heavy weapons are usually employed to secure captured positions, 
and for this purpose, they will be moved forward in the rear of the 
company. Automatic guns will sometimes be left behind depending upon 
the situation. 

210 . In night attack, strict control over security should be ex- 
ercised in order to conceal the plans. Equipage and weapons vri.ll be 
strapped firmly to the body and other measures will be taken to avoid 
making sounds and verbal comrr&nd will be avoided except in case of 
assault, Furtheimore, all lights will be thoroughly concealed from 
the enemy and no loading will be permitted, troops will carry markirgs 
in order to facilitate identification. At the same time, all officers 
and men will be thoroughly informed of the advance route to be taken 
after charging into the eneipy position. 

211 . In executing a night attack by destroying obstacles, the enemy 
situation, especially the conditions, of obstacles and the measures 
for flank defense, will be reconnoitered. A careful plan based on 
our intentions will be established concerning the destruction points, 
the number of breaches and the time and method of dest miction and 
adequate preparations will be made. 

212 . In consideration of the possible hindrance by the enemy , suf- 
ficient time should be allotted to the task of destroying obstacles. 



224 



However, premature destruction of obstacles my reveal our plan and 
give the enemy time for repairs. 

The destruction of obstacle will be carried out in utmost 
secrecy, and only when the situation renders this impossible will 
it be carried out by aggressive action. In this case, it is neces- 
sary to advance an element to the vicinity of obstacles to cover 
the operation in case of an enemy sally or obstruct the enemy repair 
work on the destroyed section* 

213 * A company approaching the enemy at night v/ill advance quietly 
in a formation to facilitate action, dispatch patrols in such direc- 
tions as may be required for security, ensure liaison with the bat- 
talion commander and maintain the advancing route so as to be able 
to reach the object without fail even if contact is broken. 
214 * In order to approach the enemy at night, the company commander 
must advance at the head of his troops, command by means of signs 
and prevent deviation from the advancing route due to rifle shots or 
battle cries from various directions. 

If the advancing company is caught in the illumination of ef- 
fective fire of the ene/iy, it should halt temporarily or utilize 
shadows. In this case, the company must neither delay its advance 
nor deviate from the route of advance. 

If small enemy units or enemy sentinels or dogs are encounter- 
ed during the advance, the security patrol will raid them or the 
company commander will take such appropriate measures, as placing 



225 



some troops at his disposal and employing them as required, while 
the nucleus of the company will continue to approach the enemy ag- 
gressively. 

215 , Upon arrival at the position to prepare for assault, the com- 
pany will promptly contact its advance elements and become thorough- 
ly acquainted with the eneniy situation and the terrain, especially 
the conditions of destruction of obstacles, establish its position 
for the assault and thoroughly orient the subordinates with regard 
to the disposition, and complete all preparations. In this case, 

it is advisable to take such measures as preparing for smoke screen- 
ing to cover passage through the breaches or advancing an element to 
the front beforehand. 

216 . The attack formation of the company at night varies according 
to the situation, but it must be such as to ensure command and con- 
trol and be suitable for effective close-quarter combat and moreover, 
to facilitate movement as much as possible. The minimizing of losses 
will also be taken into consideration. 

217 « In an assault, the company commander will lead the company and, 
normally commanding its entire strength, ensure control over his sub- 
ordinates. Utilizing the terrain, the troops will approach the eneiqy 
as stealthily as possible, by crawling if necessary. They will then 
penetrate the enemy position without firing and advance to the assign- 
ed target in a swift move. In this case, if necessary, an element 
will be used to overcome enemy obstruction or capture necessary pill- 



226 



boxes. In case the troops come under heavy enemy fire from short 
range, whether they should charge immediately or further approach 
the enemy by taking advantage of the terrain or by crawling and then 
assault the enemy position, will depend upon the situation. 

In capturing pillboxes, it is advantageous to take the enemy 
by surprise and penetrate the enemy position from its flank or rear, 
if possible* In this instance, it is sometimes advisable to divert 
the enemy's attention skilfully. When capturing the target assigned 
to the company, it is sometimes advantageous to use an element to 
capture it by taking advantage of the terrain and the enenjy disposi- 
tion and then use the main strength to secure it. In night attack, 
it is necessary to take precautions to prevent accidental fighting 
among friendly forces. 

218 . Immediately after capturing the assigned objective, the com- 
pany commander will promptly restore order, reconnoiter the eneiqy 
situation and the terrain, secure liaison with the battalion com- 
mander and adjacent units, dispose his company, provide against eneujy 
counterattack by preparing to fire within the shortest range, conduct- 
ing necessary fortifications and exercising strict control over se- 
curity, and prepare for subsequent actions. 
Section B. Defense 

219 * As night, the company normally increases its strength along the 
first line and defends itself at each strong point. In this instance, 
it is essential for the company commander to take such steps as chang- 
ing the disposition of posts or disposing an element of the reserve 



227 



force at necessary points as may be required and thereby ensure de- 
fense at night and forestall the enemy. 

In effecting the change in disposition from day to night, it 
is necessary to prevent the eneipy from taking advantage of the occa- 
sion. 

220 . The fire net at night will consist mainly of frontal fire and 
be set up so as to be effective at the shortest range. For this pur- 
pose, the company, as required, will change the daytime firing area, 
advance the position of heavy arms to the vicinity of the foremost 
line, and fire at important areas in the immediate front of the posi- 
tion especially by use of machine guns. 

If there is danger of a tank attack at night, automatic guns 
will be disposed, and close-quarter combat squads (teams) will be 
disposed in the vicinity of the foremost line of the necessary area 
— in front of the position — if necessary. 

As for firing at night, careful arrangements must be made among 
the friendly units to avoid danger to each other. 

221. At night, the strongpoints must concentrate strength insofar 
as the display of fire power is not restrained and secure command 
and control, thereby enabling close-quarter combat to be carried out 
effectively. 

At night,, the reserve unit will be employed mainly for counter- 
attack. It normally moves its position forward to the vicinity pf 
the first line and undertakes preparations so as to be employed readily. 



228 



222 « Various obstacles, especially mobile obstacles, must be skil- 
fuDy utilized, because even simple ones are effective at night. In 
this case, the obstacles must be set up so as to render it difficult 
for the enemy to hurl hand grenades. 

223 » Security at night will be chiefly maintained by the out guard 
and the sentries disposed in f ront ,of the positions by the strong 
point. The company commander normally maintains close liaison with 
^units concerned by indicating the line of sentries to be dispatched 
from the strorjg point, the return route of the outguard and other 
necessary matters* When using obstacles, special measures will be 
taken to prevent them from being destroyed. 

To guard against the approach of the enemy and increase the 
fire power, the frontal area will be illuminated with flares or other 
various illuminating devices. However, care must be taken not to 
expose our position and produce the adverse effect of facilitating 
enemy action. 

It is desirable to use dogs effectively for security purposes 
at night . 

224 . Especially aft night, liaison must be secured. In case of emer- 
gency, it is advantageous to dispatch an eleuent to obstruct t he- 
enemy with grenade dischargers or hand grenades. In this case, how- 
ever, care must be taken to prevent confusion in the combat of the 
company. 

If the enemy troops are known to be approaching and fortifying 



229 



their position or destroying obstacles, they will be obstructed by 
the sally of an element or by f iring and repairs will be carried out 
speedily. 

In any case, necessary signs will be fixed so as to prevent 
friendly troops from opposing each other and the field of fire will 
be designated by every means possible with a view to facilitate their 
action. 

226 . If the eneny troops have reached a point at the shortest range, 
the guards of the strorjg point will act calmly and annihilate them 
by heavy firing, hurlirg hand grenades and engaging in hand to hand 
combat. In this case, premature sallies must be avoided. 

If the enemy troops have penetrated the strong point, the 
guards will annihilate them in desperate hand to hand combat. 

227 . A strong point not attacked by the eneuoy will maintain strict 
watch, secure liaison with adjacent points, and if circumstances 
permit, cooperate in the combat of the adjacent points. However, 
care must be taken not to be confused by the local attack into hasti- 
ly moving troops from the strong point and neglecting the primary 
task. 

228 . If the enemy troops have been thrown into confusion at the 
shortest range in front of the position or have penetrated the com- 
pany position, the company commander will boldly carry out a counter- 
attack and annihilate them with the reserve unit. If the enemy is 
repulsed, the company commander will restore order, exercise strict 



230 



control over security and observe the enemy's subsequent action. 
Section C. Pursuit and Withdrawal 

229 * At night, the company commander will maintain close contact 
with the enemy, detect his retreat at the earliest moment and pursue 
him rapidly. In this case, the company commander will secure control 
over his subordinates, protect the front and sides, be constantly 
prepared for close quarter combat and carry out a determined thrust 
into the enemy. 

230 * In withdrawing at night from a point near the enemy, the plan 
will be kept in utmost secrecy. For this purpose, enemy reconnais- 
sance will be obstructed and troop movement, before sunset, will be 
avoided. 

In withdrawing, if the eneipy is near, small units will normally 
be left at key points along the line formerly occupied by the batta- 
lion, thereby covering the withdrawal of the main body. 
231 . The remaining units will maintain strict security, prevent the 
enemy scouts 1 reconnaissance and penetration, and deceive the enemy 
by every possible means. It will attempt to repulse the attack of 
the enemy by heavy firing and, if necessary, launch a counterattack, 
thereby concealing the withdrawal plan and holding its position to 
the very end. 

In this case, the self-sacrificing spirit of the commander and 
his subordinates will enable the friendly troops to withdraw from the 
fighting zone. 



231 



When the time for the covering units to withdraw is at hand, 
it is desirable for all units to try to withdraw simultaneously by 
maintaining contact with adjacent units* 



232 



BOOK III Machine Gun and Automatic Gun Training 

CHAPTER IV 
Night Combat 

330 * The machine gun section and the automatic gun section must be 
adept in night movements , especially in advancing over uneven ground, 
taking up of firing positions, firing preparations and firing ac- 
tions, particularly, loading, laying and remedial action, 
331 * In approaching the enemy at night, the pack-horse, usually un- 
loaded, will be attended by a person in charge and left behind so 
that it. may be brought forward any time. 

The movement of the ordinary infantry company in approaching 
the enemy at night will apply hereto. 

332 , In night attack, the machine gun section or the automatic gun 
section will ensure liaison with the commander of the unit to which 
it is attached, and when ordered to secure a captured position it 
will readily advance to the ordered point, contact the infantry along 
the first line, re conno iter the frontal area, and promptly prepare 
to fire. 

333 ♦ In firing at night, careful preparations will be made during 
daylight, and an agreement will be made, beforehand, with units con- 
cerned, as to firing targets (area), firing time, positions, the 
method to mark the location of friendly troops and the liaison system 
so that all dangers to friendly troops may be precluded. 



233 



Firing at the enemy 1 s illuminatiJTg facilities at night will be 
best conducted from the shortest range, 

334 . In changing from the day disposition to that of night, arrange- 
ments will be made with related units, reconnaissance carried out 
quickly, firing preparations and the markirjg of routes to new posi- 
tions completed before sundown. It jLa -advisable to take advantage of 
dusk for the change of positions but care must be exercised to pre- 
vent enemy detection of the plans. 

335 * In night defense, the machine gun section or the automatic gun 
section, usually situated near the foremost front, vail maintain 
close contact with friendly units, detect enemy approach by various 
means and carry out timely and effective firing. In this instance, 
it is advantageous to illuminate the enemy position. 
336 . At night, the company commander and the platoon commander must 
take special measures for their respective defense; the squad leader 
and the machine gunner or the gunner, usually located near the machine 
gun or the gun, must maintain strict watch against eneipy surprise 
attacks. If enemy troops approach the machine gun or the gun, they 
must be annihilated in determined hand to hand combat* 



234 



BOOK IV Infantry Gun Training 



CHAPTER IV 
Night Coxibat 

467 ♦ Infantry gunners require a thorough trainirg in night actions, 
especially in advance over undulatix^ ground, takirjg up of firir^ 
positions, firing preparations and firirjg actions, particularly load- 
ing and sighting. 

468 * In approaching the enemy at night, pack horses or draft horses, 
usually unloaded or unhooked, will be left behind, protected and 'at- 
tended by a person in charge and measures will be taken so that they 
may be brought forth when necessary. 

The actions to be taken in approaching the eneiqy at night mall 
be similar to those of the infantry company in general. In this in- 
stance, special care must be exercised to avoid vehicle sounds. 
469 . For night firing, careful preparations must be made duriiig day- 
light, including arrangements with the related units, the location of 
the position, the time to fire, the firing target (area), etc., com- 
munications with these units and connecting files to be dispatched to 
eliminate all dangers to friendly troops. In this instance, it is 
advantageous to utilize illumination. 

470 * In night firing, indirect aimixjg with a light as the aligning 
point is usually adopted in the case of regimental or battalion guns, 
while direct aimiiig at a light or an illuminated target is adopted in 



235 



the case of antitank gun. Care must be taken to prevent enemy 
detection of the light. 

471 ♦ At night, the company commander and the platoon commander must 
take special measures for their respective defense; the squad leader 
and the gunner, usually located near the gun, must maintain strict 
watch against enemy surprise attacks. If enemy troops approach the 
gun, they must be annihilated in determined hand-to-hand combat. 



236 



BOOK V Battalion Training 



CHAPTER II 
Combat 

514 . When attempting to approach the enemy in taking up the attack 
position under cover of night and launching attack from dawn, the 
battalion commander must, during daylight insofar as possible, con- 
duct reconnaissance and make arrangements with the regimental gun 
section, the tank section and the artillery, conceal his intentions 
and indicate the plans relative to the attack as soon as possible 
and issue necessary orders regarding the outline of the attack dis- 
position, the attack position, the advance to assume that position 
and the destruction of obstacles and thereby enable the various units 
to make adequate preparations from daylight. 

515 » To assume the attack position at night, the battalion will act 
in accordance with the principles adopted for night attack* 

As soon as the battalion advances to the attack position, the 
battalion commander will maintain control over his subordinates, 
start fortification work, conduct close reconnaissance of enemy posi- 
tions, take measures to cope with enemy sallies and endeavor to com- 
plete by daybreak necessary assault preparations such as the destruc- 
tion of obstacles, supplementation of the arrangements with the regi- 
mental gun section, the tank section and the artilleiy, effecting 
combat readiness of equipment, and, if possible, the destruction of 
the enengr's flank defenses. 

237 



If a contaminated area exists in the vicinity of the attack 
position, it is advisable to make attack preparations after advanc-- 
ing beyond that area, if possible. Decontamination will be conduct- 
ed by each unit under the over-all supervision of the battalion com- 
mander. 

516 . In conducting dawn attack, if the assault is to be carried out 
subsequent to artillery firing after daybreak, the battalion command- 
er must avoid losses as much as possible by utilizing the fortifica- 
tions and at the same time, change the assault disposition gradually 
as the enemy situation or the terrain becomes clear, also seize 
opportunities to destroy the enemy's heavy weapons, especially flank 
defenses, and thus complete preparations for the assault. In this 
case, the disposition of the units will be inspected by taking advan- 
tage of daybreak and be charged if necessary. 

517 * In executirg an attack at daybreak, if the assault is to be 
carried out by establishixg the attack position at the shortest pos- 
sible range from the enemy and by taking advantage of the dawn, the 
assault disposition of a battalion will be similar to that in attack 
in daylight, but the units of company strength and below will appro- 
priately maintain close formation to facilitate their movement and 
assault the enemy position swiftly without exchanging tire. 

With the approach of sunrise, the unit which has penetrated 
the enemy position will gradually shift to daytime formation so that 
it can successfully cariy out subsequent actions. In this instance, 



238 



smoke will sometimes be used to prolog the early daylight conditions. 

The battalion commander will make careful attack preparations 
to ensure complete cooperation among infantry, tanks and artillery 
immediately after sunrise, and at the same time, he will make careful 
preparations, especially regarding liaison with artillery and the use 
of heavy weapons, in consideration of the possibility of the assault 
continuing until sunrise, 

518 + In case of an assault at dusk, approach the eneiqy and launch 
assault by tactfully utilizing the cover of the growirig darkness. 
In this case, the attack disposition of the battalion will be at 
first in accordance with the procedure of a daytime attack, but with 
the growing of darkness, the troops will be gradually concentrated, 
and the units of company strength and below will charge the enemy 
position without exchanging fire. The action to be taken after "the 
charge will be in accordance with the procedure of night attack. 

The battalion commander will have the heavy weapons and cooper- 
ating artillery complete adequate preparations and support the attack 
as required. Moreover, it would be advantageous to be able to secure 
the cooperation of tanks in the initial assault. 



239 



CHAPTER III 
Night Combat 

Section A. Attack 

ft38 • In night attack, an out numbered force can defeat its foe by 
conspicuously displaying the characteristics of the infantry. A 
battalion is especially suitable for the execution of an independent 
night attack. Therefore, the battalion commander must positively 
under-take to plan and carry out night attacks, 

539 « If it has been decided to launch a night attack, the battalion 
commander will promptly indicate his plan to the company commanders, 
etc* * so that they may have sufficient time for preparation and fami- 
liarize the commanders and their subordinates with the terrain of the 
attack area and the conditions of the enemy position. In this case, 
it is essential that they memorize the terrain features and natural 
objects especially in consideration of their appearance in the dark- 
ness of night. 

Reconnaissance will be continued from day into night; especial- 
ly, changes in the enemy situation will be reconnoitered by taking 
advantage of the dusk. 

540 * In order to carry out a night attack, a battalion will usually 
be divided into the first-line force and the reserve force. In case 
the enenjy position is to be occupied in depth, a second-line attack 
force is often organized. In this case, too, a reserve force is 
organized as required. 



241 



In either case, a highly flexible disposition instead of a 
precise and complex one must be adopted for night attack. 
541 * In order to execute a night attack, the battalion commander 
will assemble company commanders, and others during the day, if pos- 
sible, and issue precise orders at the actual site. His orders will 
include necessary matters such as the situation, his plans, especial- 
ly the attack targets and combat procedure of the bat t alio n> designa- 
tion of the first-line company and its attack objective, assignment 
of heavy weapons, disposition for advance and assault, action of the 
reserve force, maintenance of direction, destruction of obstacles, 
reconnaissance, security, liaison, method of distinguishing the fri- 
endly forces from the enemy force, and if necessary, repulsion of 
security elements, disposition for mopping up within the position, 
action to be taken after capturing the position and decontamination. 
Sometimes, the company commanders concerned will be instructed before- 
hand in measures to be taken in case the attack does not progress 
according to schedule. 

Regarding the attack objective of a company, the points to be 
captured by each company will be indicated. 

If required by the situation, attack must be carried out 
regardless of the fact that complete preparations may not have been 
made during the day. 

J>/fc2. Machine guns will be used mainly to secure a captured position. 
For this purpose, they will usually cooperate with the reserve force. 



242 



Infantry guns will usually be used for combat after sunrise and some- 
times for such purposes as securing a captured position. For these 
purposes, they will cooperate with the reserve force or will be tem- 
porarily left behind and moved forward again at a suitable time. 

If necessary, part of the machine guns and infantry guns will 
bewsedto fire upon illuminating equipment, etc. 

Even when an attack is carried out by taking advantage of the 
power of artillery fire, from the beginning of the attack, firing of 
rifles and light machine guns is prohibited, 

543 . The battalion commander normally captures the sector of advance 
or the key points in front of the eneny position with snail units 
beforehand and cover movement or facilitate the preparation for as- 
sault. In this instance, it is necessary to conceal plans and 
maintain close contact so as to avoid mistakes, 

5% . In night attacks, the battalion commander will ordinarily as- 
semble the main body and approach the enemy and then order the com- 
panies to advance in columns and make preparation for the assault. 

Depending upon the situation, it is sometimes advantageous to 
have the front line companies separately approach the enemy and pre- 
pare for the assault, in which case the battalion commander exercises 
necessary control over their action. 

545 . When approaching the enemy at night, the battalion commander 
advances at the head of the battalion and gives over -all direction 
regardixig the movement of the battalion by keeping a unit directly 



243 



under his control. 

The formation of a battalion must be decided in consideration 
of subsequent employment and must be as simple as possible to faci- 
litate advance and ensure control, 

546 . For the maintenance of direction at night, it is preferable to 
fix the direction by natural objects, and indicate in either front 
or rear a base point which diows the direction of advance, or indi- 
cate the routes of advance by marking materials or markers. It may 
be advisable to have selected patrols lead the unit* In either 
case, the compass and route marker are used together. The mainte- 
nance of direction in the enemy position requires careful prepara- 
tion. In this case, the use of tracer bullets is advantageous. 
547 * In night attacks, it is of particular importance for a comr- 
mander to indicate his position from time to time and for officers 
and men to be in constant readiness to come under the control of 
their respective commander. For liaison at night, a particularly 
sure method must be used and for the concealment of intention, exces- 
sive use of communications should be avoided and the headquarters 
and each company should indicate their respective routes of advance 
and connect them appropriately with each other, 

548 . Whether the demolition of the enemy's obstacles at night should 
be executed -under the unified direction of the battalion commander 
or on the initiative of each front line company will depend upon the 
situation. When each front line company destroys obstacles on its 



2LA 



own initiative, the battalion commander will exercise general con- 
trol over the time to dispatch demolition squads, their protection, 
point to be demolished, method of demolition and hours of completion, 
etc* 

549 « Upon completion of preparation for an assault, the battalion 
commander should order the front line companies to launch the assault, 
and resolutely direct the fightirg, if necessaiy, repulsing enemy- 
count era t tacks with the reserve. 

If the front line company seizes the scheduled point, the bat- 
talion commander will promptly restore order, secure liaison with 
various units, and, if necessaiy, commit heavy weapons to the firing 
position, take measures for search and security, guard strictly 
against the enemy's attack for recoverirg positions previously lost, 
mop up the remaining enemy and prepare for subsequent actions. 
550 . The strength of the two attack echelons to be employed in an 
attack carried out in two waves will be decided in consideration of 
the depth and condition of the enemy positions to be captured. 

The battalion commander will order the first attack wave to 
capture the first line position necessaiy to break through the enemy 
position. The frontage to be seized wilJL be decided in consideration 
of the terrain, especially, the field of fire of the enemy position. 

The battalion commander, upon observing the success of the 
first attack wave, will command the second attack wave and the re- 
serve. Placid demolitions squads at the head of the second wave, 



245 



he will seize key points within the enemy position by passing 
through the first attack wave, and will order the second attack wave 
to charge at the proper time and seize the desired points. 

The time for the second attack wave to pass thro the first 
attack wave should be as soon as possible after the initial assault 
so as not to give the enemy time to recover; but care must be taken 
not to plunge the first attack wave units into confusion. 
551 * Liaison with the second attack wave which passes through the 
first attack wave must be secured so as to avoid mistakes and con- 
fusion. Even when the enemy counte rat tacks , firing is not permitted 
except when it can be recognized that firing does not endanger the 
units which have broken through. 

552 . The second attack wave normally determines its attack disposi- 
tion prior to an attack and advances in a formation appropriate for 
an attack. It should follow the first attack wave, reducing the 
distance and interval between units in order to avoid confusion that 
is apt to arise when passing through the first attack wave, and as- 
sume the required formation immediately after passage is accomplished. 
553 * When the second attack wave takes the point ordered for seizure, 
the battalion commander will secure the area it has been ordered to 
secure, and prepares for subsequent actions by calling up the first 
attack wave, if necessary. 

554 * When tanks are attached for night attacks, they will be employ- 
ed mainly for the destruction of wire entanglements, previously 



24b 



located heavy weapons, and flank defense weapons on the enemy front 
line. 

The battalion commander will ordinarily attach tanks to cojfr- 
panies and coordinate the time of their entry into action. The in- 
fantry will furnish as much support as possible to tanks by openix^g 
and marking the routes of advance and giving protection to them. 
$55 • If necessary, commanders will be designated for heavy weapons 
left behind when carrying out night attack and measures taken for 
their respective defense. At the same time, all conceivable measures 
such as liaison and the marking of the line of advance for follow-up 
at the suitable time will be taken. 
Section B. Defense 

ft56 . In night defense, ordinarily the first line companies will 
firmly defend the areas occupied during the day and at the same time, 
foil the enenQT's attack plans by taking various positive measures. 
$57 . For the purpose of night defense, the battalion commander will 
newly dispose, as required, an element of his strer^gth in the area 
where the gap between companies is great or at a point of special 
geographical importance. It may also be used for reinforcement of 
the company in an important area, and advanced to the vicinity of 
the first line prepared to counterattack. 

j>j5S. At night, the battalion commander must detect the eneajy attempt 
and take precautions against enen^y approach. For this purpose, he 
will take various measures such as conducting careful reconnaissance, 



2un 



assigning additional security duties to the first line companies, 
effecting close coordination among the security units, obstructing 
the enemy movement through occupation of important points in the for- 
ward area by small units or obstructing the eneipy movement by the 
sortie of small units, 

559 * At night, the battalion commander normally returns the company 
machine guns placed under his direct command to the company, advances 
and disposes necessary heavy weapons near the front line and prepares 
them for firing upon important sectors immediately in front of the 
positions. 

560 » At night, the battalion commander will effect close liaison 
especially with the front line and prepares to use the reserve force 
at a suitable time. If enenQr troops are thrown into confusion in 
the area immediately in front of the positions or if they penetrate 
the battalion positions, he will immediately carry out a resolute 
counterattack with the reserve force and destroy them. In this in- 
stance, it is advantageous to use even a single small unit to attack 
the flank or rear of the enemy. However, hasty sorties abandoning 
the positions must be avoided. 

561 . The battalion commander will issue orders at a suitable time 
regarding the change from day to night disposition so that sufficient 
time may be available to prepare for such change. This also applies 
when reverting to the day disposition. 
Section C. Pursuit and Retrograde Movements 



248 



562 . Upon detection of the enemy retreat at night, the battalion 
commander will immediately carry out close pursuit of the enemy. 
In this instance, it is necessary to send forward even a single 
small unit deep into the enemy position by bold actions, also indi- 
cate objectives at appropriate time and secure control over the sub- 
ordinates. 

The enemy situation and the pursuit measures will be promptly 
reported to the higher commander and the adjacent units notified. 

563 . When withdrawii^g at night, the attempt will be concealed by 
takiiTg the greatest possible precautions. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to obstruct enemy reconnaissance and avoid troop movement 
before sunset insofar as possible. It is advantageous to deceive 
the enemy by taking positive measures such as intensifying patrol 
activity and sometimes attacking the enemy with a small unit. 

When withdrawing, it is essential to make thorough prepara- 
tions such as making preparations in the rear area beforehand, re- 
connoitering the route of withdrawal, etc, and settling up necessary 
markers . 

564 * In case some units are left behind in a .night withdrawal, defi- 
nite missions will be assigned to tiiem, necessary matters relative 
to their subsequent actions will be indicated to them and insofar as 
possible, a single officer will be designated to command these units 
to ensure close coordination among them. In night withdrawal, even 
simple obstacles set in the route of the enemy advance will serve to 
retard pursuit. 

249 



BOOK VII Regimental Training 

CHAPTER III 
Night Confcat 

667 ♦ In night attack, usually the key-points in the enenjy position 
will be chosen as the objectives of attack in accordance with the 
purpose of the attack and the situation, especially the condition 
of the enemy position, and in consideration of tactical requirements. 

In night attack, the regimental commander will assign attack 
targets to each battalion. 

When carrying out night attack by disposix^ battalions in rows, 
the regimental commander will indicate the time of assault by each 
battalion and, if necessary, matters required for the regulation of 
movements. 

When the attacking force is disposed in two lines by parallel- 
ing the battalions to capture the enemy position in depth, the regi- 
mental commander will show in his orders where and "when the second 
line battalion should over-take the first line battalion. 
668. In nig ht attack, regimental guns will usually be left behind 
to fire at the enemy's illuminatir^ equipment, etc. as required. 



251 



APPENDIX III 
Extracts from "Raiding Combat Manual" 



253 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 



Introduction 257 

General Principles 259 

CHAPTER I Command and Employment of Rading Ufoits 263 

CHAPTER II Preparation for Surprise Raids 269 

CHAPTER III Inf iltration and Concealed Movement 275 

CHAPTER IV Preparations for Attack 281 

CHAPTER V Attacks Against Various Targets 287 

APPENDED CHARTS 

No 1 Field Rations to be Carried by Each Man . 29$ 

No 2 Organization and Equipment of a Raiding Unit > 

Consisting of Five Infantrymen (or Engineers) 296-297 

No 3 Equipment to be Carried by Raiding Unit 298-299 

No U Organization, Equipment and Disposition of a 

Raiding Unit in the Approach (Size* One-half 

Platoon ) 300-301 

No 5 Organization and Equipment of a Raiding Unit 

in the Attack (Size* One-half Platoon) 302 

No 6 Example of the Execution of an Attack b& a 

Raiding Unit (Size: One Infantry Platoon) 303-304 

No 7 Attack Procedures Against Various Targets 305-314 



255 



INTRODUCTION 



1. The term "raidixig" as used in this book refers primarily 
to small units which infiltrate eneipy positions to accomplish any 
or all of the following missions: 

a. The destruction of enemy personnel and war materiel. 

b. The collection of information (Either capture of 
prisoners or documents). 

c. General harassment of rear areas. 

2. As a general rule, raiding units are composed of rifle 
units. 

3. Strength of raidixig units will range from a few men to a 
full infantry company, and the period of activity will range from 
several days to two weeks* 



257 



General Principles 
1* There is no fixed method for executing a raiding operation 
inasmuch as each differs according to the nature of the operation, 
the enemy situation, the terrain, and the trend of the local inhabi- 
tants 1 sentiment. It is of particular importance that initiative 
and originality be exercised, and that the procedures contained in 
this manual be applied when an applicable situation exists, 

2. A surprise raid is primarily a raid upon a superior enemy 
force carried out for the purpose of assaulting enemy troops and 
supply points, utilizing elusive movement and ingenious means to 
pave the way for victory of other friendly forces* Therefore, the 
commanding officer of a raiding unit, as well as the rest of the 
raiding personnel, must be possessed of a strong sense of devotion 
and must maintain solid unity and develop fighting ability to such 
a degree that each man can kill 1,000 enemy troops. They must be 
capable of exercising originality in their tactics in order to con- 
fuse the enejpy, and maintain an unyielding spirit that will inspire 
each man to fight to the last. 

3. In training the raiding unit particular attention must be 
paid to the following matters: 

a. Each man will familiarize himself with: 

(1) Combat tactics for night assault especially for a 
night assault to be launched by a small team. 

(2) Basic rules for handling explosives and for demo- 
lishing various targets. 

259 



(3) Snipirig, hand grenade throwing, and close combat 

tactics. 

(4) Speedy deployment and assembly, and execution of 
command, liaison, and movement by means of signals (such as gestures, 
flares, and whistles). 

(5) Patrol procedures, particularly the method of 
quickly discovering enemy troops, obstacles, firearms,, and tanks by 
intuition or by interpretation of various phenomena. 

(6) Basic knowledge of trickery and deceptive tactics. 

(7) Methods of handling and utilizing enemy equipment 
and materials. 

b. Each man will familiarize himself with the followirjg 
matters necessary for executing infiltration and concealed movement: 

(1) Methods of determining direction, measuririg dis- 
tance, and locatii^ source of sounds. 

(2) Concealed movement and ambush. 

(3) Ways in which to pass through natural obstacles, 
especially jungles, to cross rivers, and to ascend or descend a 
cliffs and trees. 

(4) Immediate recognition and interpretation of various 

phenomena. 

(5) Methods of swift advance and retreat, concealment 
of trails, deceptive movement, and secret communication. 

c. Attention must be paid also to the followiJTg: 



260 



(1) Customs, manners and language of local inhabitants 
and method of appeasement. 

(2) Clever disguise and camouflage. 

(3) Requisition of local clothing and food supplies. 

(4) Cultivation of the ability to observe and memorize 
the enemy situation and terrain features. 

(5) Sanitation and first aid. 

5. Solid unity of the raiding party behind its leader is a 
vital requisite. Accordingly, it is advisable that a raiding unit 
be organized from personnel selected from a regular army unit, and 
that they be given special training. In case a raiding unit is 
organized from troops selected from among various army units or from 
temporarily assigned troops, sufficient time must be given so that 
friendly relations and mutual understanding will be established among 
the personnel. Special consideration must be paid to the selection 
of the leader of the unit. However, in view of the fact that the 
necessity for surprise raids has increased recently, and since there 
are limits to the degree of success attainable, the number of the 
raiding units will have to be increased. In view of the lack of 
personnel who have received specialized training in raiding, it is 
important that necessary preparations be made to employ infantrymen, 
engineers, or any other troops on raiding missions. 



261 



CHAPTER I 

Command and Employment of Raiding Units 

1. The principal duties to be charged to a raiding unit are: 
a* Infliction of casualties upon the hostile troops, es- 
pecially officers. 

b. Destruction of hostile command channels, firearms, 
tanks, airfield installations, aircraft and other installations. 

c. Reconnaissance of the enemy situation (including cap- 
ture of prisoners and classified documents)* 

d. Interruption of hostile supply. (Blasting of ammuni- 
tion, burning of provisions, fuel, supplies, and attack upon trans- 
portation facilities.) 

e. Destruction of hostile vessels. 

2. Judicious selection of the leader and other personnel of 
the raiding unit and appropriate employment of the raiding unit by 
the higher commander are vital requisites fo r the success of a sur- 
prise raid. Therefore, the higher commander must pay careful atten- 
tion to the duties assigned to the raiding unit; the point and time 
of infiltration; its route, organization, equipment, clothing, food, 
and medical supplies; dispatching the unit with firm confidence in 
its success. At the same time, he must apply every available means 
to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission of the* raiding unit* 

3. Organization of a raiding unit will differ according to the 
mission, the situation of the enemy and the terrain; the condition 



263 



of forests, weather, and period of operations. However, it is gen- 
erally advantageous to employ a small and efficient force, alt tough 
if the situation warrants a large unit may sometimes be employed. 

Note: The followirg are examples of the situation requiring 
larger units: 

a) In case the raiding unit must make a long detour to 
reach the rear of the enemy position and attack in cooperation with 
the main force. 

b) In case the raiding unit, must repulse a resistirg 
enemy element before launching a raid. 

c) In case the raiding unit must reach the rear of the 
enemy through a breach effected in the enemy line, and intercept 
his retreat during the attack by the main force. 

If, in consideration of the objective and the expected enemy 
situation, there is a need for specialized personnel, an effort must 
be made to assign such personnel to the raiding unit to insure the 
success of its mission. 

The raiding unit must be equipped in such a way as to faci- 
litate its operation. It will carry all necessary. equipment, sup- 
plies, ammunition and food. The raiding unit will, if possible, 
carry radio equipment because it will be advantageous in conducting 
liaison with the higher commander or with cooperating units. 

Examples of organization, equipment and disposition, of a 
raiding unit are shown in charts following Chapter V. 

4. In organizing a raiding unit (or team), care must be exer- 
cised in the selection of qualified men who have special technical 
knowledge or skill. (For example, those who excel in demolition, 



264 



climbing, or sound-locating.) 

5. In giving his order to the raiding unit, the higher com- 
mander must clarify the prevailirig general situation, and parti- 
cularly his operational intentions, the mission of the unit, and 
methods of cooperation with related units* Also, if possible, he 
should show in detail the course of action to be pursued by the 
raiding unit* 

In assignirg a mission to the raiding unit, it is a vital 
requisite to clearly indicate such matters as the organization and 
equipment of the unit, date, time, and place for initiating the 
action.- The procedure of infiltration, the designation of units 
which will be in charge of diversion and feint operations, support 
of infiltration and covering movement, and the procedures for execut- 
ing these operations will also be given. In addition, the raiding 
party will receive instruction regarding the route of infiltration, 
the operating zone, the procedure of attack including sectors and 
targets; the order in attacking the targets, the time of attack, the 
means and methods of attack in case there is no suitable target, and 
the course to be followed in case the assault ends in failure; 
liaison (including air-ground liaison), movement of the unit after 
its mission is accomplished, estimated period of operations, supply, 
and the methods of identification of all parties. 

The higher commander will scrupulously examine the opera- 
tions plan mapped out by the raiding unit and give necessary instruc- 
tions. 

265 



6. In designating the attack objective for the raiding unit, 
the higher commander will generally designate the sector to be 
attacked, and will have the unit search for targets in that sector 
and attack them. In designating the attack sector, information on 
the estimated location of targets is of prime importance. 

In case the designation of targets is made for a small 
raiding unit it is advisable to assign a limited target. In this 
case, it would be advantageous to pinpoint the target by using pro- 
minent terrain features or natural objects as a guide. 

7. Should our forces be located close to the enemy positions 
in a stalemate combat situation and want to employ a number of 'raid- 
ing units to destroy the combat strength of the enemy, the higher 
commander generally will map out a plan for the employment of the 
raiding units. In this case, he will employ a raiding unit directly 
under his control and assign attack sectors to his subordinate unit 
commanders. 

In assigning the attack sectors, it is advisable to assign 
the sector lying deepest in the rear of the enemy to ths raiding 
unit of the higher command and those lying near the front line of 
the enemy to the raiding -units to be dispatched by subordinate com- 
manding officers. In this case, the higher commander will normally 
indicate to the subordinate commanding officers such matters as the 
time for employment, number of the raiding units to be employed and 
their strength. 



266 



8« In order to facilitate the infiltration of the raiding 
unit, the higher commander will occasionally find it necessary to 
launch feint operations with other units so as to divert the atten- 
tion of the enemy to other areas and enable the raiding unit to 
infiltrate or to break through part of the enemy line during the 
confusion. In such a case, the higher echelon commander must pay 
scrupulous attention to the coordination of the time and method of 
operations of both units so that the objective will be achieved, 

9. The vital requisites for achievixg success in raiding 
operations are thorough preparations, concealment of plan and move- 
ment, elusive movement and swift attack and retreat. The secret of 
success of command lies in the commander's initiative and bold 
leadership. 

10. The raiding unit must always be prepared to make efficient 
use of enenjy equipment, ammunition, provisions and supplies. 



267 



CHAPTER II 
Preparations for Surprise Raids 

1, The success of a surprise raid is solely dependent upon 
effective preparations. Therefore, -when planning the employment 

of a raiding unit, it is essential for the higher commander to dis- 
close his intentions to the leader of the raiding unit as early as 
possible so that there will be sufficient time for making thorough 
preparations. 

2. Preparations to be made by a raidiiig unit for launchiijg 
a surprise raid generally include the following matters: 

a. Collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelli- 
gence information, 

b. Liaison and agreement with related units. 

c. Drawing -up of the raidirg plan, 

d. Preparations and training necessaiy for the assigned 

mission. 

e. Maintenance of equipment, supplies, provisions and 
other equipment. 

, 3. Intelligence information normally needed for launching a 
surprise raid is summarized below: 

a. Over-all situation of the enemy, terrain, condition, 
attitude of the native populace, traffic, communications, weather, 
local supplies, water source, sanitaiy xaatters, etc. 



269 



b. Suitability of the terrain features for concealment of 
plans and preparations, concealment of movement of the raidirg unit 
from the point of departure to the preparatory point for infiltra- 
tion, independently or under support of friendly forces, and suita- 
bility for advance from the preparatory position to the point of 
infiltration. 

c. Location of infiltration point. Knowledge of locations 
where security is neglected by the enemy, gaps, vulnerable points 
and undefended wings of the enemy, as well as determinirg the loca- 
tion of terrain features which will either hinder or s upport the 
infiltration, 

d. Routes suitable for withdrawal will be governed by the 
provisions of paragraph "c" above, and whether the xbute can be 
covered by friendly forces. 

e. Condition of the adjacent areas along the route of 
movement of the raiding unit will be studied to determine whether 
it is easy or difficult to conceal operations from the enexpy and 
reach the attack objective without fail. All efforts will be nade 
to gain information on the enemy situation, especially the state of 
his security, terrain, the condition of forests, rivers and swampy 
areas, traffic conditions, paths used by natives, conditions of 
communication, weather, and the living quarters of inhabitants, 
places suitable for halt (or ambush), locally available supplies, 
and sanitary conditions. 



270 



f. Place suitable for making preparations for attack will 
be chosen in consideration of the detailed enemy situation, especial- 
ly the location, type, characteristics and number of the attack ob- 
jectives, and state of security, terrain features (especially well- 
known natural objects), traffic, communication, weather, the living 
quarters of inhabitants, supplies and sanitary conditions in the 
neighborhood of the attack objective, and if necessary, base (or 
hiding place) and convenience to rendezvous point after the raid. 

4. In accordance with the mission, the commander of the raid- 
ing unit will decide on ways and means of accomplishing the mission 
after studying the existing situation, and will work out a raiding 
plan . 

The raiding plan will be decided after thorough considera- 
tion is given to all probabilities expected to arise in both the 
preparatory and operating phases ♦ Since there may be occasions when 
actions cannot be carried out as scheduled, alternate plans must be 
prearrarged in regard to the points, routes, targets, and the ineans 
of executing the surprise. It is particularly important that suf- 
ficient time be allowed for the operation. 

Matters generally to be incorporated in the surprise raid- 
ing plan for' attacking certain targets are shown below. 

a. Matters concerning preparations. (Collection of intel- 
ligence information, organization and equipment, and preparatory 
training. ) 



271 



ties. 



b. Date for commending movement. 

c. Movement up to the point of infiltration, 

d. Procedure of infiltration and concealed movement ♦ 

e. Procedure of attack. 
f # Procedure of retreat and return. 

g. Measures to be taken in case the attack ends in failure. 

h. Medical measures and measures for dealix^g with casual- 

i. Liaison, clothing, food, and supplies. 
Note: 

a) Whether the raiding plan should be committed to 
writing is dependent upon the mission, size of unit, period of pre- 
parations, and ability of the commander. However, in consideration 
of the fact that the commander may become disabled in the course of 
the operation, it is advisable to reveal the details of the plan to 
at least the deputy commander and the gifct of the plan to all per- 
sonnel. This is particularly necessary when the plan is not commit- 
ted to writing. 

b) Priority should be given as to the time for reveal- 
ing the plan to subordinate personnel to insure security of secrets. 
Written plans will be destroyed before departure and transmission 

of the plan should be avoided as far as possible. Code will be used 
in the written plan so as to insure secrecy. 

5# With the progress of the planning of a surprise raid, the 
commander of the raiding unit will reveal his intentions to his sub- 
ordinates as early as circumstances permit and have them make neces- 
sary preparations. The commander will revise the surprise raidirg 
plan at each clarification of the situation, and before execution 
of the raid, he will issue orders for executing the raid at an oppor- 
tune time. 



272 



The schedule and course of movement will be clearly indi- 
cated in the commander's orders so that every man will know what 
to do to the very end even if the staff officers are lost. 

6. Taking into consideration the mission of the raiding unit, 
the date for commencing movement, the enemy situation, especially 
the condition of targets, availability of supply, terrain, weather 
and sanitary conditions, the higher commander will decide on the 
type, quantity, and method of transportation of equipment, ammuni- 
tion, food, and supplies to be carried by the raidirjg unit and 
arrange them in accordance with the transport capacity of the unit. 
In this case, the commander of the raidirg unit will submit his 
opinion concerning the equipment to the higher commander, and at the 
same time will scrupulously inspect equipment and supplies to insure 
adequacy. 

7. The equipment, supplies and food to be carried by the raid- 
ing unit must be light and portable. All items should be damp- 
proofed and treated against decay. 

8. When the area in which the raidix^g unit is to be employed 
becomes known, practical trainiig in matters listed in Paragraph 

3 of General Principles will be conducted in such a manner as to 
conform with the actual local terrain and requirements. At the same 
time, preparatory trainir^g concerning the procedure of movement and 
combat suitable for the actual situation will be conducted. For this 
purpose, all personnel must familiarize themselves with the terrain 



273 



and targets in the operating area through liaison with related 
units and by referring to maps, photographs, and sketches. At the 
same time, personnel will undergo thorough training in infiltration 
procedures, concealed movement and attack, conducted by means of a 
war game, or on a sand table or in a sector which resembles the 
actual combat zone, with various combat conditions simulated. 

9» Concealment of plans during the preparatory phase of a 
raid is a vital requisite for accomplishing the mission of the raid- 
ing unit. Accordingly, it is essential for the commander of the 
raiding unit to impress the importance of security on his men, and 
at the same time, to take precautions against revealing his mission 
and the attack objectives too early, the purpose being to prevent 
disclosure of the plan. 
Note: 

a) In consideration of a possible emergency, classified 
documents (such as cryptographic publications) will be printed on 
highly combustible paper, or, if not, they will be incinerated prompt- 
ly with canned heat. 

b) Preparation will be made for emergency destruction 
of secret equipment and materials with explosives. 

c) All personnel will be cautioned against leaviig any 
mark on maps indicating disposition of our troops, location of in- 
stallations, or movement of troops. 



274 



CHAPTER III 
Infiltration and Concealed Movement 

1. The important thijqg about infiltration tactics and conceal- 
ed movement is to swiftly approach the target area without enemy 
detection. 

Concealed movement is extremely difficult because there 

are various obstacles to be overcome. In conducting movement it is 

essential that the raidirjg unit advance towards the area where the 

enemy least expects to be hit, execute feint attacks daringly and 

determinedly while mixing with the enemy troops, employ deceptive 

tactics and catch the enemy off guard, or attack with such lightn- 

ing swiftness as to deny him an opportunity for counteraction. The 

essential elements are versatility and surprise. 

Note: In order to avoid detection, it is advantageous to 
resort to sign signals (the use of small flags, tree branches, or 
gestures; instead of sound signals (special whistles) in conveying 
orders. 

2. For secrecy of plans it is extremely important that traces 
of infiltration and concealed movement be destroyed. For this reason 
everyone from the commanding officer on down, must be very careful. 
To insure successful accomplishment of its mission, the raidirg unit 
should, if possible, assign to one man the special duty of inspecting 
the area to make sure that all traces are eradicated. 

Before taking breaks, plans for destroying traces are drawn 
up and all members informed about them so that they may act accordingly. 



275 



During the break, the commanding officer will announce, in detail, 
such matters as the area in which to place equipment, location of 
latrines and the netbods of destroyir^ traces, gathering firewood, 
extinguishing fires, and disposal of drink and food remains, 
cigarette butts, packing material and notes. 

The following is a concrete example of the method of des- 
troying traces: 

a. Extinguishing traces 

Since this requires close attention to many details, it 
may be advantageous to distribute the work. In concealed movement 
little trees and branches are pushed aside and every effort is exert- 
ed to avoid leaving traces of a path. In order to destroy traces, 
first, the terrain- features and natural objects of the particular 
area to be. crossed are carefully studied and a route selected, 
second, the unit is deployed during the advance and regrouped at a 
suitable distance beyond, about 100 meters. 

(1) Withdrawal of river-crossing equipment. 

(2) Removal of markers. 

When using route markers or an improvised distance 
measurirjg instrument, it is necessary to charge one person with the 
responsibility 'of removii^ the string. 

(3) With respect to enemy dogs, poisonous compounds 
will be used. If possible the troops will leap over obstacles in 
order not to leave any footprints. 



276 



(4) Use of terrain features, climatic, and weather 

conditions • 

a) Whenever possible, activity will be conducted 
in heavy rain and passage in and out of wooded areas will be done in 
the rain* 

b) Movement will be made on native pathways 
(secret paths), ravines, wet grounds, marsh lands, and jungles. 
Passage through villages and the use of roads will be avoided wher- 
ever possible. 

(5) With respect to moving on foot, hard ground, 
rocky areas, fallen tree leaves, etc. are utilized, and each one 
must endeavor to follow in the footsteps made by the one in front 
of him. 

(6) In crossing roads or in entering rest areas, 
fallen trees and leaves will be utilized, while special care will be 
taken against leaving any traces. 

b. Deceptive traces 

(1) In order to leave footprints similar to the inha- 
bitants, local types of footgear will be worn. 

(2) In putting up route markers, enemy type markers 

will be used. 

(3) Planning deceptive traces 

In takir^g a break, or in entering a concealed 
area (base of operations) or advancing therefrom, the movement will 



277 



be made on an entirely different course than the intended one. 
Deceptive footprints will be left behind and several detours made 
before proceeding on the right course. When a fork is reached the 
false course is taken for some distance before proceeding on the 
desired course. When crossing a road, the road is traversed for 
some distance before crossing over to the opposite side, leaving 
deceptive footprints along the way. Other methods of deception 
may be: 

a) Resorting to felling trees and leaving decep- 
tive markers. 

b) Reversing indicators during passage or from the 

outset. 

c) Leaving footprints pointed in the opposite 

direction. 

d) Leaving articles behind which are used by the 
enemy or inhabitants. 

On the whole, in planning deceptive traces, bear 
in mind that the traces may afford clues to guide the enemy on your 
trail. 

c. Silencing sounds 

(1) Methods regarding the silencing of sounds are the 
same as stated in procedures for night attack. 

(2) Silencing sounds 

In covering up the actual infiltratioh, feint attacks 



278 



or aircraft may sometimes be used for drowning out sounds created 
by infiltration tactics and concealed movement, 

3. In order to guard the attack intentions the raiding unit 
while on the move must carefully observe the defined methods of 
smoking, eating, drinking, using the latrine, conversing, sneezing, 
and coughing : 

a. Smoking will be avoided as much as possible. The 
commanding officer will designate the time and plan for smoking. 
He will send a few persons at a time to concealed areas, gullies, 
uneven grounds, and caves. In smoking, care must be taken so that 
the smoke will disappear on the ground surface. When smoking at 
night one must be extremely careful concerning light leakage (from 
striking matches and lighted cigarattes). Helmets, tents, and 
pipes for concealing lighted cigarettes are used in addition to 
terrain features and natural objects. 

b. Mess gear will not be used. 

c. The latrine will be located nearby so as to prevent a 
surprise attack by the enejuy. 

d. Conversation will be conducted in whispers. 

e. Sneezing is checked by rubbing the ridge of the nose 
with the palm of the hand. It can also be done by holding the nose. 
If a sneeze or a cough is unavoidable, it must be done close to the 
ground while pressing the nose or the mouth hard with a garrison 
cap or part of the clothing. 



279 



CHAPTER IV 
Preparations for Attack 

1. As the objective is approached, a suitable site near the 
target is established for the preparation of the assault. The pre- 
paration includes activities such as, assembling troops, studyir^g 
the terrain, reconnoitering enemy positions, supplementing and 
revising the plans of the attack, examinatirg equipment and supplies, 
securing rest, and planning good opportunities for the attack. 

When tine is limited and the enemy situation is clear, 
there is no need for establishing this site, and the, unit will pro- 
ceed directly into the attack phase from the movement phase. 

Within the limits of the situation, the preparatory time at 
the preparation site must be as brief as possible* 

The following matters must be considered in the selection 
of the attack preparation site: 

a. Concealment of plannirg and movement. Facility in 
launching an attack. 

b. Cover from enemy ground and air forces. Afford early 
warnir^ of enemy approaches and good defensive position. 

c. A nearby site for stationirg reserves and a suitable 
assembly point after the attack. 

d. Facility in troop dispersion and opportunity for good 
liaison system between units. 



281 



e. Facility for concealment of supplies and provisions 
and, if possible, location for medical treatment. 

At the attack preparation site, measures for a warnirg 
system are taken, a defensive position constructed and camouflage 
•work is done. 

Note: The distance between the final concealed posi- 
tion and the preparation site depends on the terrain features and 
the enemy situation. Generally from 600 to 700 meters is advisable. 
The proper distance between the final concealed attack position and 
the objective is approximately 100 meters. 

2. It is important that the commanding officer himself go out 
in search of intelligence information. At the same time, he carries 
out tree-top observation and sound location. It would also be pro- 
fitable to capture a few prisoners. 

In general, the following should be given special attention 
with respect to gathering intelligence: 

a. Position of enenjy headquarters. 

(1) Routes frequently used by the commander's orderly 
and staff members. 

(2) Concentration of communication lines and installa- 
tions. 

(3) Tree-top installations (message center, observation 
posts, spotting stations, etc*). 

(4) -Areas where low-altitude flights are frequently 

made. 

(5) Availability of captured documents, inhabitants, 

and spies. 

282 



(6) Indications and traces left by the enemy. 

(7) Antennas of radio stations and sounds of genera- 
tors. 

(8) Spotting of radio transmitters by the use of radio 
direction finder. 

b. Varieties and positions of enemy guns. 

(1) Plotting of sounds. 

(2) Gun approach routes. 

(3) Communication lines. 

(4) Tree top observation posts. 

(5) Activities of ammunition vehicles. 

(6) Traces 

Note: A person gifted in sound discrimination is 
trained and assigned the job of plotting the sound source of onemy 
guns. 

a) It is important to know that errors can be 
caused by wind velocity, wind direction, mountain echoes, or echoes 
caused in the woods. 

b) Gun positions are usually located along a 
crest line near an open field where clearing of trees and bushes is 
not necessary. 

c) During the night the guns may be moved from 
the daytime position to a gun shelter. 

d) The ability to judge the variety of guns in 
use must be cultivated duriJTg firing exercises. 

3. In case the attacks from one base of operations on various 

targets continues over a long period of time, or the base is used 

for reconnaissance work, a site located at a considerable distance 

from the objective should be selected in order to avoid enemy 

283 



detection, and facilities concerning shelter, maintenance, supplies, 
and sanitation should be established. 

4. When the objectives are found to be too numerous in com- 
parison with troop strerjgth, the attack could be directed at vital 
points as the situation permits* 

5. At the attack preparation vSite, the commander of the raid- 
ing unit will gather detailed intelligence data, make his decision, 
and issue appropriate attack orders on the basis of his decision. 

Note: The following are matters which must be included in 
an attack order as, for example, in a surprise attack on enemy- 
headquarters or artillery (mortar) positions. 

a. The enemy situation as well as the situation of friend- 
ly forces, 

b. The plans or the essential points on the execution of 
the attack. 

c. D e tailed disposition of troops for the attack. Assign 
to each attacking unit (team or group) a specific objective, indi- 
cate the time for attack and the steps and means for carrying it 
out. 

d. The assembly point and the procedure on falling back 
after successful conclusion of the attack. 

e. The measures to be taken in case of an unsuccessful 
attack (only to officers and NCO's concerned). 

f. The means of communication between the commanding 
officer and attack units (teams or groups). 

g. Other matters of importance. 

284 



In assigning objectives, enemy forces or certain sections 
should be designated. 

6. While still in the attack preparation site and before the 
departure for the attack, the commander of the raiding unit will, 
as far as possible, clearly state in detail his intentions and the 
course of action to each and every soldier so that, as the situa- 
tion changes in the attack, each will be able to act on his own 
initiative. 

Note: The team (group) leader will direct the attack on 
the objective or auxiliary objective from a position affording a 
commanding view. 



285 



CHAPTER V 
Attacks Against Various Targets 

1. An attack is made in the form of a surprise, employing 

such means as ambush and sudden attack. 

Note: To advance concealed and attack the enemy is called 
sudden attack, and to attack the advancing enemy from a concealed 
position is called ambush. 

a. A raiding force, in order to attain its objective, 
carries out all sorts of engagements, such as, a general attack, 
defense, delaying action, etc. whenever necessary. 

b. In making a surprise attack, it is advantageous to 
secretly creep up to the target and at one stroke hurl hand grenades, 
explosives, etc., subsequently takiqg advantage of the ene^ay's state 
of shock. 

c. Depending upon the condition of the terrain, it is, at 
times, possible to approach within five meters of the target without 
being detected by the enemy. 

d. It is advisable that the jump off time be designated 
in advance and if there is no firing, the commander will throw a 
hand grenade or an explosive to signal the time. However, in the 
midst of firing, it may be necessary to signal with a wooden clapper, 
high-pitched flute, etc., without solely depending upon the blasting 
of explosives. 

e. For the purpose of screening or signalling durirjg an 
approach, it is advantageous to use branches. 



287 



2. The question of priority in an attack, that is, between 
inflicting casualties and disposiiig of weapons, equipment and pro- 
visions, is determined by the nature of the mission, the target 
condition, and the method of attack. It is exceedingly advantageous 
if we are successful in capturing the enemy commander and staff 
officers. 

As for captured weapons, equipment, and provisions, con- 
sideration regarding their utilization is always necessary before 
destroying or burning them. 

-Utmost effort will be made to capture important documents, 
maps, etc. 

3. Although the time for attack will be determined in accord- 
ance with the nature of the mission and the method of -the attack, 
it is still necessary to take advantage of opportunities. 

The time for the commencement of the attack (shiftily into 
sudden assault) differs depending upon the method of the attack it- 
self. Attack may be made: 

a. At a time when the enenjy is lax about security measures 
(observation will enable us to mark the time when the enemy is lax 
or off guard in the followii^g activities; patrol duty, postir^g of 
sentries, working, sleeping, eating, and headquarters activity). 

b. At a time when we have reached an ideal position from 
which to launch an ambush. 

c. At a time when diversionary and luriig tactics have 
proved successful. 



288 



It is imperative that the commander be well acquainted 
with the enemy situation and details of the terrain, and be shrewd 
and decisive in exploiting the enemy's weak points* 

If detected by the enemy immediately before the commence- 
ment of the attack, it is advisable to shift to sudden assault 
without losing the opportunity, provided the unit is near its 
objective. The commander of the raiding force usually determines 
the time suitable for shifting to the sudden assault* There are 
also situations which call for a section leader's judgment in 
determining the time of assault. 

4. The place of attack is generally governed by the fundamen- 
tal principles of attack. It is selected particularly in areas 
where enemy troops are sparsely deployed or -where the enemy least 
expects an attack. At the same time it is necessary to take into 
consideration the factor that the area must afford an easy route of 
withdrawal. 

In the execution of the attack, all personnel from the 
commander on do wn, should push forward resolutely in accordance with 
the established plan. No unauthorized alteration in the plan, even 
because of accident, will be permitted. 

5* There are occasions when it is advantageous to resort to 
feints in an attack or a retreat. In making a feint, do not resort 
to worn-out tactics. It is essential that we exercise our wits 
and ingenuity. For this purpose, we must skilfully employ such means 



289 



as setting fires, showing lights, imitating sounds, simulating 
attacks, feigning traces, decoying troops, emitting smoke, etc. 

6. The deployment of troops in an attack will be determined 
in accordance with the condition of the target, method of attack, 
terrain features, degree of brightness or darkness, etc. It is 
advisable to minimize the number of personnel to be assigned to a 
single target so as to attain the element of surprise. Whether or 
not a reserve force is used depends upon the situation. 

Depending upon the condition of the enemy security measures, 
the troops are divided into coverirg and attack (operations) groups. 

In either case, the commander is expected to take the lead 
in attacking the main target. 

Note: 

a) A team usually executes an attack under the command of 
a section leader. The commander of the raiding force has several 
teams under his direct command and, depending on the situation, may 
assign to each team a single independent mission as a limited ob- 
jective. 

b) Arms and supplies to be_alloted for the attack will be 
determined by the kind of objective, condition of the attack, nunber 
of troops to be used, and so forth. 

The utilization of local fuel and explosives, as well 
as enemy weapons and supplies is necessary. 

c) There are many combat examples whereby a cannon or an 
airplane was destroyed by one to three men assigned for the mission. 

7. In launching an attack it is advisable to take measures to 
cut off the outside communications of the enemy and delay reinforce- 
ments. In destroying the lines of communication caution must be 

used in choosing the proper time so as not to reveal plans prematurely. 



290 



8. In cases where repeated attacks are carried out in the 
same sector or on a series of targets located at several places but 
within the same general area, it is necessary to exercise ingenuity, 
particulary in selecting the time, direction, and method of attack, 
so as to deny the enemy the opportunity for devising counbermoves. 

9. In attacking an eneny headquarters or observation post it 
is advantageous to inflict casualties upon important personnel, such 
as the commander and staff officers, and also to capture classified 
material. At the same time, communication facilities and observa- 
tion instruments should be destroyed. 

In order to inflict casualties upon the commander and staff 
officers, it is necessary to gather detailed information concerning 
their movements in the headquarters and try to take advantage of 
laxities in the security system. 

10. If the overall plan is to inflict the greatest number of 
casualties, it is advisable to employ explosives, hand grenades, 
submachine guns, light machine, guns, etc. If possible, it is advan- 
tageous to attack camps which are condensed in a small area. 

In inflictij^g casualties, a submachine gun is preferable to 
a light machine gun, and usually, there is little chance of using a 
grenade-thrower. In place of a bayonet, a double-edged dagger which 
can readily be converted into a spear is recommended. 

11. Matters which should be considered in launching an attack 
on enemy gun positions are as follows: 



291 



a. It is advisable to choose the time for a daytime attack 
either when the energy guns are firing or its crew is in movement. 

b. The direction of the attack changes according to the 
circumstances but it should be noted that there are, at times, open- 
Ings in the eneiqy's frontal position due to the laxity in security 
measures. 

c. It is advisable to destroy the gun barrel, breech block, 
etc. with explosives or hand grenades, and also inflict casualties 
on the gun crew. 

12. Against tanks and motor vehicles, it is advisable to des- 
troy or set fire to the engine with explosives at a time when the 
eneuqy has lowered its guard. 

13. In attackii^g an enemy airfield, it is advisable to destroy 
the command post, aircraft, bo nibs, fuel dump, and communications 
facilities, and inflict casualties upon the personnel, particularly, 
important flight duty personnel. Since aircraft and important in- 
stallations are usually scattered and concealed, it is necessary to 
determine the most important target. On this point, attention must 
be paid to the fact that large numbers of decoy planes are often 
placed within an area. 

The destruction of aircraft will be carried out by means of 
blasting or burning. Biastirjg will be done by placing and ignititg 
explosives in the engine assembly. 

14. In the event blasting or burning is to be carried oat on 



292 



warehouses and supply dumps, it is advisable to use materials local- 
ly available* 

Dependirg upon circumstances, there are occasions when it 
is advantageous to thoroughly blast and burn up only articles of the 
same type. 

15 • In destroying communication lines, attention should.be 
paid to the vital trunk line. As to the time for the destruction, 
it is advantageous to choose an important moment when the enemy is 
busy with the lines. In case strict concerted action is required, 
precautions against exposing the plan prematurely must be taken • 
It is advantageous that the destruction be carried out at a remote 
distance from the enemy and where discovery and conditions, for re- 
pair of the destruction are difficult* 

16. Against enemy vessels, it is advisable to blast or set 
fire to the hull, engine room, and fuel compartment, and also in- 
flict casualties upon officers who are responsible for the command 
and operation of the vessels • 



293 



Chart No. 1 



Field Rations to be Carried by Each Man 



Basis for 

Planning 

Rations 


The operating period of a raiding unit usually covers 
approximately two weeks. However, rations to be car- 
ried by each man are limited to ten days supply to that 
he will not be required to carry a heavy burden. Con- 
sideration is given to supplying a standard quantity of 
calories. Rations do not require cooking. 


Name of Article 


Quantity 


Dehydrated bread 


2 day's supply 


opeuJLeLL I anions \Jti)j \D ) ) \\j J y \U J oc 


1 day 1 s supply 


Combined rations 


3 ciay s suppxy 


* Nutritious food (Square— shaped) 




■Jfr Combined suDDlementarv rations 


p uciy s suppxy 




2 day's supply 


PrtwrfoT'oH q/"\w saliva 

Powdered bean paste 


5 bags 


* Salt 


5 day's supply 


Refreshments 




Sweets 


£ Via cr 


Plum extract 


l 


Canned heat 


2 


Portable filter tube 


1 


"RAIHAN*" bag (Ed. Note: Compressed, cooked rice 
seale4 in cellophane bag.) 


2 (Large size) 


Matches 


1 box 


1. Special Rations (A) thru (E) were specially prepared for 
raiding units and not used for ordinary ration issue. 
Notes: 2. Symbol * indicates auxiliary rations to be issued when 
additional supply is necessary. 
3» Total weight of the above-listed items is less than 
9 kilograms. 



295 



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Chart No. 3-a 



Equipment to be Carried by Raiding Unit 



Classi- 
fication 


Required Equipment 


Optional Equipment 


Equipment 

and 
Supplies 


Submachine gun (automatic 
rifle), light machine gun, 
rifle, pistol, bayonet, 
hand grenade, glasses 


Incendiary compound (such 
as Molotov cocktail, por- 
table fuel), grenade 
thrower, mine detector 
rod, smoke candle, flare 
compound 


Demolition 


1 kg demolition can, 
igniter, aimor-piercing 
mine , wi re c uuoe r , 
detonating cord 


Pale yellow explosive, 
yellow color explosive, 
j_ana mxne , oangaJLore 
torpedo 


Tools 


Hatchet or sword, jack- 
knife, rope, pole climber, 
grindstone, oilcloth con- 
tainer can 


Sickle, saw, saw sharpener, 
axe, pick, shovel, pliers, 
pruning shears 


Bearing 
Control 
Materials 


Luminous compass, portable 
compass, applied telemeter, 
map or aerial photograph, 
portable range finder, 
measuring cord 


Plotting board, gonio- 
meter, route finder, 
height finder 


Liaison 
Materials 


Radio equipment, special 
whistle, flashlight, 
carrier pigeon, markii^g 
materials, incense sticks 
or slow matches for short 
distance signaling 


Air-ground liaisorf materi- 
als (signal panel), Very 
pistol, signal shell, 
national ensign 


Food 


1. Staple food: 
Compressed ration (special 
emergency ration). 
2» Supplementary rations: 
Salt pills, powdered shoyu, 
pickled plum essence, 
nutritious ration, com- 
pressed supplementary ratior 


Dried bonito dri^»H I^vpt* 
preserved food boiled 
down in soy, powdered and 
seasoned fish, dried fish, 
salted fish, sugar, rice 
cake, dried vegetables 



298 



Chart No. 3-b 



(Cont'd) 



Classi- 
fication 


Required Equipment 


Optional Equipment 


Medical 
Materials 


Water purification agent, 
quinine hydrochloride 
tablets (or quinine sul- 
phate tablets), plasmochin 
tablets, tincture of iodine 
in ampoule, adhesive tape, 
germicidal tablets, anti- 
thirst tablets, packed 
, bandage ; gas-prot eo tiv e 
equipment 


Mosquito ointment, insect 
powder, water eczema 
ointment, sodium bicar- 
bonate tablets, creosote, 
bismuth subnitrate 
table ts 


Clothing 


Field sneakers (avoid 
split-toe sneakers), 
gloves, socks, antimosquito 
mask, camouflage net 


Native's clothing, enemy 
military uniform 


Otter 


Matches (or lighter), por- 
table tent, canteen, watch, 
haversack, No # 16 steel wire 
(approximately 10 meters 
long). 


Bamboo tube (as supple- 
mentary canteen), fishing 
set, potassium cyanide, 
night vision tablets (Ed. 
Note: Possibly carotin), 
poisonous preparation for 
dogs, portable filter tube, 
auxiliary receiver (with 
needle). 


Remarks: 


1. Explosives and igniters will be wrapped in cello- 
phane paper, rubber sack or oil paper. 
Primers will be wrapped with cellophane or oil 
paper, 

2* Clothing will be made of quilted cotton cloth, 
dyed 'dark green. 



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CHART NO. 6 




Chart No, 6 



Example of the Execution of an Attack by a Raidijng Unit 
(Size: One Infantry Platoon) 



Procedure of Attack: 

1. Artillery Attacking Unit will leave the attack prepara- 
tion Position and approach the objective in concealed movement and 
destroy it. After completion of the attack, the unit members will 
individually hid* in adjacent juigles and assemble at the attack 
preparation position at an opportune time. When assembly has been 
completed, a designated guide will lead the men to the platoon 
rendezvous point. 

2. Headquarters Attack irg Unit will leave the attack prepara- 
tion position at an opportune time and attack the objective. 

After the attack, the unit members will assemble by teams and pro- 
ceed to the platoon rendezvous point. 



Explanation: 

® Attack Preparation Position of the Platoon 

After completing attack preparations, the platoon 
will leave its nonessential combat materials in this 
position to make its equipment as light as possible and 
each attacking team of the platoon will separately 
proceed to the objective. 

® First Attack Preparation Position of the 1st Team 

After conducting reconnaissance of the enemy 
situation and the terrain from this position, the 1st 
Team will proceed to the 2d Attack Preparation Position 
to complete fuller preparation for attack. 

© The 5th Team will cut off the communication line just 
before the attack of the main unit. 



304 



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314 



APPENDIX IV 



Extracts from "Night Attack Manual" Published in 
September 1944 



315 



In view of the importance of night attacks, this 
book was speedily compiled for the purpose of explain- 
ing tactics and techniques which are of special im- 
portance in initiating night attacks against the US 
and British Forces. The main emphasis in the expla- 
nation is placed upon combat by units smaller than 
an infantry battalion, Although this book is incomplete, 
it shall nevertheless be distributed. 

September 1944 



NOD A Kengo, Chief of the 
Inspectorate General of 
Military Training, General 
Affairs Department 



317 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 



Part 1 - Application of Daytime Combat Tactics to Night 

Combat and Necessity of Creating New Tactics 321 

Part 2 - Thorough Training for Night Attack 322 

Part 3 - Importance of Concerted Action by Various Arms 

in a Night Attack 322 

Part U - Measures Against Artillery Bombardment, Aerial 

Bombing and Tank Attacks 323 

Part 5 - Training Required by War Situation 323 

Part 6 - Points to be Noted 325 

CHAPTER I Tactics 327 

Section A. General Attack Procedure 327 



319 



1. Application of Daytime Combat Tactics to Night Combat and 
Necessity of Creating Hew Tactics 

The OS and British Forces which dread our night assaults, 
are strengthening warning measures such as illumination, obstacles 
and trip wire warning systems . At the same time, they are trying 
to guard against surprise attacks by organizing key positions and 
are trying to destroy our attacking strength by readying a fierce 
night firepower* This has served to make it more difficult to 
realize success in a surprise attack and has increased the necessity 
of initiating night raiding attacks. There is a growing tendency 
to apply daytime attack procedures to night attacks, although the 
enemy's increasing superiority in material fighting power is making 
it more difficult to carry out night combat. As a result, there 
has arisen the urgent necessity to create tactics and techniques 
that will enable us to resolve the difficult war situation. 

Under these circumstances, the Japanese forces must, in 
the light of the situation confronting them, make a careful com- 
parative study of their fighting power with that of the enemy and 
carry out night attack preparations taking into account the enemy's 
favorite tactics and the topography of the battlefield* It is imperative 
that ingenuity be exercised to devise means for successful night at- 
tacks without adhering to conventional tactics. Furthermore, they 
must make the best of all tactics available, putting ingenuity in 
the attack disposition and coordination between the various arms, 



321 



carrying out a demonstration, feint, or a raiding attack at a 
proper time. Thus, they must exert maximum efforts to achieve 
success in night combat. 

2. Thorough Training for Night Attack 

The employment of night attacks is a traditional charac- 
teristic of the Japanese Army, and success or failure depends 
solely upon the thoroughness of training. And it was by no means 
an easy task even in the past. In most cases, night attacks are 
of doubtful value because they produce many casualties among the 
officers as well as a considerable loss of material fighting power. 
Commanding officers are prone to be against the employment of night 
combat. However, they must conduct vigorous training for night 
attack, bearing in mind that a night attack, if carried out without 
proper preparation, will result only in a waste of fighting power. 
In order to insure success in night combat, the entire unit, 
including the commanding officer, must act calmly and boldly in 
perfect unity, and destroy the material fighting power of the US 
and British Forces by full display of a strong sense of responsibility 
and a death-defying spirit. 

3. Importance of Concerted Action by Various Arms in a Night 
Attack 

Previously, it was taught that a night - attack was pri- 
marily the work of the infantry, supported possibly, by artillery 
and other arms. However, since night combat has come to resemble 
daytime combat more and more, it has become increasingly necessary 

322 



for various arms to display their power in concert* Night combat 
is, therefore, fought by various arms in order to help the infantry 
to achieve its objective. The vital thing is to maintain close 
coordination and cooperation. 

4. Measures Against Artillery Bombardment, Aerial Bombing and 
Tank Attacks 

Throughout a night attack, the most important matter is to 
take proper measures against artillery bombardment, aerial bombing 
and tank attacks from the enemy. Therefore, future developments in 
the fighting must be anticipated and various measures must be taken, 
such as, preparations in regard to weapons and supplies, proper dis- 
position of troops, coordination among different arms, the choice of 
combat terrain, and determination of size of attacking unit. 

5. Training Required by the War Situation 

a. Since knowledge of the enemy situation is a prerequisite 
to this training, it is necessary to pay close attention to the 
actual combat on all the front lines, examine the terrain and condition 
of our own units, and then select the appropriate subjects and pro- 
cedures of training from the manual. 

b. With emphasis placed on night raids, the following points 
must be studied constantly: 

(1) Estimating the enemy situation and becoming acqu- 
ainted with the terrain of the sector to be attacked. 

(2) Procedures of coordination among different arms, 



323 



especially among infantry, artillery and engineers* 

(3) Advancing for the attack in a dispersed formation, 
advancing in the right direction, command liaison, and rate of 
advance . 

(A) Infiltration by means of engineering as well as 
creeping movement . 

(5) Procedures of assaults, particularly the support 
of assault by various firearms, and procedures of close-quarter 
combat by the infantry* 

(6) Firing and advance of heavy weapons and artillery, 
and forwarding of explosives and other supplies. 

(7) Disposing of barbed wire entanglements and land 

mines* 

(8) Disposing of trip wire warning systems. 

(9) .Attacking pillboxes and fire positions. 

(10) Securing an occupied area. 

(11) Raiding procedures. 

(12) Utilizing night visibility. 

c. Training is usually conducted as follows: First . combat 
techniques are taught one by one in the daytime and training in combined 
techniques is conducted at night. Then, tactical matters are taught in 
the daytime and training in practical application is conducted at night. 
However, even during the tachnical training, tactical matters must 
be taught to facilitate a better understanding of the technical 



324 



training ♦ Also during the tactical training, combat techniques must 
be exercised constantly and repeatedly to achieve improvement and 
perfection, 

d. As combat under dazzling illumination is considered 
important, it is advisable to conduct combat training in bright 
moonlight. 

e. Creeping approach, foxhole digging, antitank combat, 
etc., are so important that even officers must undergo this training 
on every occasion, and excellence in these techniques must be 
achieved. 

f. Necessary specialized training shall be conducted by 
taking into consideration, the condition of the respective unit. In 

. an infantry company, candidates shall be selected and trained for 
such missions as obstacle demolition, disposal of trip wire warn- 
ing systems, capture of a fire position, antitank combat, direction of 
maintenance and infiltration for reconnaissance. 
6. Points to be noted in this book 

a. This book deals primarily with the combat of an in- 
fantry battalion or a smaller unit in order to help readers better 
understand the essential tactics and techniques of night attack. 

b. In view of the present condition of our armed forces, 
it is deemed necessary to encourage ingenuity both in tactics and 
combat technique. For this purpose, necessary suggestions, troop 
dispositions, etc. are set forth in concrete form. However, they 



325 



are merely examples* The armed forces should not follow them 
blindly nor restrict training solely to these examples, 

c. Primarily, this book takes up beachheads and defense 
positions in strategic areas as imaginary enemy positions, but 
emphasizes that the form of combat should vary to meet changes in 
the type of enemy positions • 

Concerning terrain, the general terrain of the home- 
land is discussed in view of the changed war situation and in order 
to aid the understanding of the general reader. In describing a 
special terrain, special mention will be made regarding the differ- 
ence between special and general terrain* 



326 



CHAPTER I 
Tactics 

Section A. General Attack Procedure 

7, The Secret of Success in Attacks 

The difficulty of an attack against American or British 
positions is due to the enemy's overwhelming superiority in material* 
However, since the battlefield situation still generally enables us 
to make preparations, we must make attack preparations with utmost 
care and prudencey and at the same tirie concentrate fighting power 
at strategic points. In carrying out an attack, it is necessary 
to maintain and build up fresh fighting strength constantly in order 
to overwhelm the enemy position* Since the success or failure of 
such an attack often determines subsequent developments in the 
situation, it is particularly important to display a most furious 
fighting spirit from the outset of attack preparations, with the 
determination to annihilate the enemy forces at one blow, 

8. Noteworthy Points in a Surprise Attack 

It is difficult to make a successful surprise night attack. 
This is true, especially when the enemy occupies a strong, closely- 
organized position, such as a .bridgehead, or when our attacking 
strength is large. However, inasmuch as the surprise element is 
the one great advantage in night combat, it will be utilized by all 
means* Even in the case of an assault, the initial movement of troops 



327 



will be kept secret and developed at an appropriate time into a 
full scale open attack. 

Matters which must be carefully watched when making a suc- 
cessful surprise attack are as follows: 

a* To make attack preparations carefully and properly* 

b, To be careful to keep our intention a secret, 

c. To utilize terrain features, especially dead space 
and gullies, which make it easier to conceal our intent, 

d, To charge in through rugged terrain where the enemy 
little dreams of our approach, 

e. To attack when the enemy is in an unguarded state 
because of the time element or weather conditions, 

f • To conduct reconnaissance of the enemy 1 s security 
condition and approach and charge into those points where his 
watch is not strict, 

g. To destroy or disable various trip wire warning systems, 

h. To frustrate the enemy ! s illumination tactics. 

i. To use demonstration and feint tactics skillfully, 
j . To attack the enemy after the war of nerves has ex- 
hausted him and caused slackness in his watch, 

k. To wreck the chain of command. 

9. Necessity of Gradual Attack and Importance of a Blitzkrieg- 
like Attack 

When the enemy is overwhelmingly superior in fighting power, 



328 



especially fire power, and occupies a strong position, it is custo- 
mary to make a gradual attack against one target after another so 
that the casualties of the assaulting echelon are kept to a minimum, 
and supporting fire power equipment and supplies may be advanced 
smoothly. In this case, it is also necessary to maintain at all 
times a strength sufficient to break through the enemy position 
and to make preparations to meet tank or artillery attacks* How- 
ever, such a gradual attack on the enemy position is apt to give 
the enemy the time to muster reinforcements from imperiled .sectors 
or to make preparations for the concentration and employment of re- 
serve force or fire power, which may result in frustrating our sub- 
sequent attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the speed 
of attack as much as possible. When there is sufficient strength 
to break through the enemy position, we must carry out a daytime 
attack on the heels of a night attack. In the event of a success- 
ful break through, the penetration must be continued deep into the 
enemy position even in the darkness. 
10. Noteworthy Points in Combat 

a. All commanding officers will try to overpower the 
enemy and capture his position by employing systematically the 
front-line attacking force, heavy weapons, artillery, obstacle 
removal sections, raiding parties, etc. At the same time, they 
will always continue to improve preparations to meet the enemy's tank, 
artillery or bombing attacks, in order to secure the occupied areas 



329 



and thus facilitate our subsequent attacks, 

b. In view of the fact that command over troops in the 
dark becomes physically and spiritually difficult,, especially when 
the troops are exposed to fierce artillery or bombing attacks, all 
commanding officers will make careful preparations to meet such 
attacks and at the same time require their men to obey orders. 

c* In order to secure occupied areas and insure the 
success of attacks by front-line forces, it is necessary to speedily 
advance heavy weapons and artillery units to the front line and to 
make complete preparations to protect advance positions from the 
enemy 1 s artillery or bombing attacks. For this purpose, all com- 
manding officers must work out a detailed, elaborate plan concerning 
preparations for advance, especially the time and method of advance. 
They will also take steps to insure that the plan will be carried out 
satisfactorily, 

d. The fighting power of front-line forces will be maintained 
and increased during break-through operations by maintaining an ad- 
equatec supply of ammunition and material. 

e. kll commanding officers must constantly maintain the 
fighting power of front-line infantry units. For this purpose, they 
will order the units under their command to carry out a series of 
attacks according to their attacking capacity • 

f . Transportation facilities, especially those within a posi- 
tion, will be improved in order to facilitate the advance of rear 



330 



echelon troops, artillery units, ammunition and supplies. 

g. Timely liaison with important areas will be achieved, 
even when under the enemy 1 sjfurious artillery and bombing attack, 
by insuring prompt communications. 

h. In order not to suffer unnecessary losses, fortifica- 
tion works will be utilized throughout the offensive, forces will 
be deployed, advance will be made on all fours and camouflage will 
be emphasized. 

i. Raiding parties will be employed to throw the enemy 
position into confusion, facilitating a subsequent attack by the 
main force. 

11. An example of the plan for attacking the enemy position 
is shown in Charts 1-A, B and C. 



331 



CHART NO. I A 



a. When an attack or approach is made only at nighty with the 
daytime spent in attack preparations for defensive action. 



Divisional Reserve- 
(Objective) 



Regimental Reserve --- 

To be captured and 
secured mainly by 
second line companies 
of both battalions 



Company's Line of 
Resistance 

To be captured and 
secured by front line 
companies of both 
battalions 




Advance on 
the night of 
X+2 day 



Advance on 
the night of 
X+l day 



RAIDING UNIT 



Advance on 
the night of 
X day 



(Example of 
distances) 



FRONT LINEl 



HQ 



Advance by 
the night of 
X-l day at 
the latest 




SECOND LINE 



332 



Chart No. 1-A 



Explanation: 

(1) In the event daylight movement is difficult due to the 
difference in the fighting power of both sides, particularly in 
regard to firepower on the ground and air power, a series of 
attacks based on this plan will be executed, 

(2) In many cases when carrying out an attack, a small group 
of picked troops will capture an enemy position and the main body 
will be used to secure it firmly ♦ 

(3) Various methods will be devised for movements advancing 
to the position of preparation for the attack. 

(4) Cover and help for the advance of heavy firearms and 
artillery and the transportation of ammunition and materials be- 
fore X+l day will be executed by the second line battalion. 

(5) The regimental commander will draw up an integrated plan 
regarding the employment of raiding units. He will not only 
commit into v the front line elements from the second line battalion 
troops under his direct command, but he may also command both 
front line battalion commanders to commit and employ other troops 
on their respective fronts. 

(6) It has been decided to advance up to the enexpy company's 
line of resistance during the night of X day because altogether 
ten hours would be necessary to approach, capture and secure firm- 
ly the enemy position, seven hours being required to approach and 
penetrate it, which means an average of one hour to advance 100 
meters, and three hours to secure the position firmly. Moreover, 
because it is deemed that it will be extremely difficult to secure 
the enemy position firmly during the daytime of X4-1 day inasmuch 
as tanks, mortars, artillery, etc, constitute the enengr's main 
fight ixjg power, will be active during the day, it is essential to 
devise special effective measures for antitank contoat and cover 
against enemy artillery bombarcUosnt in order to obtain excellent 
results in conducting raidix^g tactics against the enemy. On the 
night of X day, the deeper the enemy position is penetrated, the 
greater will be the damage inflicted on energy tanks, mortars, 
artillery, etc, so it will become easier to secure the captured 
position firmly. Therefore, it will be planned to penetrate the 
enemy front as deep as possible, and, for this purpose, if circums- 
tances permit, it is advisable to commence the attack at dusk# 



333 



CHART NO. I B 



b. When conducting an attack during the day and night, 



Divisional Reserve 
(Object to Attain) 



Regimental Reserve 

Both battalions 
will capture enemy 
position with their 
main forces at dawn. 
In this case the 
leapfrogging movement 
of the second line 
companies will be 
executed. 



Company 1 s Line of 
Resistance 

Both battalions 
'will capture this with 
elements of front line 
companies and then 
prepare for another 
daytime attack. 




Advance on 
the night of 
X+2 day 



Attack during 
the daytime 
of X+l day 



RAIDING UNIT 



Advance on 
the night of 
X day 



(Example of 
distances) 



HQ 




SECOND LINE 



Advancing by 
X-l day at 
the latest 



334 



Chart No. 1-B 



Explanation: 

(1) This plan was worked out on the premise that the night 
penetration would be exploited fully. 

For the daylight attack on X4-1 day, heavy fire arms and 
artillery will cooperate with their full strength in the. front line 
fighting and preparations for this cooperation will be completed 
by the morniqg of X4-1 day. 

The heavy fire arms and artillery necessary for the above 
cooperation will be ^nroute to their positions, so their coopera- 
tion may not be expected in the night attack of X day. 

(2) Depending on the circumstances, each battalion may be 
employed for additional aims. 

(3) The second line battalions, in most cases, cannot expect 
the powerful cooperation of hea^ fire arms and artillery for their 
night assault of X-KL day. Accordingly, the night assault for X+l 
day may possibly be put off tiH after the daytime of X+2 dsgr. 

(h) In case attacks are to be continued throughout the day 
and night, sometimes the attacks will be commenced in the degrtiuB 
instead of at night as shown in this plan. It will be advantageous 
to commence attacks at night when the fighting power includirg 
artillery is not sufficient but the darkness makes possible the 
completion of careful preparations. Attacks may be commenced at the 
daytime when the situation is otherwise. 



335 



CHART NO. I-C 



c. Ylhen the Attack by the Main Force is Facilitated by a 
Powerful Raiding Unit. 



N \ 
\ 

\ 



^ ^ S 



t s ll>{:-| \ 
P4I i !NJ 



\ ?\'?\\ 9 \ ' 



From this tiine on these units- 
will becojiE raiding units 



With the advance of the front ■ 
line battalions, the second 
line battalion vdll advance 
to the line formerly occupied 
by the front line battilions 
and then prepare for the day- 
time attack of X+l day 




-To be 
executed 
of the 
night of 
X day 



Advance by 
the night 
of X-l day 



RESERVE 



33b 



Chart No. 1-C 



Explanation: 

(1) This is a plan, in view of the increasing difficulty 
for the raiding unit to infiltrate into the enemy position, to 
penetrate the enemy position by the use of force and then' shift 
to raiding tactics in order to facilitate the day attack of the 
main force. 

(2) The main duty of the front line battalion after turning 
to raiding tactics resembles the aim of the artillery's preliminary 
firing for attack, and it consists of destroying obstacles and 
trip wire warning devices, exterminating tanks, breaking down the 
command system and destroying artillery and trench mortars. 

The movements of the front line battalion after shifting 
to raiding tactics will always be determined by the existing 
situation. However, heavy fire arms usually will be placed under 
the command of the second line battalion commander. 

(3) Depending on the situation, various methods will be 
utilized such as the dispatching of strength formed principally 
around one company from each battalion which is to carry out the 
attack in place of the raiding battalion* 



337 



d. In launching a surprise night raiding attack , when the 
difference between the enemy's and our combat strength is too great 
to permit the maintenance and securing of an enemy position after its 
capture special care must be taken to conceal our intent. Also, the 
time, area or target of attack will be coordinated and determined 
mathematically and systematically, and preferably, as many raiding 
parties as possible will be used against the enemy position after 
sunset, but they must return to the position of attack preparation 
by dawn. 

In case it is necessary to carry out an attack as mentioned 
above, it is important to utilize various means to obtain- the greatest 
sum effect, by utilizing such methods as conducting a series of night 
attacks or uncovering secrets of the enemy position and attacking his 
neglected point. - 

12. Use of Firearms in Night Attacks 

In night attacks stress is laid on the surprise 'element, and 
since small arms are not as effective at night as during the day, and 
since there is the ever-present danger of shooting at friendly troops, 
the Amy has hitherto preferred to carry out night attacks utilizing 
close quarter combat. However, when a large attack strength is to 
be employed due to the increasing necessity of carrying out night 
attacks and also, due to the frequency of attacks under illumination, 
the attack will be carried out by taking advantage of favorable 
terrain features and the effective use of fire arms. 



338 



However, as there is a limit to the effectiveness of our 

fire arms, it is essential to decide on the key target so that 

the effectiveness of a surprise attack may be demonstrated to its 

fullest extent • 

13 . Matters to be Noted in Carrying Out an Attack With the 
Support of Firearms 

a. The senior commander will give a plain, preliminary 
explanation regarding the use of fire aims. At this time, it is 
better, in most cases, not to use rifles as stipulated in the Infantry 
Drill Regulations, but to use light machine-guns and submachine guns. 

b. Generally, the time to use firearms will be determined 
definitely, but may be changed according to the enemy situation or 
to gain the most out of the surprise element. 

In employing fire arms at night, it should be noted that 
various troubles will occur unless careful preliminary arrangements 
are made. And even when the situation is such that it can be antici- 
pated that it will become necessary to employ raiding tactics from 
the middle of a surprise attack, the time to use firearms will be 
determined and planned, and changed only to meet changes in the 
enemy situation. Only in such cases can success in surprise attacks 
be expected. 

c. Matters to be specially noted in fixing the time for a 
forced shift in tactics to meet changes in the situation; 

(1) See whether the enemy has commenced firing ou the entire 



339 



front. 

(2) Know the condition of subordinates while under 
enemy fire and illumination. 

(3) Utilize terrain features, so that when the enemy- 
fires on the entire front, a minimum of losses will be sustained and 
the advance can be continued. 

(4) Remember that, at very close range, it is more 
advantageous to charge into the enemy position instead of continuing 
to fire. 

(5) When there is fear of being subjected to sudden fire 
attack due to the enemy's illumination and signals, efforts must be 
made to suppress the latter without loss of time. 

Generally speaking, those decisions based upon the 
above conditions will be made by the infantry battalion commander, and 
executed by the front-line company commander as was ordered in advance 
according to the situation. 

14.. Preliminary Firing for Attack 

It would be to our advantage if we could carry out preliminary 
firing to prepare for night attack and destroy the vital points of the 
enemy's command system and fire network. However in view of our artil- 
lery strength and the difficulty in utilizing its power, this firing 
is feasible only on rare occasions. Accordingly, it will be necessary 
in most cases to carry out only destructive firing in preparation for 
charge or to concentrate on support firing during a charge. 



340 



In case preliminary firing for attack or destructive firing is 
practicable, it will usually be carried out shortly before the attack 
on the enemy's main position, so that our objective may be attained 
in the shortest possible time* In this event, the enemy's trench 
mortars and command center will be fired upon by the howitzers and 
trench mortars disposed to the rear and the enemy's special pillboxes 
will be destroyed with the light guns stationed on the front line as 
part of the support firing during a charge. 
15. Charge and Support of Charge 

The principles of daylight attack apply to the charge and 
to the support of the charge when conducted through the use of fire- 
arms. However, inasmuch, as close harmony between close combat and 
fire power, which is difficult even in the daytime, is necessary, the 
commanding officer concerned must determine careful and detailed 
procedures after studying the situation and terrain and thus do his 
utmost to make preliminary preparations complete. 

For convenience in supplying support fire for the charge, 
positions for heavy fire arms and .artillery will be selected as near 
the front line as possible with a view to suppressing or destroying 
special pillboxes, covered machine gun emplacements, and if necessary, 
illuminating apparatus. If artillery and trench mortars have to be 
stationed in the rear due to the situation, they will be used to 
subdue vital points in the enemy position, cut off communications 
between the enemy's front line and rear or suppress enemy trench 



3U 



mortars. 

Heavy fire arms and artillery assigned to giving support fire 
for the charge will begin surprise firing immediately before the charge 
of the infantry in order to aid in attaining attack aimsin the shortest 
possible time. In this case, aligning points prepared in advance will 
be utilized usually for indirect aimirg, but under intense illumina- 
tion firing by direct aiming will be possible in some cases. 

If it is possible to assign heavy fire arms and artillery 
exclusively for the purpose of destroying illuminating apparatus, it 
will jfrtfove advantageous. However, when the number of guns is not 
sufficient, those assigned to the suppression of special pillboxes 
or covered machine gun emplacements will be ordered, when necessary 
to destroy illuminating apparatus near the firing line. 

The front-line infantry, after closing in upon the enemy 
position by means of creepiig and crawling, will begin firing light 
machine guns and grenade throwers in concert with tte heavy firearms 
and artillery and thus overpower the enemy by carrying out a surprise 
charge after advancing as close as possible to the enemy position. 

It should be noted that heavy fire arms and artillery for 
night firliig often delay the activities of the front line by taking 
more time than expected in makirjg preparations for firing. 
16. Counterbattery (Trench Mortar) Fire 

a. If our artillery strength is inferior to the energy's it 
is difficult to conduct counterbattery fire, except under the most 



342 



favorable situations. Therefore, generally speaking, counterbattery 
fire shall be avoided, but it may be employed suddenly and for a 
short period against those hostile artillery and trench mortars 
positions which are inflicting the most serious damages upon our 
forces, to check the activities of these positions. 

b. In carrying out counterbattery fire, it will be advantage- 
ous if methods other than the artillery are used to disperse the hos- 
tile artillery fire and to destroy his artillery, trench mortars and 
observation and commanding posts. 

Enemy artillery fire should be dispersed by attacking 
from several directions and also by carrying out various demonstra- 
tions and feinting operations. 

When employing a raiding party .with the above objective 
in mind, it is better to carry out a surprise attack against the 
hostile artillery, trench mortar firing line, and observation posts, 
and to destroy his radio equipment, telephone sets, and sever his 
telephone lines. In particular, such attacks should be carried out 
by taking advantage of the enemy 1 s bombardment. 
17. Guidance for Position Combat 

In conducting position combat, it must be fully remembered 
that position combat is equal to counterbattery fire. Advance shall 
be made with ample preparations so as to be able to carry out anti- 
tank combat at any time, and every opportunity shall be seized to 
destroy tanks when attacked. At the same time, thorough preparations 



343 



for antitank combat shall be included in the activities to secure 

an occupied area. 

18, Guidance on Coordination between First Line Units, and 
Heavy Weapons and Artillery, in Night Position Combat 

a. In order to make a proper selection of the time and place 
for the full display of our fire power a n d to facilitate coordination 
between fire power and the activities of the first-line units, the 
commander shall give precise combat guidance and shall rigidly control 
the activities of the first-line units. 

In position combat first-line units shall make all out 
efforts to conduct raiding tactics against the enemy, even when they 
have accompanying firepower. 

b. The first-line units, shall maintain close liaison with 
the artillery and heavy weapons and shall advance or attempt to re- 
move confronting obstacles while under fire cover. In this case, 
due attention should be paid to the disposition of troops and utili- 
zation of terrain so as not to obstruct firing. On the other hand, 
the first-line units shall continuously inform the artillery unit 
about their location, disposition, and fire effect, in order to aid 
the artillery. 

c. Night firing by heavy weapons and artillery gins in posi- 
tion is generally limited, compared with daytime firing, but illumina- 
tion is often used to facilitate night firing. Moreover, inasmuch as 
the effectiveness of firing is important in breaking down strong enemy 
resistance, it is necessary to make thorough preparations for night 



3U 



riring by the artillery and heavy weapons and to improve command 
techniques, firing operation, observation, and liaison, in order to 
meet the demands of the first-line units. 

19. Important Points in Planning and Carrying put Night Attacks 

a. Time to Commence Attack 

Although it is better to surprise the enemy by taking 
advantage of his unguarded points, much time is required to approach 
enemy positions commence an attack immediately after sunset* Attack 
is sometimes started at dusk and continued throughout the night to 
secure or expand our gains. 

b. Designation of Attack Targets 

(1) Both areas to be captured and areas to be secured 
are generally to be designated as attack targets. On this occasion, 
the front and the depth of the areas concerned must be clearly indi- 
cated and conspicuous terrain and landmarks utilized for this purpose. 

(2) It is provided in the regulations that a combat 
zone shall be assigned to units larger than the tactical unit, but for 
the purpose of facilitating combat in covered ground and promoting 
preparation for night attack, it is often advantageous to assign a bat- 
tle zone to an infantry company, which is the combat unit. 

c« Battle Front 

Just as night fighting resembles day fighting in riiany 
respects, the battlefront of a night attack must resemble the front 
of a day attack in order to facilitate the capture and subsequent 



345 



securing of occupied positions* 

d* In carrying out troop disposition for a series of attacks, 
importance must be attached to the task of firmly securing an occupied 
area* Therefore, the depth of penetration into enemy territory must 
be restricted properly* 4s a result, it is often the case that the 
size of the units to be employed for a series of night attacks is 
of company size or smaller. 

e. Emphasis on Combat Team Tactics 

Because of the importance of attacks on pillboxes and 
fire positions and closing -in tactics in antitank warfare, combat 
team tactics must be more and more emphasized in night attacks* 

f * The distance to be maintained and other matters requir- 
ing special attention when the rear unit is following the front-line 
unit, are as described below: 

(1) In order to avoid as much as possible casualties 
and losses from the same barrage fire directed against the front-line 
unit, the rear unit will advance by maintaining proper distance that 
will still enable it to remain in contact with the front-line unit. 

(2) From the outset the rear unit will fix the point of 
attack disposition and advance in a formation ready for this dis- 
position* It will exert efforts to minimize casualties and losses by 
deploying thoroughly as in the case of front-line units. 

(3) The rear unit will dispatch beforehand a liaison 
officer (he will carry communication equipment as much as possible) 



346 



to the commander of the front-line unit to become acquainted with 
the conditions of the front-line unit. 

When executing a leapfrog movement, the commanders of 
both units will directly meet in order to have a full knowledge of the 
enemy situation confronting them and the topography of the battle- 
front. 

20, Demonstrations and Feints 

Demonstrations and feints must be carried out in accordance 
with the higher echelon commander's plan in such a manner as to make 
the enemy misjudge the time of attack, frontage of an attack, strength, 
plan, troop movement, etc. An example of the procedure for conducting 
demonstrations and feints is as given below: 

The enemy shall be deceived by utilizing any of the following: 
false cooking smoke; deceptive illumination, signals, and sounds; 
dummy soldiers, guns, and installations; simulated fire, the occupation 
of false attack preparation positions; destruction of obstacles; removal 
of trip wire warning systems; reconnaissance of enemy positions; 
raiding attacks and simulated traces of a march, etc* 

The demonstration or feint will usually be carried out against 
a sector other than the intended main sector of attack. But when it 
becomes necessary to deceive the enemy as to the time of the attack 
instead, because it has become difficult to conceal our projected 
attack, such means as repeated concentrated fire on the point of 



3A7 



assault during attack preparation and advancing of elements under 
cover of fire, or the use of smoke screens may be employed. 

In conducting false demonstrations, careful preparations 
must be made so as not to produce the countereffect of exposing the 
true plan or hampering the over-all attack. 

21. Since the execution of a night attack is liable to be 
hampered by various unexpected troubles or not carried out as expected, 
the commander must make full preparations to meet any emergency. 

22. Brave and resolute actions by all commanding officers as 
well as tight control of troops are essential prerequisites to a 
successful night attack. If and when they are imprudent and reckless 
in action their troops will suffer such great casualties as to affect 
seriously the subsequent attack. Therefore, they must complete 
thorough preparations to meet enemy bombing and shelling attacks. 
Furthermore, commanding officers must take into account the possi- 
bility of death or disability of leaders during an action and take 
proper measures so that command may be continued and maintained. 

23. Example of Casualties in Night Combat 

The estimate of casualties resulting from a night attack is 
an important factor in formulating an attack plan, but since the 
details will vary with the situation, it is difficult to give examples. 

However, the following example derived from recent combat 
experiences may serve as a guide. 



348 



In a series of night attacks , a front-line company will 
suffer the following casualties: 

The pillbox seizure unit and obstacle removal squad will, 
lose approximately 40 percent of their total strength before the 
seizure of - an enemy position. The company main force will lose 
approximately 20 percent during an approach movement and approximately 
30 to 40 percent during the securing of an occupied area during day- 
light. Heavy fire, arms and artillery units will lose 1'5 to 20 percent. 
The second-line company will suffer casualties of 10 to 20 percent 
before leapfrogging the front-line company. 



349 



APPENDIX V 

Field Service Regulations 

Part IV 

Attack Against Special 
Defensive Zone 



351 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

General 

CHAPTER I General Procedures of Attack 357 

General 357 

Section A. Attack Preparations 361 

Section B. Conduct of the Attack 366 

CHAPTER II Assault by Pillbox Assault Unit 371 

General 371 

Section A. Organization 371 

Section B. Attack Preparations 372 

Section C. Conduct of the Attack 374 

CHAPTER III Night Attack 377 

CHAPTER IV Heavy Artillery Action 379 

General 379 

Section A* Attack Preparations 380 

Section B. Conduct of the Attack 383 
SUPPLEiflEN TAR Y CHARTS 



CHART I Organization and Equipment of Pillbox 

Assault Unit, Example 1 

CHART II Organization and Equipment of pillbox 

Assault Unit, Example 2 . 



353 



Attack Against Special Defensive Zone 
General 

1. This book, a part of the Field Service Regulations (Sakusen 
Yomurei), discusses the peculiarities of the attack against special 
defensive zones (field positions organized around pillboxes)* 

The attack against a special defensive zone is conducted 
according to this book and the tactical principles laid down in 
Part II, Position Warfare • 

2. Because the procedures for attack against a special defen- 
sive zone vary greatly according to the situation preceding the 
attack, the organization and equipment of our forces, the organiza- 
tion of enemy positions, the terrain and geological features and the 
weather; units conducting the attack must make a thorough study based 
on local conditions and must endeavor to effectively apply tactical 
principles with initiative and resourcefulness ♦ 



355 



CHAPTER I 
General Procedures of Attack 

General 

3. The strength of a special defensive zone depends to a large 
degree on the situation. A defensive zone, even when pillboxes are 
already constructed, is weak unless other supporting defenses are 
also completed. Further, the defensive zone is not strong, even if 
all construction is complete, unless the positions are manned by an 
adequate number of men or a timely troop reinforcement is possible. 
However, the well developed and adequately manned special defensive 
zone which maintains vigilant security measures is especially strong. 

4. The following are generally considered the principle weak- 
nesses of the special defensive zone: 

(1) Because the organization of defense positions is dif- 
ficult to conceal, the attacking side is able to plan appropriate 
measures for its destruction. 

(2) Destruction or neutralization of a pillbox renders it 
difficult for the defender to redispose his forces without weakening 
the rest of the position. 

(3) Cooperation between troops manning pillboxes and those 
manning other defense positions is difficult. This is especially 
true in cases of sudden change in the situation. 

(4) The effectiveness of the entire defensive position is 
lowered v/hen the limited visibility of night or fog prevents any 



357 



pillbox functioning with maximum efficiency. 

5. Adequate preparations must be made in order to attack the 
special defensive zone* The attack must be made with surprise and 
speed and must penetrate the entire depth of the hostile defensive 
zone* It is highly essential to determine the weak points of the 
enemy defense and to surprise the enexny by opening the attack sudden- 
ly, takirjg advantage of foul weather and difficult terrain whenever 
possible. Once the attack is launched every effort must be made to 
accelerate the speed of penetration and to overpower the defenders 
before the arrival of enemy reinforcements. 

The various points with the hostile defensive zone may be 
seized in successive stages, depending on the strength of our force 
and the condition of hostile positions. In a progressive attack the 
front line unit must exert every effort to advance to the designated 
objective. 

6. It is important to utilize the cover of darkness in attack- 
ing a special defensive zone. 

Depending on the season and the situation, an attack is 
often launched utilizijpg the half-light of dawn or dusk. Sometimes 
large-scale use of gas or smoke is advantageous in facilitating the 
attack. 

?• The front line unit assigned to attack the special defensive 
zone must organize the necessary nunber of pillbox assault units and 
employ them in direct attack against the pillboxes while the main 



358 



body is attacking the rest of the hostile defensive zone. 

In the event that the pillboxes in the hostile defensive 
zone are neither numerous nor strong, the front line unit may have 
its components dispose of the pillboxes at their own discretion, 
without organizing special pillbox assault units, 

8. The division commander will support the front line unit 
with heavy artillery and engineer ,f Ki ,! units**- in order to speed the 
seizure of enemy positions • In such a support action, it is advan- 
tageous to progressively employ the full support strength against 
each objective without dispersirg maximum power. This is especially 
so when the ft Ki tt and heavy artillery units are available only in 
limited strength. When these support units are not available, the 
division commander must employ a part of his field artillery to neu- 
tralize pillboxes or in laying down a smoke screen to obstruct enemy 
observation* 

9» In general, the followiig are the weak points of pillboxes: 

(1) Concealment of pillbox is difficult. 

(2) Limited fields of vision and fire often leave a number 
- of dead spaces or angles in front of the defensive 

zone . 

(3) It is difficult to open the steel shutters and deliver 
fire while the firing slit is being subjected to direct 
fire. 



1. "Ki" was an abbreviation of the term Sogoki , the name applied 
to tanks which were especially designed and equipped to assault pill- 
boxes. Equipment included flame throwers and trench crossing treads. 
A r, Ki H Regiment was composed of 3 companies with 3 Sogoki tanks each. 



359 



(4) They are susceptible to smote screens, 

(5) A shell explosion inside a pillbox will invariably 
cause serious damage and many casualties. 

(6) Fire from a pillbox may be rendered less effective 
due to the accumulation of powder smoke within the 
pillbox. 

(7) It is almost impossible to purify the air in a pillbox 
as they seldom have an exhaust blower capable of re- 
moving gases. 

10. In attacking a pillbox, the assault unit usually neutralizes 
the weapons first and then mops up the enemy inside. However, a sep- 
arately organized mop-up unit may be employed. 

Gas may be used effectively by the pillbox assault unit as 
it will either completely suppress the enemy or hamper the effective 
use of the pillbox. 

11. The "Ki tt unit is attached to the front line divisions and 
employed in the demolition of enemy pillboxes in close cooperation 
with infantry troops. Every effort must be made to utilize the 
characteristics of the ,f Ki !! unit to the best advantage. 

The division commander usually attaches the "Ki" unit to 
the front line unit in the sector of the main attack effort. A "Ki" 
company either beirjg attached to the front line infantry regimsnt 
(or battalion) or employed in direct support. ^ 

Whenever the situation requires, the division commander 
directly employs all or a part of the attached "Ki" regiment in sup- 
port of the front line unit in order to destroy enejuy pillboxes in 
depth. The division commander may also attach a part of the "Ki" 



360 



unit to the tank unit, 

12. The tank unit is, as a rule, employed to penetrate the 
rear positions of the hostile defensive zone* Tanks are normally 
employed in support of the attack against the general position, but 
may be employed in direct support of the pillbox assault units. 

13. The direct air support of the attack against a special 
defensive zone is conducted in accordance with air support procedures 
for an attack against field positions, A bombing attack against 
pillboxes is not usually conducted because such attacks are seldom 
effective. 

14. The unit assigned to attack a special defensive zone, tak- 
ing into consideration the organization and character of enemy posi- 
tions, the nature of terrain and the enemy disposition, must select 
the tactics and combat materials suitable for the situation in order 

to achieve the element of surprise and must conduct as much battle- 
field training as possible. 

Section A. Attack Preparations 

15. The attack must be thoroughly prepared by exercising tight 
security to conceal our intention, guardiiig against enemy intelligence 
activities, and endeavoring to the utmost not to give the enemy ob- 
servers any impression of changes taking place. While making detail- 
ed attack preparations, it is. also essential to complete preparations 
for immediate raiding if it should be possible to take advantage of 
enemy unpreparedness. 



361 



16. Attack preparations should include moving the front line 
unit as close to the enemy as possible. However, when the front line 
unit is familiar with the terrain, it may be more advantageous to 
first move picked officers and men of the front line unit to the 
attack position in order to secretly complete preparations, and then 
move the balance of the unit to the position during the night preced- 
ing the attack. 

17. Reconnaissance of pillboxes is conducted to obtain informa- 
tion which may be evaluated and classified by taking into considera- 
tion the inf ormation acquired from past studies. Even during combat 
the captured pillbox must be studied in order to evaluate the capabi- 
lities of other pillboxes. Some of the items of inf ormation required 
are: 

(1) Organization of fire between the pillboxes and between 
the pillboxes and the other positions. 

(2) The terrain of the area in which the pillbox is locat- 
ed and the dead spaces in the fires of the pillbox. 

(3) The obstacles protecting the pillbox. 

(4) Existence of warning devices (electrical or other) for 
the pillbox. 

(5) The shape and the thickness of the walls. 

(6) The number of firing slits, the direction of fire, the 
height of , fir ing slits f rom the ground, and the 
existence of loopholes for firing downward at close 
range. 

(7) The thickness of steel shutters of firing slits and 
the working of the shutters . 



362 



(8) The type and number of weapons and the number of men in 
the pillbox* 

(9) Interior construction of the pillbox, especially the 
existence of a partition wall or lower deck* 

(10) Location and construction of entrance* 

(11) Ventilation, water supply, lighting, and periscopic 
equipment. 

(12) Existence of communication tunnel and the tunnel open- 
ing. 

(13) Location of sector command post. 

(14) Signal communication devices. 

(15) Detection of dummy or unmanned pillboxes. 

18. The guns and automatic weapons to lay direct fire against 
the firing slits must be moved up as close to the enemy pillbox as 
possible and placed in a position directly facing the slits. Every 
measure must be taken to conceal the positions of these guns and 
automatic weapons. 

19* The front line unit responsible for attacking a special 
defensive zone and the artillery unit to directly support the attack 
must, prior to the attack, agree on the respective sectors of respon- 
sibility in disposing of pillboxes, the time and procedures to be em- 
ployed against the pillboxes, action to be taken by pillbox assault 
units and the method of maintainiiig liaison with those units. 

20. In case a fl Ki tt unit is to be employed, the commanders con- 
cerned must coordinate and be in complete agreement on the following 
procedures: 



363 



(1) The time to commit the Sogoki (tanks equipped with 
flame throwers and other weapons especially suitable 
for assaulting pillboxes.) and the attack objective 
of those machines. 

(2) Action by the infantry, tanks, artillery, and M Ki" 
unit. 

(3) The line of departure and the area of operation of 
Sogoki and the time and method of passing through 
the front-line infantry. 

(4) The timing of the assault by the front-line infantry 
and the demolition of pillboxes, and the distances 
to be maintained to avoid losses from the demolition 
activity. Support to be provided during each suc- 
cessive phase of action and infantry and artillery 
cooperation between tanks and Sogoki. 

(5) Cooperation by the other engineer units when the 
Sogoki pass the obstacles. 

(6) The means of signal communication. 

(7) The measures to be taken in case the attack does not 
progress as scheduled. 

(8) Action by the Sogoki after the mission is accomplished. 
21. The usual practice is to dispose the front-line regiment so 

as to achieve rapid penetration throughout the entire depth of ^ the 
hostile defensive zone which is the division objective. For this 
purpose the front-line unit may be disposed in two successive attack 
echelons (TN A battalion comprises each echelon) with one battalion 
leapfrogging the other duririg the attack. In such an attack, the 
regimental commander, taking into consideration the attack objective 
and the firmness of enemy defense, prescribes the limit of advance 



for each echelon. 




364 



\ 



22. The commander of the infantry regiment usually employs the 
regimental gun unit and attached artillery units to fire at the 
firing slits to neutralize the pillboxes or to support the assault 
unit. The regimental commander's decision whether to take direct 
command of the regimental gun unit and the attached artillery unit 
or attach these units to the first echelon battalion, rests on th$ 
number of enemy pillboxes and the strength of the attached artillery. 
When necessary, the regimental commander regulates the target and 
time of fire against the firing slits, and the positions of the 
regimental guns and attached artillery. 

23. It is advantageous for the first echelon battalion commander 
to employ his first echelon company in a rapid penetration that by- 
passes the enemy pillboxes. In such an attack the battalion commander 
usually not only regulates the firing against the pillboxes, but 
organizes a required number of pillbox assault units from his infantry 
and engineer components and employs them under his direct command. 

The regimental commander must take measures in accordance 
with Paragraph 22 to facilitate penetration of the hostile position 
by the first echelon battalion. For this purpose, the regimental 
commander may occasionally organize the pillbox assault units. 

The battalion &nd regimental commanders must plan on the 
appropriate measures to be taken in case an unexpected pillbox is 
encountered or the attack by the pillbox assault units is stalled. 
For this purpose, it is advisable to organize reserve pillbox 
assault units, particularly at battalion level. 



%5 



24. The battalion commander, taking into consideration the 
number of enemy pillboxes to .be dealt with, regulates the action of 
the pillbox assault units and the deployment of the heavy weapons 
and artillery under his direct command in laying fire against the 
enemy fir ijng slits and, if required, designates the pillboxes to be 
dealt with by the first echelon company. 

When necessary, the heavy infantry weapons and artillery 
to be used to deliver fire against pillboxes may be deployed in an 
adjacent unit's zone of action. 

In firing against firing slits, the usual practice is to 
employ one weapon to each main aperture. 

25 • Tanks employed in direct attack on pillboxes will neutralize 
the pillbox by firing against the firing slits or prevent firing 
through slits by placing the body of the tank immediately in front of 
the opening. 

26. Units which are to advance into the hostile defensive zone 
in order to lay direct fire against the enemy pillboxes must be 
equipped to pass through obstacles and shell -pocked areas, to use 
camouflage and be ready to seize the initiative to open the fire first. - 

Section B. Conduct of the Attack 

27. If possible, the attack must be launched suddenly to surprise 
the enemy. The front-line unit, while neutralizing the enemy pillboxes, 
must advance rapidly toward the objective and the division commander 
must be prepared to exploit the success immediately. Often, when the 



366 



situation permits, the principle pillboxes are seized at the onset 
by a surprise attack conducted by a part of the front-line unit. 

28. During the preliminary bombardment, the field artillery 
must: direct the fire on enemy positions other than the pillboxes, 
destroy the defensive installations and facilities protecting the 
pillboxes, destroy the camouflage concealing the pillboxes, and 
distrupt the enemy command system. 

Heavy artillery, when available for the attack, is 
employed to destroy key pillboxes in the inner areas of the hostile 
defensive zone, 

29. If possible, the pillbox assault units must advance 
rapidly ahead of the attacking infantry and assault the pillboxes 
immediately. 

The pillbox assault unit committed to attack the pillbox 
in the inner areas of hostile defensive zone is usually deployed 
behind the front-line unit. As the attack progresses, the assault 
unit is moved up ahead of the front-line prepared to assault the 
pillbox at the first opportunity. 

30. The obstacles protecting the pillbox are usually destroyed 
by the pillbox assault unit, but it will be advantageous if the 
obstacles are destroyed by artillery fire before the assault. 

31. The opening of direct laying against the firing slits of a 
hostile pillbox should be so timed as to suppress the pillbox in 
time for the front-line infantry to commence the assault. 



367 



32. Direct laying against the firing slits must bo so conducted 
as to achieve the desired result in the shortest possible time. 
Important points to be remembered in conducting such fires are: 

(1) Field and mountain artillery and regimental guns 
usually fire high explosive shells with instantaneous or short 
delay fuzes* Whenever required, the field and mountain artillery 
fire gas or smoke shells. A shell e:xplosion inside a pillbox is 
often conf irmable by smoke emitted from firing slits and observation 
port. 

(2) Antitank guns normally fire high explosive shells, 
with instantaneous or short delay fuzes but when the slit shutters 
are closed, armor piercing shells are used. 

(3) Machine guns and machine cannons usually fire at the 
firing slits at close range when the shutters are opened, but when 
the shutters are closed, the firing of armor piercing shells are 
more effective. 

(4) Light machine guns or rifles are usually fired at the 
firing slits (one light machine gun or several rifles against one 
slit) at close range. Even when the shutters are closed, it is 
advantageous to continue firing to discourage opening of the shutters. 

33. Guns and automatic weapons which provide direct supporting 
fire to the pillbox assault unit continue direct laying against the 
firing slits, as long as possible, while the pillbox assault unit 
advances and act to suppress enemy f irijng points and counterattacking 
enemy troops which may hinder the advance of the pillbox assault unit. 



368 



34* Necessary preparations must be made to cope with pillboxes 
which are unexpectedly encountered as well as with those which are 
so located as to deny prior reconnaissance as to direction of fire, 
etc. The reserve pillbox assault unit should be committed to 
assault such positions. Sogoki can also be used to excellent 
advantage. 

35. In case the assault by the pillbox assault unit is unsuc- 
cessful, heavy infantry weapons must be temporarily employed as an 
emergency measure. The reserve pillbox assault unit and others are 
committed after the cause of the failure is eliminated. In spite 
of delays in neutralizing individual pillboxes, the main body of 
the attacking unit must continue its relentless advance. 



369 



CHAPTER II 
Assault by Pillbox Assault Unit 

General 

36. Each pillbox assault unit is usually assigned the mission 
of assaulting one hostile pillbox. The normal procedure for 
assaulting is first, the prompt suppression of its firing capabilities , 
followed by mopping up inside to put the pillbox completely out of 
action. 

Section A. Organization 

37. The pillbox assault unit is usually organized with both 
infantry and engineer troops. The numbers of each and their equipment 
being determined by the structure of the pillbox, the surrounding 
terrain and the weather and light conditions. 

The pillbox assault unit is platoon size, or less, commanded 
by a picked infantry or engineer officer. However, under some circum- 
stances a pillbox assault unit of less than 10 men commanded by a 
non-commissioned off icer will suffice. 

The organization and mission of a pillbox assault unit must 
be determined well in advance so as to allow the unit ample time for 
preparations. Troops of assault units should be equipped as lightly 
as possible. 

38. The commander of a pillbox assault unit plans the assault 
on the basis of the 'mission of his unit. Units are normally organ- 
ized into assault, support, obstacle clearing and reserve sections. 



371 



A small unit may be organized into a lesser number of sections by 
combining duties* 

39 • The assault section engages chiefly in the attack against 
firing slits and mopping up and destruction of the interior* 

The support section neutralizes any enejmy obstructing the 
movement of the pillbox assault unit. For this purpose the support 
section must direct fire at the firing slits at a very close range 
in conjunction with heavy infantry weapons and artillery fire and 
continue firir^g until the assault section closes in. It is also 
necessary for the support section to neutralize any enemy directly 
supporting the pillbox during the assault. 

The obstacle clearing section destroys the obstacles 
protecting the pillbox. 

Whenever necessary > the reserve section replaces men, 
carries extra demolition charges and other equipment for the assault 
section and assists in mopping up the interior of the pillbox, 

40. Supplementary Charts 1 and 2 show the organization of a 
pillbox assault units. 

Section B. Attack Preparations 

Zil. When assigning the mission to a pillbox assault unit; the 
pillbox to be assaulted, the time of departure, the zone of action, 
the assault method, and the action to be taken after the success is 
achieved must be clearly prescribed. Prior arrangements between 
the pillbox assault unit and other units concerned must be made by 



372 



familiarizing the pillbox assault unit with the planned action of 
the main body and the units which are to support the pillbox assault 
unit. 

42. If the situation permits, the commander of a pillbox as- 
sault unit should rehearse his men for the contemplated assault in 
order to thoroughly familiarize every man with his duties. He must 
also arouse in his men a willingness to die for the success of the 
main body and an unyielding determination to accomplish the mission. 

43 • The commander of a pillbox assault unit, accompanied by 
the noncommissioned officers picked to lead the sections and teams 
should reconnoiter the pillbox to be assaulted, studying the routes 
of advance, the dead spaces, and other important factors in order to 
perfect the assault preparations. Every caution must be exercised 
during reconnaissance in order not to attract enemy attention* 

44. In order to assure perfect execution of the pillbox assault, 
the unit commander's plan should cover the following pertinent points: 

(1) Attack procedures and the organization and mission of 
each section. 

(2) Attack preparations: 

(a) Distribution of equipment and material. 

(b) Selecting the line of departure (where to select 
the line of departure depends on the location of 
the enemy pillbox, but the line is usually 
selected near the assault position of the front- 
line infantry. 

(c) Disposition of each section. 

(3) Conduct of the attack: 

373 



(a) Time of departure (relationship with the timing 
of supporting fire by the infant ly and artillery 
is specified)* 

(b) Method of advance. 

(c) Action of each section and coordination. 

(d) Action following the successful accomplishment of 
the mission, 

(e) Cooperation with other units concerned and means 
of liaison. 

Section C. Conduct of the Attack 

45. The pillbox assault unit approaches the pillbox, taking 
advantage of dead spaces and the suppression of enemy fire. The 
component sections cooperate to accomplish the mission promptly* 

46. The support section approaches the enemy rapidly, clearirg 
the obstacles without assistance, if possible, and suppresses the 
enemy impeding the advance of the assault section. The obstacle 
clearing section clears the obstacles with the cooperation of the 
support section. 

4?. The assault section must endeavor to approach the pillbox 
quickly and establish themselves in the dead spaces (dead angles of 
firing slits, rear or roof of the pillbox, adjacent shell holes, 
trenches, etc.). Yforking from these close-in positions they attack 
the firing slits and suppress the pillbox fire which may be inter- 
rupting the attack of the main body. At times the firing slit with 
the greatest capabilities is attacked first and the rest of the slits 
are attacked progressively, but whenever the situation permits, it 



374 



is advantageous to' assign each firing slit to a team and attack them 
simultaneously. 

48. The assault section, when it closes in upon the pillbox, 
promptly suppresses the fire from the slits by using a flame throiver 
or demolition tube (Bangalors torpedo). Under some circumstances, 
an implement is employed to block the firing slits or screening 
objects (straw, cloth, or smoke) are placed or spread in front of 
slits to obstruct firing before the pillbox is neutralized by the 
use of hand grenades, flame throwers, etc., fired through the firing 
slits, ventilation openings or periscope holes. Closed steel shutters 
are destroyed by armor piercing mines before attacking the interior. 

49* When the firing from slits is successfully suppressed the 
assault section, avoiding unnecessary concentration, promptly enters 
the pillbox to mop up the enemy. Once inside, underground communi- 
cation lines and tunnels are either blocked or utilized. 

50. When the communication tunnel of a pillbox is demolished, 
the location of a tunnel entrance which may be located some distance 
from the pillbox is often revealed by the emission of smoke. It is 
important that the tunnel entrance be discovered promptly and de- 
molished or blocked. 

The absence of a direct entrance to a pillbox indicates 
the existence of a communication tunnel and efforts must be made to 
discover its location even after the pillbox is destroyed. 



375 



51* The ventilation opening must be plugged before introducing 
gas into a pillbox. 



376 



CHAPTER III 
Night Attack 

52. The night attack is used against a special defensive zone 
in order to capture key points to facilitate the daylight attack 
-which follows. When the situation permits, the night attack is 
carried through the entire depth of the hostile defensive zone. If 
night comes while an attack is in progress the assault must be 
continued. 

53 • The organization of the pillbox assault unit used in a night 
attack is similar to that employed in the daylight attack, with the 
exception that the organization is simpler, usually the number of 
riflemen are increased and the assault section is not normally pro- 
vided with a flame thrower. 

At night it is of ten preferable to organize a. team composed 
of a small number of picked men and have it approach the pillbox 
stealthily to carry out a surprise attack. 

54* In the night attack, a reserve pillbox assault unit should be 
organized when a key pillbox is the objective. 

55» The commander of a pillbox assault unit must exercise every 
precaution to prevent the component sections firing on each other in 
the confusion of darkness. He must also prescribe the anti-illumination 
measures and the means of liaison following the successful accomplish- 
ment of the mission. In addition, he must take into consideration 
the possible changes in enemy disposition. 



377 



56. The assault section must suddenly close in on the hostile 
pillbox and destroy it promptly by using a demolition charge, hand 
grenades, gas, or other means. Circumstances may make it advisable 
to block the firing slits first. 

57. Although a pillbox located in the inner area of a defensive 
zone often has to be taken by storm, rifle firing by the pillbox 
assault unit should be avoided whenever possible. 



378 



■CHAPTER IV 
Heavy Artillery Action 
General 

58. The 300 mm howitzer, because of its tremendous destructive 
power and effective range, is most suitable for the destruction of 
strong pillboxes or those located at lorg range. 

The 300 mm howitzer (long ) is superior to the 300 mm 
howitzer (short) in both accuracy and destructive power. 

The 240 mm howitzer is also suitable for destruction of 
strong pillboxes. 

The 280 mm howitzer, older than the 2/jO mm or the 300 mm, 
is less effective than the newer weapons both in range and destructive 
power but is suitable for destruction of moderately strong pillboxes 
at close range. 

Destructive power of the 150 mm gun is not great, but it 
can be employed in the neutralization of comparatively weak pillboxes. 

59. The greatest possible power of heavy artillery must be 
brought to bear on the main defensive zone of the enemy. When an 
outer defensive zone exists in front of the zone of main resistance, 
that outer zone is sometimes captured prior to the deploynent of the 
heavy artillery components. 

60. Although dose cooperation and strict adherence to the time 
schedule is necessary to insure that no del^y will result, the deploy- 
ment of heavy artillery should be executed as short a time as possible 
before the start of the attack. 



379 



The effectiveness of heavy artillery depends largely on the 
available ammunition supply. Because the transportation of heavy 
artillery ammunition in large quantities is time consuming and requires 
much transportation, it is often necessary to stockpile ammunition 
near the scheduled sites of artillery deployment. 

61. The movement and attack preparations of heavy artillery 
must be carried out with the utmost care and secrecy in order to 
conceal the intention to attack. 

Section A. Attack Preparation 

62. Heavy artillery positions must be selected as close to the 
enemy as practicable so as to enable delivery of maximum fire through- 
out the depth of the hostile defensive zone. The sites selected must 
also afford concealment of weapons and for construction of positions 
as well as being convenient for the transport of ammunition. 

63. The division commander must provide the artillery commander 
with the necessary transportation to deploy additional howitzers 
provided, 

64. The heavy artillery position is usually constructed at night. 
Standard time requirement for construction is as follows: 

300-mm howitzer (short) 3-4 nights 

300-mm howitzer (long ) 4-5 night s 

240-mm howitzer and 150-mm gun 

(base mounted) •••*•••«..• 2 nights 

240-mm howitzer and 150-mm gun 

(wheel mounted) 1 night 



380 



280-mm howitzer 3-4 nights 

The time required for construction of positions would be 

shortened if prior preparations have been made, but would be greatly 

prolonged in severe cold. 

65. The division commander must regulate traffic in the deploy- 
ment of heavy artillery, allotting it priority in the use of roads 

at night. 

66. Aircraft and other air defense measures may be employed in 
order to conceal and protect deployment of heavy artillery and 
preparation of positions. The need for such employment is greater 
when tactical urgency requires construction of artillery positions 
during the day. 

67. The heavy artillery commander must, at the earliest oppor- 
tunity, work out necessary arrangements for coordination with the 
commanders of the field artillery, infantry attack unit, tank and 
"Ki M units as well as other units concerned. 

Complete understanding and agreement must be reached 
regarding the missions of each unit; the pillboxes to be attacked by 
each, the sequence, the hour, and the procedures of attack; the 
actions of the pillbox assault unit, tank and "Ki" units, and the 
coordination of artillery fire with the actions of other units. 

68. In order not to endanger the infantry, when employing low- 
angle fire with large caliber howitzers, the distance between the 

center of the impact area and the most forward infantry line should be 



381 



approximately 300 meters on level ground. The distance may be varied 
according to the situation, with greater distance being maintained 
when artillery fire is directed at the flanks of friendly infantry. 
However, the distance may be decreased when convenient cover can be 
utilized by troops. 

69. The condition of each pillbox, the type of howitzer or gun 
to be used, and the range must be taken into consideration in dis- 
tributing targets to heavy artillery components. Each battery is 
usually assigned one pillbox to destroy with target distribution being 
made to permit delivery of frontal fire against the wall of the 
pillbox. 

The number of shells required to destroy a pillbox increases 
markedly beyond ranges of 7*000 to 8,000 meters for 300-mm howitzers, 
4,000 to 5*000 meters for 240-aim and 280-mm howitzers; and 5*000 to 6,000 
meters for 150-xiim guns, this factor must be considered in target dis- 
tribution and ammunition supply. 

70. The extent to which each pillbox should be destroyed must be 
determined by taking into account its tactical value and strength, the 
kind of howitzer or gun being employed, and the available supply of 
ammunition. 

To create an opening in the walls large enough to neutral- 
ize a pillbox usually requires one hour of firing by a battery at 



382 



medium range. The number of effective hits needed to achieve neutral- 
ization is as follows: 



Thickness of Wall 
^^Reinforced concrete) 
^^■^-^^^ (in meters) 
Types of Howitzer or^-^^^ 

Gun ^^-^^^ 


1 1.5 2 


300-mm Howitzer 


2 3 5 
4 8 13 

20 35 x 


240-mm Howitzer 


150-mm Gun 



A small opening in the wall of a pillbox would put the 
pillbox out of action temporarily and any hit registered sometimes 
serves the purpose of temporarily suppressing the pillbox* 



Section B. Conduct of the Attack 

71. The duration of artillery preparations should be as short 
as possible , but the time limit must be determined by the time 
estimated to be required to destroy all pillboxes throughout the 
depth of the hostile defensive zone to be captured, 

72. Correct evaluation of the effect of fire by the commander 
of the heavy artillery unit is of utmost importance. For this reason 
the commander is usually required to accurately observe the location 
and penetration of hits, damage accomplished and the condition of 
openings in the pillbox wall. 

73 • .While the attack is under way, the heavy artillery must 
move observation posts close to the front line in order to maintain 



383 



closer liaison with all units concerned. It will continue firing in 
accordance with the assigned missions and whenever required, will 
also destroy or neutralize pillboxes which the field artillery cannot 
cope with successfully. 

The situation may require the employment of the heavy 
artillery to suppress a pillbox which opens fire when our front-line 
infantry penetrates the hostile position and enters the new phase of 
attack. 

74* As the attack progresses the division commander moves 
forward necessary components of the heavy artillery according to the 
tactical plan. For this purpose, he must take measures to promptly 
repair the roads to be used in the movement and provide the artillery 
commander with required transport. 



384 



Supplementary Chart 1 




385 



o 
o 



3 
a 



CO 

w 
H 
O 

I 



c 
o 

•rl 

a 5 

o 




386 



Supplementary Chart 2 



Organization and Equipment of Pillbox 
Assault Unit (Example 2) 



Commander of pillbox assault unit . 


... 1 Officer 


Self -pro jecting smoke candles .... 


as required 



1st Assault Section 


2d Assault Section 




, — f — , — 

Organization and 
Equipment same as 
1st Assault 
Section 





Reserve 


Section 






1 NCO (or 


Sup Pvt) 






6 




Tubular demolition bomb 










, as required 






ii 






it 






it 






« 






tt 






tt 






tt 



Note: This example shows the pillbox assault unit composed of 
about two infant ly squads. 



387 



JAPANESE NIGHT CQMBAT^ 

At) b~> ~>>' 



, : JAN 9 1956 - 

ACCESSION NO 



t<J ix.L.Ui'vS.ij.w,, 



PART 3 OF 3 PARTS 



SUPPLEMENT: 

NIGHT COMBAT EXAMPLES 



Combined Arms Research Library 
special Collections and Archives 
FSort Leavenworth, Kansas 



Special 
355.422 
U56j 
pt3 
c 1 



HEADQUARTERS 

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST ^e/f* 

AND * 
j EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY 
1 MILITARY HISTORY SECTION 

[ JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION 



JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT 



Part 3 of 3 Parts 
SUPPLEMENT: 
NIGHT COMBAT EXAMPLES 



HEADQUARTERS 
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR 
and 

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY 
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION 
Japanese Research Division 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 

Example No 1 Night Attack Against Mt Kungchangling by the 

2d Division During the Russo-Japanese War 395 

Maps 

No 1 Disposition of Friendly and Enemy Farces in the 

Mt Kungchangling Area, 22 Aug 1904 397 

No 2 Progress of Night Attacks, 2d Division, 

26 Aug 190^ 402 

No 3 Progress of Night Attack, 4th Infantry Regiment, 

26 Aug 1904 407 



Example No 2 Night Attack by the 2d Battalion 'of the 

17th Infantry Regiment in the Vicinity of 
Nantienmen, North China 413 



Maps 

No 1 Progress of Operation, Kawahara Raiding Force, 

21 - 27 Apr 1933 415 

No 2 Progress of Night Attack, 2d Battalion, 

17th Infantry Regiment, 28 Apr 1933 421 



Example No 3 Night Attack by the 14th Division on the 

Banks of the Tatse Ho (River ) in North China 425 



389 



Maps and Sketch 



No 1 
No 2 
No 3 
No h 
Sketch 



Progress of Chochou and Paoting Engagements, 

1U - 27 Sept 1937 1*27 

Deployment of Enemy and Friendly Forces, 

21 Sept 1937 U31- 

Progress of Actions by Right Pursuit Unit, 

22 Sept 1937 U37 

Progress of Attack of £Oth infantry Regiment 

in Huangtsun Area, 22 Sept 1937 14*3 

Attack of 9th Company, 22 Sept 1937 14i9 



Example No k 



Night Break-through by the Main Body 
the First Army at the Beginning of the 
Chungyuan Battle, May 19U1 



No 1 
No 2 

Sketch 

Sketch 



Maps and Sketches 

Plan of Chungyuan Battle, May 19U1 

Plan of Break-through by the Main Body of 
the First Army, May 19lpL 

Break Through Plan and Disposition of the 
37th Division, 7 May 19lil 



U57 
U61 
U67 



Disposition of Left Flank Force of 37th Division, 
7 May I9I4I U71 



Example No $ 



Night Attack by the 1st Battalion of the 
75>th Infantry Regiment Against Changkufeng 
(Bill) in July 1938 



Page 



i*77 



390 



Maps and Sketch 



Page 



No 1 Disposition of Japanese and Enemy Forces in 

Changkuf eng Area, 30 July 1938 h!9 

Sketch Disposition of Enemy Position on Changkuf eng 

Hill, 30 July 1938 U87 

Mo 2 Progress of Night Attack of 1st Battalion, 

75th Infantry Regiment, 30 July 1938 U91 



Page 

Example No 6 Night Attack by the 228th Infantry Regiment 

Against the Kowloon Line, North of Hong Kong, 
December 19l*l U99 



Maps 

Wo 1 Disposition of Japanese and Enemy Forces, 

9 Dec 19l|l 501 

No 2 Progress of Battle South of Chengmen Reservoir, 

9 Dec 19U1 505 



Page 

Example No 6a Attack on Position on the South Side of Hill 
255 by the 10th Company of the 3d Battalion 
of the 228th Infantry Regiment at Kowloon 
in December 19UU £11 



Map 

No 1 Attack of "the 10th Company Against Enemy Fire 

Positions; 9 Dec 19itl $13 



Pass 

Example No 6b A Night Attack by the Goto Platoon of the 

6th Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment 

During the Occupation of Hong Kong £17 



391 



Map 

Page 

No 1 Attack of Goto Platoon Against Enemy Pillboxes, 

18 Dec 19U1 519 

Page 

Example No 7 Night Attack by the 215th Infantry Regiment 

in the Vicinity of Kuzeik in South Burma 523 



Map 

No 1 Attack of 215th Infantry Regiment in Kuzeik Area, 

11 Feb 19U2 525 



Page 

Example No 8 The Establishment of Raiding- infiltration 

Tactics by the Eighteenth Army in New Guinea 

and the Formation of the Takasago Volunteer 

Unit 529 



Sketch 

Sketch Movement of Raiding Infiltration Attack Unit, 

in Buna and Giruwa Sectors, Late Dec 19U2 531 



Page 

Example No 9 Night Attack by the Kawaguchi Detachment 

on Guadalcanal .537 



Maps 

No 1 Disposition and Attack Plan, Kawaguchi 

Detachment, 29 Aug - 7 Sept 19^2 539 

Mo 1A Defensive Disposition of the Kawaguchi 

Detachment, 12 Sept 19hZ 5U3 



392 



Maps 



No 2 Progress of Attack, Kawaguchi Detachment, 
12 - Hi Sept 19U2 

No 3A Hydrographic Chart of Guadalcanal 

No 3B Aerial Photograph of Lunga Area 



5U7 
553 
557 



Example No 9a Summary of the 2d Battalion Attack on the 
Night of 13 September I9l2 



561 



Page 

Example No 10 Night Attack of the 2d Division on Guadalcanal 563 



Maps and Sketch 

No 1 Disposition of Enemy and Friendly Forces and 
Attack Plan of Seventeenth Army, 13 Oct 19U2 

Sketch Situation of Enemy Positions, 20 Oct 19h2 

No 2 Progress of Attack of 2d Division, 
20 - 25 Oct 19U2 

No 3 Aerial Photograph of Lunga Sector 



565 
571 

575 
581 



Example No 11 Night Attack by the Nakai Detachment in the 
Vicinity of Kesewa, New Guinea 



587 



Maps 

No 1 Situation Before Commencement of Fighting, 
1 Dec 191+3 

No 2 Attack Plan of Nakai Detachment, 8 Dec 19U3 



589 
593 



393 



Map 



No 3 Movement of No 2 Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit, 

7 Dec.l9U3 595 



Page 



Example No 12 Night Attack by the Eighteenth Army near 

ALtape, New Guinea in July 19kh 599 



Maps 

No 1 Disposition of Enemy and Friendly Forces, 

3 July 19UU 601 

No 2 Enemy Positions and Attack Plan of the 

Eighteenth Army, 10 July 19UU 663 

No 3 Disposition of Units of 20th Division and 

237th Infantry Regiment, 10 July 19kh 611 

No h Progress of Attack, 237th Infantry Regiment, 

10 July. 19UU 61$ 



39U 



Example 1. Night Attack Against Mt Kungchangling by the 2d Division 
During the Russo-Japanese War. (Based on the Battle 
Report of the 2d Division, First Army.) (See Maps No. 1 
and No. 2) 

In early August 1904, Field Marshal Oyama, Commander -in-Chief of 
the Manchuria Army, ordered the First, S e cond and Fourth Armies to 
commence a mass offensive toward Liaoyang area before the arrival of 
powerful reinforcements for the Russian Ariiy. 

The First Army which had been conducting the operations along 
the Antung - Liaoyang Road since April of that same year had broken 
through the Russian forces in the vicinity of Mt Matienling and Mt 
Yangtzuling during June and July, and had been undertaking prepara- 
tions for the next offensive operation against Russian forces which 
were firmly entrenched in positions in the Hungshaling - Tatientzu 
Sector. At that time, the First Army was composed of the Guard 
Division, the 2d Division, and the 12th Division. 

Enemy positions confronting the First Army were semipermanent 
installations which had been constructed several ninths earlier. 
Located on top of rugged mountains and defended by four divisions, 
they were virtually invulnerable. Owing to the fact that the terrain 
in the vicinity of the battlefield consisted entirely of rugged 
mountains and deep valleys, it was extremely difficult for our forces 
to establish artillery positions, except in the vicinity of the 
Liaoyang Road. The strength of the positions, the terrain of the 
battlefield and ratio of strength were all favorable to the enemy 
and the only thing which could be considered unfavorable was the fact 



3Q$ 



MAP NO. I 




397 



that the position was extensive, haviijg a width of more than 40 
kilometers. 

Maintaining close contact with all its subordinate divisions, 

the First Army had been studying attack procedures since mid-August 

and finally decided to commit its main body to a night attack and 

effect a break through in the center of the enemy position, taking 

advantage of a weak point* On 22 August, the Amy issued an attack 

order which read generally as follows: 

1* The Army plans to attack the enemy forces in the Taan- 
pino and Liaoyang Road areas on the 26th, committing its main body 
and sua element. 

2. The 12th Division (less one mountain giin battery) will 
launch an attack on the enemy forces north of Mt Chipanliijg at dawn 
of the 26th. 

3. Before daybreak of the 26th, the 2d Division (less the 
cavalry regiment and one field artillery battalion) plus one moun- 
tain gun battery of the 12th Division will attack the enemy forces 
disposed in the area between Mt Kungchangling and Hill 300, south- 
west of Tzekou. * 

4. Beginning at dusk of the 26th, the Guard Division 
together with the cavalry regiment and one field artilleiy battalion 
of the 2d Division will cany out an attack on the enemy forces in 
the vicinity qf Tatientzu on the Liaoyang Road. 

At that time, the 2d Division had concentrated its strength at 
a point about 10 to 15 kilometers from the enemy position and had 
been undertaking preparations for attack. The plan to employ the 
2d Division in the night attack on Mt Kurgchangliqg was decided prior 
to the issuance of the order and the 2d Division Commander ha£ already 
directed all forces under his command to undertake terrain reconnais- 
sance. Although the area between the friendly outposts and enemy 



399 



positions was extremely hazardous, owing to the fact that both fri- 
endly and enemy patrols and reconnaissance units were engaged in 
activities, by the 26th , most of the officers were familiar with the 
terrain in the vicinity of the attack objectives* 

The enemy had constructed defensive installations along the 
crest line in the area extending from the high grounds north of ttt 
Kungchanglicg to Hill 300, southwest of the same sector, and it was 
estimated that its artillery positions were located near Mt Kung- 
changling. In addition, there were some defensive installations on 
the high grounds southwest of Hill 260 and south of Changchiakou* 
Enemy lookouts were stationed in the vicinity of Hill 260 and Chang- 
chiatou, and friendly patrols made frequent contacts. In the Mt 
Kungchanglifljg area, enemy lookouts were posted on the high ground 
west of Kaochiakou. Skirmishes between small unitf took place occa- 
sionally in the Hochiaputzu, Tioaiputzu, and Hsiawengputzu areas* 
The high grounds south of Kaochiakou were occupied alternately by 
the enemy and friendly forces. Also on Taheishan friendly patrols 
occasionally made contacts with enemy patrols. Reconnaissance indi- 
cated that the enemy's massed strength was located in the vicinity 
northwest of the ravines and Hill 300 in the Tzekou Valley. 

Upon receipt of the First Army Order on 22 August, Lt Gen Hishi, 
commander of the 2d Division, issued the following order for attack 
on 24 August: 

1. Before daybreak of the 26th, the Division will launch 

UOO 



attacks on the enemy forces located in the area between Mb Ku*)gchang- 
ling and Hill 300 situated southwest of Tzekou. 

2. After sunset of the 25th, the 3d Infantry Brigade (the 
4th and 29th Regiments; plus two cavalry squads) will depart from 
Mt Wuchialing and the saddle north of Houwu, and before dawn of the 
26th, will commence an attack on the enemy forces located in the area 
between the high ground approximately 1,500 meters south of the 
saddle of Mt Kungchangling and Hill 300 situated southwest of the 
sector, 

3 # After sunset of the 25th, the 15th Infantry Brigade 
(the 16th Infantry R e giment and the 2d Battalion of the 30th Infan- 
try Regiment j plus one cavalry and engineer platoon) will depart 
from Hsihuangnikou, and before dawn of the 26th, will launch attacks 
on the enemy forces located between Mt Kuig changling and the high 
ground about 1,500 meters south of Mt Kungchangling* 

4. The 30th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) will 
be designated as the division reserve force and will concentrate its 
streiTgth at Mt Santaoling before sunset of the 25th. 

5. By sunset of the 25th, the 3d Cavalry Company (less one 
platoon and two squads) will assemble at Mt Santaolirg ♦ 

6. Before sunset of the 25th, the Field' Artillery Regiment 
(less one battalion) plus one engineer battalion will concentrate 
its strength in the area south of Hsihuangnikou. Later, it will 
follow the 15th Infantry Brigade, take a position in the area west 
of Hsikou and establish necessary installations* 

The mountain gun battery assigned from the 12th Divisior 
will assemble at Mt Santaolirjg before sunset of the 25th. It will 
later proceed behind the 3d Infantry Brigade and establish positions 
in the vicinity of the high ground about 1,500 meters northeast of 
Hill 260. One engineer company will be assigned to assist the bat- 
tery in the establishment of its positions. 

The 2d Division Commander directed all officers and man to wear 

white armbands about 15 cm wide on their left arms during the night 

attack in order to facilitate identification. 

Over-all Progress of the Night Attacks. (Based on the Battle Report 
of the 2d Division.) (See Map No. 2.) 

In accordance with the division order, all forces departed from 



U01 



MAP NO. 2 



PROGRESS OF NIGHT ATTACKS 
2D DIVISION 

26 AUGUST 19 04 

> JAPANESE ARMY 
» > RUSSIAN ARMY 

| I 2 ? 

KILOMETERS 



TO TAANPING 





U02 



the designated points after sunset on the 25th. The 3d Brigade con- 
centrated its strength in the Shangwengchiaputzu area at 2100 hours 
and routed enemy lookout units stationed on the high grounds extend- 
ing from Hill 260 to the area northeast of the hill. At 0130 hours 
on the 26th, it commenced an advance in the valley near Chatzukou 
in extended formation and about 0300 hours, it approached the crest 
line, extending about 2,000 meters westward from the grade-change 
point of the high ground situated approximately 1,500 meters south 
of Mt Kungchanglirjg , with the 4th Regiment on the right and the 29th 
Regiment on the left. 

The enemy was emplaced on the ridges of all the high ground in 
front of the 3d Brigade position. These troops opened fire on the 
3d Brigade as soon as it reached the vicinity of Chatzukou, but the 
3d Brigade did not return the fire and approached the enemy's main 
position utilizing the protection afforded by the valleys and spurs 
in the area. The difference in elevation between Chatzukou and the 
crest line where the main enemy position was located, was 100 to 180 
meters. Despite the rugged terrain and steep grades, braving the 
heavy fire the 3d Brigade routed the enemy to the north and occupied 
the main positions about 0400 hours. The tvro infantry regiments 
suffered heavy casualties in this assault and the 4th Infantry Regi- 
ment lost its commander, Lt Col Yoshida. 

The 15th Infantry Brigade massed its streigth in the area west 
of Titaiputzu shortly after 2300 hours and approached the enemy 



U03 



positions from the high ground west of Kaochiakou. Although the 
terrain in the area was rugged and the jnain enemy position was 
approximately 200 meters above the attacking brigade, the enemy 
offered only slight resistance and fired sporadically* The 15th 
Brigade succeeded in penetrating the enemy position without firing 
a single shot and had routed all enemy forces by about 0400 hours 
on the 26th, occupying the crest line extending about 1,500 meters 
southward from the south of the saddle of Mt Kungchangling. 

It being a clear night with a full moon, objects were visible 
at a distance of 200 to 300 meters. For this reason our fbrces were 
subjected to enemy fire, however, it facilitated our movea&nt. The 
moonlight made it possible for all friendly forces to reach their 
objectives in an orderly manner and to launch assaults without los- 
ing their bearings while advancing in the rugged terrain of this 
mountainous area* 

Note: Some veterans say that the weather was partly cloudy and 
the moon was covered occasionally by drifting clouds. 
They claim that, although the night was of medium bright- 
ness, the visible range was approximately 150 meters. 
At all events, there is no doubt that it was a moonlit 
night ♦ 

The mountain artillery battery which was assigned from the 12th 
Division established its position near the high ground northeast of 
Hill 260 with the assistance of the 1st Engineer Company. The three 
field artillery batteries established their petitions at the designat- 
ed points and the division 1 s reserve force assembled in the area 
south of Shangwengchiaputzu before dawn. Each force was prepared for 
battle after daybreak* 



The casualties suffered by the 2d Division during this night 
attack are shown below: 



Unit 


Killed in Action 


Wounded 


Officers 


NCO & Privates 


Officers 


NCO & Privates 


4th Infant iy 
Regiment 


5 


53 


11 


184 


29th Infant ry 
Regiment 


3 


69 


13 


201 


16th Infantry 
Regiment 




18 


2 


131 


30th Infantry 
Regiment 


1 


10 


2 


38 


Totai: 


9 


150 


28 


554 



Progress of the 4th Infantry Regiment. (Based on Speech by General 
Miura. ) (See Map No, 3.) 

Maj Gen Matsunaga, Commander of the 3d Infantry Brigade, 
planned to carry out the night attack by usirg as front line forces, 
the 29th Infantry Regiment on the left and the 4th Infantry Regiment 
on the ri^ght, with the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment in 
reserve. Under this plan, the forces were to commence the advance 
at 0200 hours on the 26th from the vicinity of Chatzukou and occupy 
the enemy position by Q+00 hours. 

Lt Col Xoshida, Commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment, deploy- 
ed the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right, 



MAP NO. 3 




U07 



and ordered the forces to advance for the assault from both sides 
of Iwayama. Together with the reserve (the 4th and 9th Companies), 
the regimental commander fo Hewed the 3d Battalion. This assault 
disposition was employed because it was believed that it would be 
difficult for the enemy to station troops on Iwayama, a towering 
jagged mountain. (However, as soon as the two battalions of the 4th 
Infantry Regiment commenced the advance, enemy troops suddenly 
appeared on Iwayama and opened heavy fire on the flank of the two 
battalions. Therefore, Brigade Commander, Maj Gen Matsunaga, order- 
ed the Brigade reserve (the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regi- 
ment less the 6th Company) to capture Iwayama immediately. 

The 2d Battalion which had been eagerly awaiting the opportunity 
to take part in the battle, charged resolutely toward Iwayama, The 
7th Company advanced along the central crest line, followed by the 
battalion headquarters and the 5th Company, The 8th Company, the 
front line force on the right, advanced by way of the right slope. 
Because of the heavy eneipy fire and rugged terrain, it encountered 
considerable difficulty in advancir^g and the formation of both com- 
panies became confused. Nevertheless, the 7th Company finally scaled 
the summit, broke through the enemy lines and occupied the position. 

1st Lt Miura (later, General Miura) adjutant of the 2d Battalion, 
who was inspecting the front line at that time, led the front line 
force and continued the advance aloi^g the crest line, accompanied by 
1st Lt Nambu, 2d Lt Hosoda and approximately 60 men. To the right 



U09 



front, the 10th Company of the 3d Battalion had occupied one crest 
line after losix^ the company commander and 30 men, either killed or 
wounded. Further to the front, several enemy positions were visible 
in the vicinity of Point A from which and enengr troops fired sporadi- 
cally • The time was drawiijg close to 0400 hours, the time set as the 
deadline for capturing the enemy position and 1st Lt Miura decided 
to charge the position to the front. 

After a brief, but fierce, hand to hand encounter in which Lt 
Miura was wounded, the enemy was routed and the position in the vici- 
nity of Point B was captured. 

Author 1 a Observation 

Of the many night attacks conducted during the Russo-Japanese 
War, the 2d Division attack on Ut Kurgchanglirg brought about the 
most successful results* Although casual tie s were high, they could 
be considered as minor when compared with losses sustained in other 
engagements. The capture of Mt Kungchangling was the major factor 
in bribing about the total disintegration of the Russian Army posi- 
tions. Among the principal causes of this success were: 

1. Comparatively thorough preparations were made. Under the 
later concepts of highly developed night attack tactics, the prepara- 
tions for night attacks undertaken by the 2d Division were far from 
adequate. Nevertheless, because reconnaissance of the enepy situa- 
tion and terrain was conducted for several days prior to the attack, 
the officers were well acquainted with the terrain. 



Uio 



2. The moonlight greatly facilitated the movement of the 
assault force, although under the later concepts, it was generally 
believed that moonlight was disadvantageous to night attacks. This 
disadvantage was also recognized at that time, but owing to the 
fact that trainirg for maneuvering under cover of darkness had not 
been intensive, it is assumed that the troops sometimes depended on 
moonlight to facilitate their movement during the night. As men- 
tioned in the battle report of the 2d Division, the moonlight helped 
greatly in enabling the units move without losing their bearings. 

3. Courageous acts of the officers were particularly res- 
ponsible for the success of the attack conducted by the 2d Battalion, 
of the 4th Reginent. In other regiments and battalions, the coura- 
geous deeds of the officers were also instrumental in bringing about 
success. 

In spite of the success of the night attack on lit Kungchangling 
the Japanese Army was not entirely satisfied with the results. 
Study and deliberation were devoted to the following factors: 

1. The success of the 2d Division was due to the fact that 
the Russian Army made no attempt to launch a counterattack. Had 
Russian Army carried out a full-scale counterattack, it was consi- 
dered doubtful if the 2d Division would have succeeded in securii^ 
such a complete success. 

2. Durii^ the day of the 26th, a heavy fog shrouded the 
entire battlefield and slowed down the assault and the pursuit action 

Ull 



of the 2d Division. In view of this, it was deemed unwise to commit 
the entire strength of the division to a night attack. It was con- 
sidered that it might have been better to capture the enemy positions 
and strategic points in the vicinity of Mt Kungchangling by commit- 
ting one regiment to the night attack and employing the rest of the 
division to e:xploit the battle success on the following day. 

3« It was suggested that attack preparations were insuffi- 
cient, considering the length of time available. Until sunset on 

/ 

the night of the attack, the 2d Division was located at a point 
approximately 15 kilometers from the eneny position and was, there- 
fore, unable to obtain detailed information on the main enemy posi- 
tions. It was considered advisable to select an attack preparation 
point nearer the enemy. 



102 



Example No, 2 

Night Attack by the 2d Battalion of the 17th Infantry 
Regiment in the Vicinity of Nantienmen, North China 

(Based on the statements of Lt Col Amano, color bearer 
of the 17th Infantry Regiment and Col Furuya, commander 
of the Machine Gun Unit of the 2d Battalion, and the 
battle report of the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry 



Regiment, ) 

This night attack was carried out in the course of the opera- 
tions conducted by the Kwantung Army in North China during the spring 
of 1933, immediately following the occupation of Jehol. On March 
1st, the Kawahara Raiding Force of the 8th Division (commanded by 
Maj Gen Kawahara , Commanding General of the 16th Brigade and having 
the 17th Infantry Regiment as a nucleus) had launched an operation 
at daybreak and on March 10th occupied Kupeikou (approximately 110 
kilometers northeast of Peking) on the south side of the Great Wall. 
(See Map No. 1) 

For political reasons, operations were suspended until 20 April 
when the Kawahara Raiding Force was reinforced by the assignment of 
the 32d Infantry Regiment, building the force to five infantry bat- 
talions, two field artillery battalions and two engineer platoons. 
The opposing Chinese force was an army of six divisions and one 
cavalry brigade under direct command of Chiang Kai-shek. Since it 
wae estimated that the fighting power of one division of the Chinese 
Army was equivalent to one infantry regiment of the Japanese Army, 
the enemy had about three times the power of the Kawahara Force. In 
addition, the Chinese had made good use of the time since the 10th 



U13 



of March in setting up formidable defense positions in the sectors 
south and west of Kupeikou. 

General Kawahara directed that the main attack be made on the 
enemy facing the 32d Infantry Regiment which was on the right front, 
and planned to annihilate the eneiqy in the vicinity of Nantienmen 
by advancing from Mitsu Watch Tower toward Shangtientzu • The 17th 
Infantry Regiment plus one engineer platoon and one tank platoon 
(less the 2d and 3d Battalions, which were disposed in the rear on 
guard duty) constituted the left flank force and was ordered to com- 
mence an attack from the bank of the Chao Ho (River) toward Laokutien. 

At dawn of 21 April, both the right and left flank forces attack- 
ed simultaneously, and about 1030 hours of the same day, the right 
flank force occupied Mitsu Watch Tower, it then proceeded southward 
and succeeded in penetrating about three kilometers into the enemy 
position by the 24th, but a succeeding assault was brought to a 
standstill by the stiff resistance offered by the Chinese. On the 
left flank, the 1st Battalion captured Hill No* 7 on the 23d, and 
Hills No* 6 and 9 on the 26th. The 3d Battalion, ubich had been 
brought up to the front, captured Mt Namako on the 24th. However, 
two Chinese divisions facing the left flank force offered stubborn 
resistance and the attaok on this front did not progress according 
to plan. 

Great importance was attached to this operation because it was 
to be the final operation to be undertaken by the Kwanbung Army during 



U17 



the Manchurian Incident and the outcome was believed to have a signi^ 
ficant military as well as political affect. Consequently, the 8th 
Division commander effected a gradual reinforcement of the force 
under the command of Maj Gen Kawahara and urged the early completion 
of the operation. On the 25th or 26th General Kawahara 1 s staff ex- 
pressed as their opinion, that it would be advisable to surmount the 
stalemate by occupying the key points in the Nantienmen area, cutting 
of the enemy's route of withdrawal* On the 26th, General Kawahara 
ordered the 17th Infantry Regiment to make preparations for a night 
attack on Nantienmen. 

The commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment decided to employ 
the 2d Battalion which had recently been sent to the front. On the 
mornipg of the 27th he sumnaned the battalion commander, Major Toya, 
and all company commanders to the regimental headquarters, located 
south of Hohsi, outlined his plan and directed them to commence pre- 
parations for a night attack. The following attack order was issued 
at 1830 hours on the same day: 

1. On April 28th the left flank force will break through the 
enemy position situated to its front and advance to the line linking 
Laokutien and Nantienmen with the high grounds to the east of 
Nantienmen. 

2. The 2d Battalion (less half a platoon each of the 5th and 
8th Companies and less one platoon of the 7th Company) plus two 
engineer squads will constitute the first line force on the left 
flank, and after occupying the line half-way up Hill No. 17 by dawn 
of the 28th, it will push on to capture Hill No. 12. 

3. The 1st Battalion will constitute the first line force on 
the right flank and after routing the enemy confronting it, will 
occupy as many enemy positions west of Nantienmen as possible. 



Ul8 



4. The 3d Battalion will constitute the first line force on 
the central front and, from its present location, it will conduct 
coordinated action with the assault of the 1st and 2d Battalions. 
Later, it will launch an attack directed against the high ground 
east of Nantienmen. 

5. The line linking the east edge of Mb Namako and the west 
edge of Hill No. 12 will divide the operational areas of the 2d and 
3d Battalions. 

As indicated in the order, the 2d Battalion was only required 
to conduct a night attack against Hill No, 17 and to occupy a sector 
only half-way up the hill. (This was considered to be a reasonable 
objective for a night attack.) Although it was not indicated in the 
order, the time for the commencement of the attack was set for 2200 
hours on the 27th and it was hoped that the forces would occupy 
Nantienmen by 29 April, the Emperor's birthday. 

Although the Chao Ho (River) was only 30 to 40 meters wide and 
50 to 80 centimeters deep, there was an unscalable precipice on the 
northern bank, leaving only two points where a crossing was possible. 
Since it was not possible to cross the river and proceed directly 
towards the objective, it was planned to ford the river soon after 
sunset and to proceed eastward along the southern bank of the Chao Ho, 
under cover provided by the 1st and 3d Battalions, advancing to a 
point north of Hill No. 17. The attack was scheduled at midnight. 
Although the battalion arrived somewhat later than scheduled, its 
advance to the point north of the hill progressed smoothly. The 
Chinese forces, considering it inconceivable for the comparatively 
small Kawahara Raiding Force to attempt an attack against their strojqg 

U19 



positions were unaware of the battalion's advance and were complete- 
ly unprepared. 

The battalion commander disposed the 5th and 7th Companies on 

the front line and soon after midnight commenced the charge on Hill 

No, 17* (See Map No. 2) 

Note: The battalions of the 8th Division not beirg on a wartime 
organization, were composed of three companies each. 

Most of the hills in this area, including Hill No. 17, had steep, 
rocky grades and could not be easily scaled. Nevertheless, the two 
front line companies charged up the steep, 210 meter slope and 
occupied the summit of Hill No. 17 at 0230 hours on the 28th. 

As a result of the surprise attack the enea^y was at first in 
a state of confusion, but later offered resistance, throwing hand- 
grenades and opening fire with rifles. After the main body of the 
2d Battalion left Hill No. 17 in its drive westward, the Chinese 
launched an attack from the south in an attempt to reoccupy the hill. 
However, a machine gun unit remaining on the hill opened fire and 
the Chinese withdrew after sufferirjg hea^y losses. 

Having succeeded in occupying Hill No. 17, the 2d Battalion con- 
tinued its attack westward along the crest line, with the 6th Company, 
having leapfrogged the 5th and 7th Companies, acting as first line 
force. Although the crest of the rocky hills restricted the forces 
to single file passage, the first line force attacked one enemy posi- 
tion after another and occupied Hill No. 12. Later, the 5th and 7th 
Companies took part in the action and vied with the first line force 



U20 



in taking the lead. The entire batt'alion advanced toward Nantienmen, 
crossixjg into the operational zone of the 3d Battalion* Unable to 
recover from the shock sustained at the outset of the battle and be- 
ing subject to attack on the flank, the enemy retreated in disorder. 

By 0400 hours on the 28th the 2d Battalion occupied an area 
approximately two kilometers in depth and had succeeded in capturing 
Hill No. 15, Nantienmen and Hill No. 14, west of Nantienmen. 

Upon beir?g informed of the success of the attack by the 2d Bat- 
talion, the 1st and 3d Battalions launched a coordinated assault and 
occupied Hill No. 13 on the morning of the 28th. With all hills 
east of Hill No. 7 in Japanese control, the Chinese forces facirg the 
right flank force commenced a withdrawal. The unexpectedly great 
success achieved by the 2d Battalion in this night attack was the 
principal factor contributing to the victory of the Kawahara Raiding 
Force. 

Author's Observations: 

This night attack is a fine example of effecting a penetration 
by employing leapfrog tactics. The attack was not limited to the 
capture of key points in the enemy positions, but involved the defeat 
of an enejny of overwhelming strength by a small unit, paving tte way 
for a successful operation by the entire force. 

Factors contributirg to the success of the operation were: 
The operational plans were kept hidden from the enemy ani the 
surprise attack was effectively conducted. 



U23 



The timing of the movement of the 2d Battalion and the fact that 
the enemy situation was favorable for a surprise attack by the bat- 
talion, 

Japanese forces were well trained and possessed high morale, 
and exploited fully the initial effect of the surprise attack by 
making a subsequent assault* 

The Chinese force was given no opportunity to regroup and sub- 
sequent attacks, exerting constant pressure, overwhelmed the enemy 
by maintaining the favorable situation brought about by the initial 
surprise attack. 



U2U 



Example No. 3 

Night Attack by the 14th Division on the Banks of the 
Tatse Ho (River) in North China 

(Based on Volume IV of the History of the China Incident, 
Compiled by the Army General Staff and on statements by 
Lt Col Ito, Commander of the 9th Company, 2d Infantry 
Regiment.) 

This night attack was conducted by the 14th Division of the 
First Army on the night of 21-^22 September 1937 against Chinese 
positions on the right bank of the Tatse Ho (River), located north 
of Paoting. The First Army (composed of the 6th, 14th and 20th 
Divisions) was then under the command of the North China Area Army. 
At the beginning of the China Incident offensive, the First Amy had 
destroyed the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Chochou on the right 
bank of the Tungting Ho (River), and was pursuing the enemy toward 
Paoting. (See Map No. 1) 

The battle at Chochou commenced on 14 Septenber 1937 and by 
afternoon of the 18th, the eneay was routed and the pursuit was pro- 
gressing favorably. At this juncture the Army commander decided to 
have his forces occupy positions in the Paoting sector by maintain- 
ing the pursuit and extending it toward the sector west of Paoting. 
Accordingly, at 1800 hours on the 18th, he issued the following order 
from Army headquarters at F e ngtai. 

1. The 20th Division will launch an assault in the vicinity of 
1ft Shihpanshan through Ichou, advance to the vicinity of Fangshun- 
chiao and cut of f the enemy's retreat. 

2. The 14th Division will penetrate the enemy positions in the 
vicinity of Mancheng, advance to the sector west of Paoting and des- 
troy the enemy. 



U25 



3. The 6th Division will attack the enemy to the front from 
the area of the Peiping - Hankow Railway and destroy the enemy after 
advancing to the vicinity of Paoting. 

The Japanese knew that the enemy's prepared positions on the 
right bank of the Tatse Ho north of Paoting were of considerable 
strength, having been constructed about one month previously. Never- 
theless, the First Army Commander decided to occupy them by exploit- 
ing the momentum of the pursuit. This was not only in line with the 
intentions of the North China Area Army Headquarters, but was based 
on the First Army's estimate of the enemy situation. 

Information obtained through air reconnaissance and other means 
indicated that the eneny along the Peiping - Hankow Railway would 
abandon serious resistance in the vicinity of Paoting and instead 
attempt fresh resistance in the Huto Ho (Rive?) sector in the vicinity 
of Shihchachuang south of Paoting. The Army concluded that while 
the enemy might offer some resistance in the vicinity of Paoting, it 
would be limited to supporting a general withdrawal. 

Following the orders of the First Army, the vanguard of the lAth 

Division advanced in line with Kaolitien on the 19th and Lao t sun on 

the 20th after routing the enemy to its front during the advance. 

On the 21st, the division was continuing the pursuit of the enemy 

toward the Tatse Ho in accordance with divisional orders issued at 

2120 hours on 20 September: 

1* According to air reconnaissance, no enemy elements can be 
seen in the vicinity of Paoting, while many trains are observed mov- 
ing southward in the area south of Paotirg. 



U29 



2. The division will continue pursuit toward the portion of 
the Peiping - Hankow Railway line which lies between the Paoting 
area and Chenchiachuang Station. 

3. The Right Pursuit Unit, (under the command of the 2?th 
Infantry Brigade Commander and composed of the 2d Infantry Regiment; 
the 59th Infantry Regiment, less the 3d Battalion; plus one artillery 
battalion and one engineer company) will pursue the enemy toward the 
heights north of Mancheng through Tawangchuang. 

4. The Left Pursuit Unit (under the command of the 28th Infan- 
try Brigade Commander and composed of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 
less the 2d Battalion; plus the 50th Infantry Regiment, less the 2d 
Battalion; and two field artillery batteries and an engineer regiment) 
will pursue the enemy toward the vicinity of Changchuang through 
Tunghsikuangmen and Mt Nanlung. 

5. The remainder of the Division will advance along the road 
connecting Hut sum, Chucheng, Tawangchuang and Mancheng, 

The Right Pursuit Unit advanced to the Fangshai^g - Tatseying 
line at 1830 hours on 21 September and reconnoitered the enemy situa- 
tion and terrain on the right bank of the Tatse Ho, ascertaining the 
following conditions: 

1. The enemy occupied a strong position in the sector on the 
right bank of the Tatse Ho. 

2. Friendly artillery support would be difficult because of 
the terrain. ' 

3* Fording the Tatse Ho would be comparatively easy. 

The commander of the Right Pursuit Unit thought it advisable to 
penetrate the line of enemy positions to the front by a night attack. 
The two regimental commanders of the first line units concurred and 
the Right Pursuit Unit commander presented his views to the division 
commander, while ordering the tw first line regiments to make pre- 
parations for a night attack. (See Map No. 2) 



U30 



The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit had previously sub- 
mitted a recommendation to the division commander to carry out the 
crossing of the Tatse Ho at night after passing the vicinity of 
Tawangchuang on the afternoon of the 21st, By havixg his first line 
troops advance to the line connectir^g Tachucheng and Hsichuang and 
reconnoiter the terrain and enemy situation, he had obtained infor- 
mation, which influenced him to decide on a break-through of the 
eneiqy positions located on the right bank of the Tatse Ho by a night 
attack, and ordered each unit under his command to make preparations 
for this action. His information indicated that: 

1. The enencr occupied the entire area near the right bank of 
the Tatse Ho. In the vicinity of Huangtsun, they had constructed 
several lines of positions. 

2. The Tatse Ho was about 50 centimeters deep and could be 
easily forded (Author's note: It was actually 80 to 100 centimeters 
deep). 

The division commander, who reached Hsiayingkou at 1800 hours 

on the 21st, received the recommendations from the commanders of the 

Left and Right Pursuit Units as well as their estimates of the enemy 

situation. At the same time, he was given the following information 

regardifig conditions: 

1. The enemy confrontirjg the division is probably the main body 
of the 25th Division and 2d Guard Brigade, . plus elements of the 2d, 
10th and 17th Divisions nvhich had retreated from the Chochou and 
. Ghienchuntai areas. Total strength is estimated at over 10,000 n©n. 

2» The eneny force had started construction of positions in 
the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho about one month before, 
with the apparent intention of makipg it a part of the left-flank 
defense of Pad ting. 



U33 



3. The enemy positions are constructed near the river bank and 
consist of a series of key points, making direct use of local settle- 
ments. In the vicinity of Huangtsun there are several lines of posi- 
tions, the strategic parts of which are surrounded by wire-entangle- 
ments. Beach obstacles are placed along the bank of the Tatse Ho 
and mines are laid in the river, 

4. The advance of the main body of our artilleiy and infantry 
units with heavy weapons have been greatly slowed owing to the muddy 
road conditions and the advance of troops carrying heavy equipment 
as well as transport units has also been delayed. Therefore, our 
ammunition supply is inadequate, while the greater part of provisions 
must be obtained from local sources. 

In view of these conditions as well as the fact that the 14th 
Division had been concentrating on night attack training, the divi- 
sion commander approved the plan submitted by the commanders of the 
two pursuit units. He determined to penetrate the enemy positions 
to the front by dawn of the following day and then begin the pursuit 
of the eneiry toward the sector southwest of Paoting. The division 
commander realized that it would be extremely difficult to deploy 
his units in front of the enemy positions that evening and then carry 
out an attack the same night, inasmuch as there was not time to make 
adequate preparations. However, he concluded that any delay would 
afford the enemy time to make preparations and, having sufficient con- 
fidence in the superiority of his first line troops and their fight- 
ing experience, he decided to carry out the night attack. 

In accordance with his decision he issued the following order at 

2000 hours on the ZLflft of September; 

1. The once routed enemy now occupies positions in the sector 
on the right bank of the Tatse Ho. The 20th Division is pursuing the 
enemy toward Mt Shihpanshan and the 6th Division, on the left bank of 
the Tatse Ho, is preparing for an assault against the enemy on the 
right bank. 



U3h 



2. This division is to break through the enemy positions to 
its front by dawn tomorrow and immediately launch a pursuit of the 
enemy toward the sector southwest of Paoting. 

3. The Right Pursuit Unit will break through the enemy posi- 
tions to their front by dawn tomorrow and advance to the sector on 
the right bank of the Tatse Ho. With the arrival of daybreak the 
said unit will launch a pursuit of the enemy toward Kuanchuang by 
way of Chiangcheng. 

4* The Left Pursuit Unit will break through the enemy posi- 
tions to their front by dawn tomorrow and advance to the sector on 
the right bank of the Tatse Ho. With the arrival of daybreak the 
said unit will launch a pursuit of the enemy toward Fuchangtun by way 
of Nanchitsun. 

5. The operational boundaries for the Right and Left Pursuit 
Units will be the line connecting Yentsun, Imuchuan, Lichuang, Pei- 
.langchuang, and Hsiaochuchai, with the border line itself included 
in the operational zone of the Left Pursuit Unit. 

6. The Cavalry Unit will concentrate in the right rear of the 
Right Pursuit Unit and advance to the sector on the right bank of 
the Tatse Ho at daybreak* It will then advance to the sector south 
of Paoting ; severing the enemy's route of retreat. 

7. The main body of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment will 
advance to the vicinity of Tatseying and corns under the command of 
the Right Pursuit Unit Commander. 

8. The 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment will consti- 
tute the reserve force. It will depart from its present position at 
0300 hours on the 22d and advance to Fangshang. 

Attack of the Right Pursuit Unit. (See Map No. 3) 

The commander of the Right Pursuit Unit, upon receiving the 

order from division, issued the following order at Yehchiehtsun at 

2100 hours of the 21st: 

1. The Right Pursuit Unit will start from the line of the Tatse 
Ho at 0100 hours of the 22d proceed toward the enenQr's main positions 
located above the Tawangchuflg - Mane he rig Road/ carry out a night 
attack, penetrate the enemy's main positions, and pursue the enemy 
toward the southwestern sector of Paoting, during and after daybreak. 



MAP NO. 3 




2. The 2d Infantry Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) on the 
right front line, will prepare for the attack on the line of the 
Tatse Ho south of Tasetsun, will cross the Tatse Ho at 0100 hours 
and carry out a night attack against positions south of Tasetsun. 
Advancing into Liuchiatso, it will exploit gains toward the Shunmen 
area after daybreak, and then advance to the Peiping - Hankow Rail- 
way, cutting off the enemy's retreat. 

3. The 59th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) on the 
left front line, will prepare for an attack against the positions at 
Shihtoutsun. It will cross the river at 0100 hours, advance to the 
line formed by the western saddle of the heights north of Mancheng 
by daybreak, advance at dawn to the Peiping - Hankow Railway, through 
the sector west of Mancheng, and cut off the enemy's retreat. 

4. The Artillery Battalion will occupy positions in the vici- 
nity of Fangshaijg by 0500 hours of the 22d and with its main force, 
support the left front line regiment in order to exploit gains. 

5. The loading and firiig of artillery pieces is strictly pro- 
hibited during the night attack. 

The 2d Infantry Regiment, the right first line unit, crossed 
the Tatse Ho in the sector south of Tasetsun at 0300 hours of the 22d. 
The 59th Infantry Regiment, the left first line unit, decided to make 
a night attack against the enemy's position at W a ngkouchuangpu after 
crossing the Tatse Ho from Fangshang. This decision was made upon 
receipt of intelligence from the engineers that the river above Shih- 
toutsun was deep and the banks were swampy, making passage difficult* 

At 0200 hours the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received 
the following report from the 59th Inf antiy Reginasnb on the left front 
line. 

The regiment crossed the Tatse Ho in the vicinity of and to 
the north of Wangkouchuangpu and came close to the enemy positions, 
but was detected by the enemy. The regiment attempted to penetrate 
enemy positions by a determined assault. However, since the positions 
are strong and difficult to penetrate, the regiment is engaged in a 
fierce battle. The depth of the Tatse Ho is more than one meter. 



U39 



At that time no firing could be heard from the conibat area of 
the 2d Infantry Regiment on the right front line, and since communi- 
cation with this regiment had been severed, its situation was unknown. 
However, the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit was fully confident 
of the success of his unit. 

At about 0300 hours the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit 
received a report from the commander of the 59th Infantry Regiment 
statixig that owing to strong enemy positions the regiment was still 
unable to penetrate and desired the prompt and thorough neutraliza- 
tion of those positions by artillery and other heavy weapons. Around 
0430 hours, the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received a report 
from the commander of the 2d Infantry Regiment that the night attack 
had progressed satisfactorily and that the regiment had seized the 
heights north of Mancheng. At dawn artillery units occupied the 
positions on the southern side of the isolated hill north of Yehchieh- 
tsun and directed harassing fire upon the rear of the enemy on the 
hill north of Manchexjg and in the vicinity Wangkouchuangpiu 

At 0520 hours the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received 
a report from the 2d Regiment intimating that the reginent was dis- 
posed on the hill north of Mancheng and requesting that artillery 
fire in that area be suspended. In view of this development in the 
area of the right front, the commander decided to exploit gains from 
this area, and advanced with the reserve force aftsr crossing the 
Tatse Ho north of Shihtoutsun. 

hho 



With daybreak, elements of the 2d Infantry Regiment began to 
attack the flank and rear of the enemy positions in the vicinity of 
Wangkouchuangpu . 

The 59th Infantry Regiment on the left front line had been 
fightijig at close range since the previous night. At daybreak the 
regiment closed in under the supportiig fires of artillery and heavy 
weapons and occupied the positions. After a desperate battle and 
despite mounting casualties , the regiment was able to seize the rear 
position of the enemy in the vicinity of Wangkouchuangpu in coopera- 
tion' with the 2d Infantry R e giment which had outflanked the position. 
It was then about 1130 hours and the regiment immediately concen- 
trated in the vicinity of Wangkouchuangpu to prepare for further 
pursuit. 

Attack of the Left Pursuit Unit. (See Map No. 4) 

At 2000 hours on 21 September, the commander of the Left Pursuit 
Unit received a report from the commander of the 50th Infantry Regi- 
ment that the regiment was planning to attack the enemy to its front 
and advance toward Huangtsun by having elements cross the river in 
the vicinity of Nantsung while the main body crossed from the vici- 
nity of Tachucheng at 2300 hours. The commander of the Left Pursuit 
Unit issued the followirig orders: 

1. The Left Pursuit Unit intends to cross the Tatse Ho in the 
vicinity of Tachucheng at 2300 hours of the 21st. 

2. The 50th Infantry R e giment will cross the river at 2300 
hours with elements from the vicinity of Changchuang while the main 
body, from the vicinity of Tachucheng, will advance to attack 
toward the vicinity of Huangtsun, 

Ml 



MAP NO. 4 




3* The 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment will secure 
Hsichuang village by 2300 hours and concentrate as many troops as 
possible in the area northwest of that village and be prepared to 
support the attack by the 50th Infantry Regiment. 

4» The commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment shall advance 
to Tachucheng with the entire strength presently under his command, 
(less the 4th Company and the 3d Battalion) by 2300 hours and prepare 
to meet further developments in the situation, 

5. The Artillery Unit shall advance to the vicinity of Liu- 
chienfang early in the morning of the 22d, and prepare to respond 
to further developments of the situation. 

In the area occupied by the main body of the 50th Infantry Regi- 
ment the troops on the front line advanced close to the left bank 
of the Tatse Ho from the vicinity of Taehucheijg about 2200 hours of 
the 21st and at 2320 hours crossed the river in the face of intense 
enemy fire and advanced to the bank occupied by the enemy. 

At 0030 hours of the 22d, the commander of the Left Pursuit 

Unit received the following report from the commander of the 50th 

Infantry Regiment on the left bank of the Tatse Ho: 

n 0ur casualties on the front line seem to be great* I am now 
goirg to the front for inspection. It will be most effective to 
have troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment cross the river imradiately 
from Hsiaochucheng and launch an attack against the enemy. tt 

A little past 0100 hours, the commander received the f ollowij^j 

report: 

"Wire entanglements are strung in front of the enemy positions 
to the front of the 4th Company, the extreme left flank of the front 
line of the regiment. It is requested that wire-cutters be sent to 
us without delay." 

The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit immediately dispatched 

an engineer platoon with wire-cutters to that front and attached it 

to the 50th Infantry Regiment. 



The enexny offered stubborn resistance relying upon the several 
lines of strong positions. However, front line troops captured 
enemy positions one after another by hand-to-hand combat, and at 
about Q300 hours they approached the third line of positions which 
was the main line of resistance. Meanwhile, the enemy steadily 
intensified his resistance and even launched frequent counterassaults. 
Friendly and enemy battle fronts became entangled and confusion 
reigned. 

As casualties on the front line mounted steadily and many 
officers, includirjg company commanders, were killed in action, the 
battle situation did not permit optimism. Despite the critical 
situation, the regiment launched repeated assaults. 

In view of the intensity of the battle being waged by the 50th 
Infantry Regiment, the commander of the Left Pursuit Unit ordered 
the 1st Battalion (less the 4th Company) of the 15th Infantry Regi- 
ment to participate. At about 0330 hours right flank units, which 
had already captured the third line of eneipy positions, were continu- 
ing fierce attacks and enemy losses mounted. The 1st Battalion 
crossed the river from the vicinity of Tachucheng at dawn, participat- 
ed in the battle of the extreme left wing, and advanced toward the 
northeast corner of Huangtsun. The 3d Company of the 50th Infantry 
Regiment which had advanced from the Nantsur^g area established liai- 
son with the right wirg of the regiment and attacked the enemy to 
their front. 



hh6 



At daybreak, the situation developed remarkably, and the troops 
gradually pressed the enemy in the vicinity of Huangtsun. The right 
flank units and the main body of the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infan- 
try Regiirent rushed into the village of Huangtsun at about 0600 hours 
from the vicinity of the town's west gate and from its northeast 
corner, respectively. 

The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit immediately ordered the 
units which had been awaiting further orders in the vicinity of 
Tachuchejng to advance toward Huangtsun. 

However, the enemy continued stiff resistance near Nanshangkan, 
Hsiaomafang, Houtailiu, and Chientailiu, and prevented the rear units 
from crossing the river and advancing into Huangtsun. The commander 
of the Left Pursuit Unit ordered the 3d Battalion of the 15th Infan- 
try Regiment to break through the enemy positions between Huangtsun 
and Houtailiu and to advance to the sector southeast of Huangtsun. 

At about 0930 hours the 3d Battalion repulsed the enemy, advanc- 
ed to the designated line, and the Left Pursuit Unit, concentrated 
its units at Huangtsun at about 1300 hours and made preparations for 
further pursuit. 

Personal Experience of the Commander of the 9th Company (ex-Lt Col 
Ito) of the 2d Infantiy Reginsnt. (See Sketch) 

The 9th Company held a position as the second line assault 

unit of the left first line battalion of the 2d Infantiy Regiment 

at the beginning of the night attack. (See Map No. 3) The strength 

of the company at that time was 168 men equipped with 150 rifles, 



UU7 



3GE32 

HO 9p§l 2 



ATTACK OF 
9TH COMPANY 

MORNING ON 22 SEP 1937 



JAPANESE ARMY 



CHINESE ARMY 




hk9 



6 light machine guns, 6 grenade-throwers, and about 300 hand grenades. 

While the time for crossing the Tatse Ho given in the Right 
Pursuit Unit Commander's order was 0100 hours of the 22d, much time 
was consumed in shifting from Yentsun to the cross ijng point and pre- 
paring for the crossing and it was 0300 hours when the 3d Battalion 
started to cross Tatse Ho. Though the banks of the Tatse Ho prevent- 
ed free movement of troops because of numerous marshes, the thick 
growth of willows and reeds provided cover for easy approach to the 
enemy. During the crossing, the unit received no fire from tte eneipy, 
while the moon clearly illuminated Mt P and Mt Q, which were the 
targets of the attack. 

At about 0330 hours, immediately after crossijng the river, the 
unit suddenly received fire from the enemy. The 9th Company Command- 
er immediately deployed his troops into open formation and ordered 
them to advance. 

CM CO. CMDR. 

HQ9 



60 J 



-IOO M - 



IOO M . 



... 



At t his -bine the 10th and the 12th Companies on the front line 
were forced to halt their advance, and communication with battalion 
headquarters was severed . The commander of the 9th Company ordered 
his company to advance between the other two companies charge into 
the enemy position. 

When the 9th Company approached the enemy position, it unex- 
pectedly encountered a large outer moat. The company commander 
ordered steps dug in the banks and jumped into the moat. With the 
moonlight brightly illuminating the watery the enemy delivered 
intense flanking fire. Nevertheless, the officers and men who jump- 
ed into the moat, following the commander, made footings on the 
slope on the far side. "Those vjho have climbed lower ropes," "Push 
up the hips of those climbix^," "Beware of counterattack, H - 
"Remember flank defense," were among the orders issued by the com- 
pany commander standing in the moat. 

Following some 10 subordinates, the company commander climbed 
out of the moat and rushed into the enemy position without waiting 
for the entire company, and then broke through into the enemy's 
position on R Hill. It was 0430 hours. After taking R Hill, an 
inspection revealed that there were only three casualties. 

At R Hill the commander of the 9th Company prepared for the next 
attack while awaiting the concentration of the company. *The regi- 
mental commander arrived at R Hill, approved the plan of the com- 
mander of the 9th Company for occupying Mt P and when the main body 



U52 



of the 9th Company had completely assembled, the company bore down 
upon the enemy on tit P, threadijqg through gaps in the enemy posi- 
tions, taking advantage of the dim light of dawn. The company 
occupied the mountain at 0600 hours. 

During this period, though the noise of enemy counterattack 
with reports of rifles were heard from the rear and flanks, the 
enemy seemed to have been thrown into confusion and little resis- 
tance was offered. The 9th Company owed its success in occupying 
Mt P chiefly to the rapidity of its penetration. 
Author's Observations 

The outstandiJTg feature of the night attack of the 14th Divi- 
sion against the Chinese positions on the southern bank of the Tatse 
Ho was that it was launched by almost an entire division to achieve 
a complete breakthrough of the enemy positions. This was the first 
example of such a large scale night attack since the Russo-Japanese 
W a r. The gains made by the 14th Division, on the night of the 21st, 
were exploited by the 6th and 20th Divisions, which made daylight 
attacks on the 22d. 

In reviewirjg the success of the 14th Division, the enengr situa- 
tion is of primary interest. Despite the fact that the enengy posi- 
tions were strong, having been constructed just om month previously, 
the disposition of troops was inadequate . The positions along the 
Tatse Ho had an overall length of about 45 kilometers and, accordiig 
to Japanese defensive tactics, the manning of such a line would 



U?3 



normally require about three divisions, but the enejqy's effective 
strength was only about 10,000 men (the equivalent of about two- 
thirds of a Japanese division). Of these, a considerable number 
were committed to the direct defense of Paoting. 

Of only slightly less importance was the high standard of 
training of each unit of the 14th Division and the high morale and 
confidence of its personnel, gained through the fighting in the 
vicinity of Chouchou. 

A contributing factor was the advantage taken of the momentum 
of the pursuit. Had the start of the attack been delayed, pendirjg 
arrival of hea-vy infantry weapons and the artillery, perhaps no 
choice would have remained but to adopt the plan to initiate the 
attack on the 23d as originally planned by the 6th Division, The 
results of the battle testify to the accuracy of the estimate of the 
14th Division. 

The competitive spirit among the divisions, which was especially 
noticeable during the early phases of the China Incident, undoubtedly 
motivated the 14th Division in launching its night attack on the ZLst, 
in order to be the first division to cross the Tatse Ho and advance 
toward Paotiqg . 

The Japanese Army, in selectiijg night attack targets, sought 
principally those targets which were conspicuous and readily acces- 
sible. Consequently, in many cases, the attack was directed toward 
enemy strong points. The results of this action show the advantage 
of directing attacks against the weaker parts of the enemy positions 
wherever the conditions permit easy and sure approach actions. 



Example No . 4 

Night Break-through by the Main Body 
of the First Army at the Beginning 
of the Chungyuan* Battle, May 1941 

(Based on operations records, compiled by the Demobilization 
Bureau, the May 1%2 issue of the monthly publication of the 
Army Officers 1 Club (Kaikosha), data possessed by Senior 
Officer Lt Col Kanda of the First Army and the statements of 
the 37th Infantry Group Commander, Lt Gen Nakajima.) 

In the spring of 1941, in the southern part of Shansi Province, 
a strong Chinese Army had strongholds in the Chungtiao Mountains 
and in the southern part of the Taihsing Mountains* Detachments 
from this force frequently invaded the Japanese occupied areas and 
not only disturbed public order, but threatened attack. The total 
strength of the army was estimated at 24 divisions (168,000 men). 

The Chungtiao Mountain area was rugged country with mountains 
as high as 2,500 meters, lackir^g in communications and being an in- 
habited area it presented difficulties for any military. movements. 

The Japanese First Army (36th, 37th and 41st Divisions and the 
9th and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades), which was assigned garri- 
son duty in Shansi Province under the North China Area Anny, made 
plans to destroy the Chinese Army and advance its security patrol 
line to the Yellow River, Both the North China Area Army and the 
China Expeditionary Force supported the operation. The Commander- 
in-Chief of the CEF dispatched the naih body of the 33d Division 
from Central China and it was placed under the First Army conniander. 
The North China Area Army commander conmitted the 21st and 35th 

* Code name given to operational area. (See Monograph No. 178, 
Page 221.) 

1*55 



Divisions which were under his direct corEimand. (The operational 
concept of the North China Area Army is shown on Map No. 1.) 

The First Army was to attack from the direction of Shansi Pro- 
vince and the 21st and 35th Divisions, under the direct command of 
the Area Army were to attack from Honan Province. 

In accordance with recommendations of the First Army, the date 
for the attack was established as 7 May 1941. 

The First Army divided its operational zone by a line running 
from Changma to Yuanchu, plannii^g to direct the min effort to the 
western sector. In order to inflict maximum losses on the eneiqy, 
it was determined to utilize 39 out of a total of 47 battalions in 
the western sector and maintain a strejqgth ratio of 70 per cent 
against the nine Chinese divisions (50,000 to 60,000 men) in the 
sector. 

Note: In past offensive operations against the Chinese it had 
been usual to conduct operations with a ratio of about 
30 per cent of the Chinese strength. 

Chinese Fifth Group Army and the Eightieth Airay had con- 
structed comparatively strong positions on a front extending about 
100 kilometers from south of Changma to a point on the Yellow River 
east of Pinglu. The depth of the position was about ten kilomsters 
with wire entanglements and pillboxes on the first lite. The First 
Army planned to effect a double envelopment of the enemy positions 
and to cut off routes of retreat by utilizing the Yellow River as a 
barrier and by dispatching raiding units which would block all 



U56 




1*57 



possible river crossing points. After completing the envelopment, 
repeated mop-up operations would be conducted within the enveloped 
zones. 

In accordance with that concept, the First Army Commander issued 
the following order: (See Map No. 2) 

1. After sunset of 7 May, the 33d Division (seven infantry bat- 
talions and six mountain artillery batteries) will attack the enemy 
in the sector east of a line between Changma and Yuanchu from the 
vicinity of luncheng and advance to the area east of Yuanchu. 

2. The 16th Independent Mixed Brigade (five infantry battalions 
and two mountain artillery batteries) will destroy the enemy in the 
area east of Pingliu. Powerful raiding units will occupy crossing 
points of the Yellow River and cut off the enemy 1 s routes of with- 
drawal* 

3. The 37th Division (ten infantry battalions, six mountain 
artillery batteries, three 10 cm howitzer batteries and two jaortar 
companies) and the 41st Division (nine infantry battalions, six 
mountain artillery batteries, three 10 cm howitzer batteries and 
six heavy field artillery batteries) will make attack preparations 
at Yuncheng and at the sector west of Changma as an outer enveloping 
force. After sunset of the 7th, they will effect a surprise attack, 
penetrate the enemy position and advance to the Yellow River at top 
speed. The two divisions will maintain close contact and establish 
an outer enveloping zone after which they will change direction to 
the northwest and the north to destroy the enemy within the zone. 
The two divisions upon penetrating the enemy 1 s line, will rush effec- 
tive raiding units to each Yellow River crossing point to cut off the 
enemy's routes of withdrawal. 

An element will be dispatched to secure key points on the 
route of advance of the main body to contact and destroy the re- 
treating enemy. 

4# The 36th Division (nine infantry battalions and nine moun- 
tain artillery batteries) and the 9th Independent Mixed Brigade 
(six infantry battalions, three mountain artillery batteries and one 
mortar company) will make preparations for attack at Wenhsi and in 
the sector west of Chianghsien, respectively. They constitute the 
inner enveloping force and will, after sunset of the 7th, effect a 
surprise attack upon the enemy position and drive a wedge deep into 
the enemy line. After establishing the inner enveloping zone both 



h59 



MAP NO. 2 




units will advance to the north and destroy the enemy within the 
zone* In conducting the wedge attack on the enenjy positions, an 
element of the raidirg unit will be dispatched in advance to the 
key points vdthin the enemy line to secure and expedite the execu- 
tion of the annihilation operation. 

5. The Army Reserve Unit (one and a half infantry battalions) 
will be at Chianghsien and with the development of the operation, 
will advance to the sector north of Yuanchu. 

To accomplish the plan, the First Army Commander issued precise 

instructions: 

1. Penetration speed 

The penetration front of each division will be limited to 
about two kilometers. Each division will constantly maintain its 
strength in depth and, by rotating the first line strength, continue 
penetration attacks without surcease both day and night. Until the 
envelopment is established, effort will be concentrated entirely on 
penetration, no attempt will be made to expand the front laterally. 

Note: In the past, the usual tactics of a Chinese force 
when attacked by the Japanese Army was to withdraw, 
avoiding decisive battle. Therefore, to contact the 
Chinese Army, it was essential to cut off its route 
of withdrawal and establish an envelopment by rapid 
advance. 

2. Assault support 

The assault will be supported by brief massed fires of 
small arms. Artillery preparation and assault support require more 
than one hour to be effective and then the effect of surprise is 
lost, allowing the enemy to withdraw and reducing battle successes 
even when the attack is successful. 

Mote : Lt Gen Shinozuka advocated the preparation and sup- 
port of assaults with brief mass small arms fire, 
particularly in situations such as this where it was 
difficult to transport weapons heavier than heavy 
machine guns to the front line because of the rugged 
terrain. Therefore, for the attack on the enemy ! s 
first line position he directed an assault with mass 
surprise fire of light machine guns and rifles. 
Although artillery supporting fire was planned, it 
was directed to minimize the time for the prepara- 
tion to about ten minutes. 



U63 



3* The conduct of attack 

To penetrate about 10 kilometers through the enemy main line 
of resistance and to exploit the initial effect of the surprise 
attack, it will be advantageous to utilize as many night hours as 
possible. 

Note: Lt Gen Shinozuka, normally critical of the efficacy 
of night attacks and close-quarter combat considered 
it expedient in this case to effect the assault 
under cover of darkness, 

• All First Amy units exerted utmost efforts to complete opera- 
tional preparations, giving attention to the dissemination of infor- 
mation on operational procedures and tactics to all officers and 
conductirjg training in night penetration and raiding techniques. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the training of those units (one 
infantry company from each battalion) responsible for the disruption 
of the enemy 1 s routes of withdrawal and those assault units charged 
with the penetration of the enemy positions. 

Every effort was made to collect and disseminate detailed in- 
formation on the enemy positions and surrounding terrain as well as 
the terrain of the route of advance, the names of the villages and 
distances between them. Individuals and units checked and prepared 
their weapons, ammunition, operational materials and equipment. The 
number of light machine guns in the first line units were increased 
and each man was equipped with a rope to aid in mountain climbing. 
Operational preparations progressed as planned and were completed by 
noon of May 7th. 

At 0900 hours on the 7th, strong, dust laden northwesterly wiwis 

h6k 



reduced visibility to about five meters, effectively concealing 
attack preparations. Because of the ckist storm and the reduced 
visibility the attack, which had been scheduled for sunset (1900 
hours), was slightly advanced. 

Each division was divided into two assault units which minimiz- 
ed their attack fronts and penetrated the enemy positions in column 
formation. In the beginning the energy's resistance was very strong, 
but as a result of the rapidly effected break-through the enemy com- 
mand was confused and organized resistance weakened as the attack 
progressed. 

Each unit continued its assault until the morning of the 8th, 
maintaining its attackiijg strength by successively leapfrogging 
fresh troops into the first line positions* In ten hours the assault 
units succeeded in making a ten kilometer penetration. 

In accordance with the plans of the First Army, units continued 
their advance, steadily over coining enemy resistance, and within 35 
hours after the commencement of the attack, they had completely 
established the outer envelopment zone and within 41 hours, the inner 
envelopment zone was completed. 

The Yellow River crossing point at Yuanchu was secured by a 
raiding unit within 21 hours after the start of the attack and other 
crossirgs were subsequently secured. 

After completing the envelopnent, the main body of the First 
Amy changed direction to the northwest and north and attacked the 



enemy from the rear. Later it changed direction again and began 
mop-up operations toward the Yellow River, As a result of repeat- 
ing the dividing and mop-up tactics, the First Amy was successful 
in destroying the bulk of the eneiqy within the envelopment. 

Losses inflicted on the Chinese were: Prisoners - 30,000, 
Dead - 4L,000. Captured equipment included: Field and mountain 
guns - 28, Mortars - 124, Heavy machine guns - 161, Light machine 
guns - 528, Rifles - 13,081, Japanese losses were 553 of fleers and 
men killed, 1£04 wounded. - — " 

Break-through Plan of the 37th Divisioh. (Based on the statement 
of Lt Gen Kichisaburo Nakajima, Left Flank Force commander of the 
37th Division.) 

During the attack preparations the 37th Division assembled the 
commanders of infantry and artillery regiments and battalions under 
its command and conducted on-the-spot training for about one week at 
a point 500 to 1,000 meters from the enemy position under the direc- 
tion of Haj Gen Nakajima, Infantry Group Commander. The officers 
wore enlisted men's uniforms and particular attention was paid to 
conceal intentions from the enemy. After this on-the-spot training, 
more detailed training was conducted at each regiment and battalion. 

The outline of the break-through plan and disposition of the 
37th Division is shown on the following map: 



U66 



BREAKTHROUGH PLAN AND DISPOSITION 
OF THE 37TH DIVISION 
EVENING 7 MAY 1941 

JAPANESE ARMY 
<J?B5> CHINESE ARMY 




U6? 



The divisional order was as follows: 



1. On the 6th, one day before the commencement of the attack, 
the 37th Division will advance to the vicinity of the front line 
position, 700 meters in front of the enemy, under cover of darkness 
and complete attack preparations at the line by noon of the 7th. 

2. At sunset, it will further advance its attack preparation 
line to about 300 meters of the enemy position and launch an assault 
just before darkness. Prior to the assault surprise fire will be 
delivered for about 10 minutes with all the artillery, infantry guns 
and machine guns. Direct assault support fire will be delivered 
with infantry guns; the artillery will fire mainly on the rear posi- 
tions and targets in the vicinity of the crest line. 

The two flank forces will advance to the crest line (saddle 
between Hills 1600 and 1700) by dawn of the 8th. Three raidiiig units 
(each unit consisting of one battalion) under the direct command of 
the division, will advance to a point just behind the front line and 
in accordance with the command of the flank force commanders, will 
leapfrog the flank units at this line and assault their designated 
targets. 

The disposition of the Left Flank Force (226th Infantry Kegi- 
ment) was as shown on the following map. 



U69 



DISPOSITION OF LEFT FLANK FORCE 
OF 37TH DIVISION 
EVENING 7 MAY 194! 

S *** JAPANESE ARMY 

CHINESE ARMY 




*H*200M » 



700 M 



LEFT FLANK FORCE 
FIRST LINE 2 

HQ 



HQ 



226 



226 



37 OIV 



RAIDING UNITS 
UNDER DIRECT 
COMMAND OF 
DIVISION 



226 
225 




RAVINE \ *fy 



RIGHT FLANK FORCE 

f><l 227(-IST BN) 



AT 



SECOND LINE 3 [><H 226 
THIRD LINE TW0^^225 



remarks: 

the depth of the ravine between the flank forces was 
iso to 200 meters. 



U71 



Since the attack front of the Left Flank Force was a crest line 
about 500 meters wide, the strength deployabie on the first line was 
about one company. The Left Flank Force commander ordered the first 
line battalion to penetrate about 11 kilometers to the saddle of 
Hill 1600 by dawn of the followirg day, at which time the second 
line battalion was to move into the first line. In accordance with 
his instructions, the first line battalion commander assigned the 
following leapfrog attack disposition: 

1. As the first line unit, A Company will penetrate the enemy 
position six kilometers alorg the crest line. 

2. B Company will be the second line unit and will relieve A 
Company at this line and advance to the saddle of Hill 1600 by dawn 
of the followij^g day. 

3* C Company will be the third line unit, and will be prepared 
to reinforce or relieve B Company. 

To effect the break-through, the Left Flank Force ccmmander 

particularly stressed the followijqg points to his subordinates. 

1. Assault fire will be employed in the first assault; however, 
a later assault will be conducted without fir&, and hand-to-hand 
combat will be effected. 

2. After capturing 1 the enemy position, units will pursue and 
overtake the routed enemy and storm the rear positions. 

3. No consideration will be given to the enemy remaining on 
the flanks of the break-through. Even if eneiqy units on the flank 
deliver fire, the advance will be continued without halting or fir- 
ing. 

The break-through was conducted almost as planned. Although 
stubborn resistance was met initially, the first line battalion suc- 
ceeded in capturing the saddle of Hill 1600 by about 2300 hours on 



U73 



the 7th - much earlier than planned. Because of the speed of the 
break-through, the enemy was confused and resistance from the second 
line positions was comparatively weak. 

Author's Observations 

While the Chungyuan Operation cannot be considered a large- 
scale operation, compared with other operations conducted against 
the Chinese, the objective was completely attained and the results 
of the battle were extensive in comparison with the strength com- 
mitted. From that standpoint the operation is without parallel. 
From the standpoint of tactics, it is an excellent example of a 
night break-through usirjg leapfrog tactics and the procedure of 
developing a break-through to effect a complete envelopment and sub- 
sequent annihilation of the enemy forces. 

The- assembly of maximum strergth, operational preparation based 
on a new and cautious concept, effective and careful direction, 
thorough dissemination of operational procedures to all subordinate 
units and the supply of necessary operational material and equipment 
are contributed to the success of the operation. 

A more immediate reason for success was the break-through in 
depth. The attack objective was not to capture key points in the 
enemy position but to break completely through the entire enemy posi- 
tion area. The wedge penetration upon a very narrow front and the 
leapfrogging by second and third line attack units were conducted 
for the .first time in a large-scale operation, this was made possible 



because of the fact that the Chinese positions were disposed both 
in depth and width with strength widely dispersed. The result of 
the operation proved that it was effective to use such tactics in 
an operation of that size. 

Since support fire was delivered at the beginning of the attack, 
the opportunity for complete surprise was abandoned. However, since 
the operational concept and date and time of attack had been comple- 
tely concealed from the enemy the operation might well be termed a 
strategic surprise attack. 

The tactics employed by the First Army, against an enemy dis- 
posed in both depth and width, proved correct. Particularly wise 
was the continuing of the advance without consideration for flanking 
fire, this method proved advantageous in that it gave the enenjy no 
time to reorganize. The conducting of a brief period of assault 
support fire at the beginning of the attack also proved effective. 

Paramount among the reasons for the success of the operation 
was the well planned attack preparations of each force under the 
First Army. Information of the enemy situation and terrain was col- 
lected in detail and disseminated to all officers and detailed train- 
ing was conducted. The First Amy commander considered that opera- 
tional preparation was a prerequisite to victory and took several 
months for the completion of preparations* Unlike other Japanese 
Army commanders, Lt Gen Shinozuka personally directed the tactics 
and operational preparations whenever necessary . Although such direc- 
tion sometimes caused eommand difficulties, it is now believed that 
his personal interest and attention was one of the most important 
factors in the success of the operation, 

kit 



E;>Lample No* 5 

Night Attack by the 1st Battalion of the 
75th Infantry Regiment Against Changkufeng (hill) 
in July 1938o 

(Based on battle reports of the 75th Infantry 
Regiment and Charts and Maps of "The China 
Incident", Volume I) 

On 9 July 1938, the Soviet Army dispatched a small force to 
Changkufeng (hill) and began construction of positions and a gradual 
build-up of strength * Although settlement of the matter was being 
attempted through diplomatic channels, in anticipation of the 
possibility of the failure of diplomatic settlement the Korea Army, 
which was in charge of the border defenses in that vicinity, ordered 
the 19th Division to move to the vicinity of Changkufeng on July 
17th. (See Map No, 1) 

In compliance with orders, the 19th Division (Headquarters at 
Nanam) advanced to the Tumen River with the 75th Infantry Regiment 
from Hoeryong as advance unit. However, in accordance with instructions 
from the Government and the Army High Command, the division took no 
action but remained in the sector along the right bank of the river 
for approximately ten days* On the 27th, the Korea Army ordered the 
division to return to its original stations « 

On the 29th, the Soviet Army began to construct positions across 
the border, near the village of Shatsaofeng. The Korea Army immediately 
cancelled the return of the 19th Division and ordered it to secure 
Chiangchunfeng (hill) and the hill southwest of Shatsaofeng. On the 



U77 



MAP NO. I 




DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE AND ENEMY FORCES 
IN CHANGKUFENG AREA 
EVENING OF 30 JULY 1938 



1 AREA SHOWN I 



MANCHURIA J U. S. S. R. 

^.pHUNCHUN J 



U79 



night of 29 July the entire 75th Infantry Regiment crossed the Tumen 
River and assembled in the vicinity of Chiangchunf eng (hill) by 0700 
hours on the 30th. The regimental commander inspected the situation 
and concluded that settlement of the incident was impossible without 
the employment of military force. He ordered the 1st Battalion to 
commence preparations for a night attack against Changkuf eng (hill) 
and at 1430 hours called all unit commanders to the southwestern 
base of Chiangchunf eng and issued orders for the night attack against 
Changkuf eng: 

1* The enemy is constructing defense installations on the 
line connecting Changkuf eng (hill) and the village of Shatsaofeng. 

2. The regiment will conduct operations to annihilate, the 
enemy along a line extending north and south of Changkuf eng. 

3* An element (company size) of the 1st Battalion with attached 
antitank and regimental gun units will secure Hill No. 52 in the 
Wof eng (village) area and at 0100 hours on the 31st will launch an 
attack toward Changkuf eng from the direction of Wof eng. 

4» At 0100 hours on the 31st the 10th Company will attack in 
the area along the crest line at the northern foot of Changkufeng 
and disrupt the enemy's route of withdrawal* 

5. Both attack units will make advance preparations • To avoid 
firing upon friendly troops , no advance north of the wire entanglements 
will be made after the capture of the enemy position at Changkufeng. 

6. The 3d Battalion (less the 10th Company, plus the 6th Com- 
pany) will assemble as the regimental reserve at the northwestern foot 
of Chiangchunfeng by 2300 hours today. The 6th Company will prepare 
for a night attack upon Changkufeng from the Chiangchunf eng front 

at an opportune time. 

Matters concerning concealment of plans, the use of green flares 
as a signal of success and the pass words Shojiki (honest) and Yumo 



(brave) were also mentioned in the order* After issuing his in- 
structions, the regimental commander encouraged each unit commander 
as follows: "The secret of success of a night attack lies in a 
strict ban on the use of firearms and the carrying out of a daring 
assault ♦ It is also necessary to act at the risk of ones life." 
The regimental commander determined to direct the attack from 
Hill No, 52* About 1600 hours on the 30th, the commander of the 19th 
Division arrived at Chiangchunfang and, observing the overall situation, 
expressed his approval of the plans ♦ Great importance was attached 
to this action since it was the first battle of the Japanese Army 
against a Soviet force and the most efficient battalions were selected 
for the action and every possible attention was given to details 
which might assist in insuring victory ♦ 

At that time, the 75th Infantry was on a peacetime organization 
with its strength and equipment being about half the wartime organiza- 
tional strength. 

Each battalion was composed of a headquarters, three rifle 
companies, a machine gun company and an infantry gun platoon. The 
strength of each rifle company was about 100, organized into two 
platoons » 



The Soviet force defending Changkufeng (hill) numbered approximately 
300, equipped with two antitank guns, eight heavy machine guns, about 
ten automatic rifles, and 20 hand grenade throwers ♦ Considering that 
the front was only a little over 300 meters wide, the armament was 
comparatively heavy* Furthermore, the position was strong, two heavy 
machine guns were installed in covered gun Emplacements and during the 
attack it was discovered that there were mine fields between Positions 
C and D. The enemy artillery with an estimated 20 guns was east of 
Lake Hasan* (See attached sketch) 

The attack was planned to be conducted in complete darkness 
between 2130 hours (moonset) and 0408 (sunrise)* Actual visibility 
at the time of the attack was approximately ten meters, with a maxi- 
mum visibility along the crest line of 40 meters. 

Reconnaissance had indicated that the eastern and western slopes 
of Changkufeng were generally steep and that near the top the slope 
became steeper and very rough* In addition, there were many cliffs 
on the northwestern slope* Movement would be comparatively easy only 
on the southeastern slope, although in that area there were cliffs 
which would necessitate frequent halts and rests* Due to the rugged 
character of the terrain there were many dead spaces near the top which 
could not be covered by the Soviet emplaced weapons. However, they 
were covered by means of rifle grenade launchers* 

The Changkufeng area was all quiet at noon on the 30th. Enemy 
patrols were sighted occasionally in front of the 3d Battalion position 

U85 




U87 



although there was no patrol activity in front of the 1st Battalion • 
At 2310 hours on the 30th the 1st Battalion reached the line of 
departure and commenced moving forward. By 0020 hours on the 31st 
the battalion had succeeded in breaching two lines of enemy obstacles 
in front of Position A and had completed its assault preparations on 
the south side of the first line of obstacles. (See Map No. 2) 

At 0115 hours the 1st Battalion commenced an attack through the 
breach in the wire entanglements with the 1st Company on the right 
flank, the 2d Company (plus one engineer platoon) on the left and the 
3d Company (less one platoon-half its strength) as the reserve. When 
the first line troops reached the second line of wire entanglements, 
military dogs disposed in front of the Soviet position began barking, 
the attack was exposed and the enemy opened fire with all available 
weapons • 

Despite the heavy fire, the 1st Battalion continued to approach 
the enemy position without returning the fire in accordance with their 
orders. Major Nakano, the battalion commander, was severely wounded 
but continued to advance. 

The 1st Company, on the right flank, advanced up the eastern slope 
of Changjkufeng and rushed Position E, with its antitank installations, 
occupied it and attacked the camp site. Captain Yamada, company com- 
mander, was killed at about 0230 hours and command of the company was 
taken over by 1st Lt. Inagaki, senior platoon leader, who succeeded 
in occupying the vicinity of the camp site by 0300 hours. 

, U89 



On the left flank area, the enemy intensified their fire and 
steadily resisted at Positions A, B and C. Japanese losses increased* 
Captain Sakata, 2d Company commander, was wounded at Position C at 
0230 hours. Captain Kitahara, commanding the Machine Gun Unit, was 
delivering heavy fire against the enemy from a point about 20 meters 
from Position D but, at 0305 hours he also was killed. These losses 
caused the attack on the left flank to be temporarily suspended. 

In the meantime, while the 1st Battalion was engaged in its 
attack on Changkuf eng, one enemy compaiqy with several tanks attacked 
the platoon of the 3d Company which was holding Hill No. 52. Although 
the platoon was successful in disabling three tanks, the enemy 
continued the attack until dawn when the platoon counterattacked the 
decimated enemy company and drove it back in confusion. 

In view of the critical situation, the reserve platoon (3d Com- 
pany), entered the attack on Position D. Advancing on the left of 
the 2d Company it approached within about ten meters of the enemy 
position but was slowed down by the steep slope. The enemy began a 
heavy hand grenade attack and at 0330 hours, the company commander, 
1st Lt. Nakajima, was killed and the platoon discontinued the attack. 
At 0400 hours) the battalion commander, who had been severely wounded, 
was commanding the battle from a position in the rear of the left 
flank company. As he was about to assault the enemy position with 
men from the left of the 2d Company he was hit by a hand grenade 
and killed. 



U93 



Colonel Sato, the regimental commander, on Chiangchunfeng was 
observing the battle situation. Worried because the flare signifying 

■: I 

success had not been given by 0200 hours, at 0215 he ordered the 6th 

Company to attack Changkufeng from the direction of Chiangchunfeng. 

The enemy intensified its fire and shortly thereafter the regimental 

commander received the following message from the 6th Company: 

"Request artillery support at dawn. The battle situation 
at 0400 hours is extremely critical. 11 

Captain Sakata, commander of the 2d Company, although severely 
wounded was commanding the 1st Battalion. The 1st Company moved to 
the left flank of the first line after overrunning the campsite and 
gave support to the left flank units . The enemy was sending rein- 
forcements on trucks and tanks from the direction of Shatsaofeng 
and enemy troops were sighted scaling the northern slope of Changkufeng. 

Captain Sakata attempted a last assault with the 1st and 2d 
Companies. The 2d Company penetrated the enemy position on the south- 
ern tip of the summit and engaged in hand-to-hand combat . The 1st 
Company approached the rear of the hilltop position from the west 
slope. As a result of the coordinated attacks, the enemy suddenly 
began a withdrawal from their positions and their reinforcements 
withdrew to the north in confusion. At 0410 hours the 1st Battalion 
succeeded in capturing the hilltop. 

The enemy artillery immediately started shelling the 1st Battalion 
forces on the hill, however, it began to rain very heavily and the 



U9U 



enemy suspended fire* 

Enemy personnel losses totalled about 300 killed and wounded ♦ 
Two antitank guns, four heavy machine guns, six light machine guns, 
six automatic rifles and six rifle grenade throwers were captured 
and seven tanks destroyed or damaged. 

Japanese casualties were also high; four officers, including 
the battalion commander and three out of four company commanders were 
killed as were 30 enlisted men. Three officers and 96 enlisted men 
were wounded. This loss of approximately one-third of the battalion 
strength was sustained principally as a result of the enemy hand 
grenade attack. 

As a result of this engagement, the Japanese Army learned a 
number of things about the Soviet Army. It was obvious that night 
security of the Soviet force was not adequate, although it was noted ' 
that military dogs were used successfully in giving the alarm. It 
was also noted that the Soviets did not employ reconnaissance patrols 
in all areas and that there were no standing patrols in the vicinity 
of the wire entanglements. Regarding the Russian reactions during 
the attack, it was observed that upon learning of the attack they 
opened fire at random with all available weapons, very much in the 
manner of the Chinese, and Japanese losses by this firing were com- 
paratively light. The Soviets also cheered and shouted as they fired, 
revealing their positions to the attackers. 

The Soviet use of tanks was also of interest. Although some 

k9$ 



tanks were used in action at night, most of them seemed to have been 
established in fixed positions and used as defensive strong points • 
In this attack, most of the Soviet tanks were disposed half-way up 
the east slope of Changkuf eng and were able to deliver heavy fire 
upon the attacking troops . Soviet hand grenade attacks were particular- 
ly effective and it was deemed necessary for the Japanese Army to im- 
prove grenade attack tactics . 

Author 1 s Observations 

The Changkufeng Incident involved the first fighting by a Japanese 
Army force against the Soviet Army and was the first and most famous 
night attack since the Russo-Japanese War. 

The 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment broke through the 
entire depth of the enemy position, and after three hours of desperate 
fighting, finally succeeded in capturing the summit of Changkufeng. 
The success of the attack is attributed to the strong fighting spirit 
of the officers and men of the battalion and their thorough training* 
From a strategic viewpoint, it should be borne in mind that although 
the Soviet position consisted of several lines, its ehtire depth was 
only about 300 meters. Consequently, the capture of the summit was 
the end of the battle, a big factor in the success of the attack. 
Since the 1st Battalion had expended its entire attacking power when 
it captured the summit, if there had been one more enemy position, it 
is doubtful if it would have been possible for the battalion to have 



U96 



captured it# 

In connection with night attacks, consideration should be given 
to providing artillery support. Although successful, this attack 
was conducted with only infantry without artillery support, and the 
summit was captured with difficulty and later than originally planned. 
Had there been artillery support to check enemy reinforcements, the 
battalion could have effected its victory more easily and with fewer 
casualties. 



k97 



Example No. 6 

Night Attack by the 228th Infantry Regiment Against 
the Kowloon Line, North of Hong Kong, December 1941 

(Based on the record of operations compiled by the 
Demobilization Bureau, the collection of examples 
of small-scale fightirjg published by the Inspector 
General of Military Training in August 1%3 and 
statements of veteran officers*) 

In South China, the Twenty-third Army had been conducting 
operational preparations, since November 1941* with the aim of 
capturing the British positions in Kowloon with an attack by the 
38th Division and the Army artillery unit. With the outbreak of 
war against Great Britain and the United States on 6 December, com- 
mencement of action was ordered at 0300 hours. 

On the morning of the 8th, the advance unit of the 38th Divi- 
sion crossed the Chinese-British border and by evening of that day 
the first line unit had advanced to the Mt Tamaoshan line, a strate- 
gic point in front of the enemy's main position. 

The Twenty-third Army commander believed that the enemy would 
offer full-scale resistance at the main defense line and, at 0900 
hours on the 9th, he issued an order concerning attack preparations 
on the main position, with the principal attack to be made against 
the hill southwest of the Chengmen Reservoir. 

In accordance wLth the Army order, the 33th Division designated 
the 230th Infantry Regiment as the Right Enveloping Unit, the 228th 
Infantry Regiment as the Center Enveloping Unit, and the 229th Infan- 
try Regiment as the Left Enveloping Unit. On the afternoon of the 



U99 



9th, the division commenced attack preparations with a disposition 
as shown in Map No, 1. In order to support the attack of the 38th 
Division, the main body of the Amy artillery and an element com- 
menced deployment to capture the position in the vicinity of Tapu 
and Chintien, respectively* 

At that tins the first British defense line in the Kowloon 
peninsula consisted of permanent positions with concrete pillboxes 
constructed in several echelons along a line linking Hsiakueiyung, 
Hill 255 (south of Chengmen Reservoir), Shinchung and Nushenshan. 
Although the number of the defenders of that line was not known, the 
total British-Indian defense strength in Hong Kong and Kowloon was 
estimated at approximately 10,000 men. 

At the time of the border crossirjg on 8 December, the 228th In- 
fantry Regiment commenced its advance as the second line regiment of 
the division. On 9 December it was ordered to advance to the first 
line ae the Center Enveloping Unit. It leapfrogged the 229th Regi- 
ment at Tapu and advanced toward Chiensuangling (Lead Mine Pass). 

On the afternoon of the same day, the 3d Battalion was assigned 
as the advance unit of the regiment. At 1700 hours on the 9th, the 
battalion arrived at a sunken place four kilometers south of Tsaoshan 
Hill and the battalion commander dispatched the 10th Company to the 
hill east of the Chengmen Reservoir to reconnoiter the enemy situation 
and terrain south of the reservoir. From Tsaoshan Hill Colonel Doi, 
commander of the 228th Infantry Regiment also reconnoitered the eneiny 



5oo 



MAP NO. I 




situation and terrain and found the terrain and the enejpy position 
to be the same as shown on the maps the regiment had been using for 
the past two months • However, no enemy troops could be sighted in 
the position and it was assumed that they had either withdrawn or 
were not expecting an attack. The regimental commander therefore 
planned to effect a night attack on the hill south of the Chengmen 
Reservoir, Although the sector south of the reservoir was in the 
patrol area of the Right Enveloping Unit (230th Infantiy Regiment) 
and was outside the zone assigned to the 228th, he considered that 
if the attack was successful, the division would approve his action. 
He was, of course, well aware of the orthodox attack plan of the 
army and the division, but harbored a desire to capture the enemy 
position by a surprise attack if there was a possibility of taking 
the enemy unaware* 

The 3d Battalion commander, Major Nishiyama, and the 10th Com- 
pany commander, 1st Lt Wakabayashi, were also planning to effect a 
surprise attack upon the Kowloon position at an opportune moment. 

The regimental commander called all battalion and infantry gun 
unit commanders together, reported the results of his reconnaissance 
and asked the opinion of each battalion commander. All recommended 
a night attack. The 3d Battalion commander was particularly strong 
in his recommendation, giving as his reason that his reconnaissance , 
conducted from the saddle west of Tsaoshan Hill, indicated^tjiat the 
enemy disposed in the sector south of the Chenguaen Reservoir was not 



$03 



very strong. Because of the complete agreement of the various com- 
manders, a night attack was decided upon. 

The regimental commander immediately ordered the 3d Battalion 
to effect a night attack on Hill 255 and directed the main body of 
the regiment to advance to the sector east of the reservoir to sup- 
port the battalion in the attack. (See Map No. 2) 

At 2030 hours, the 3d Battalion advanced to the area north of 
the embankment at the southeastern end of the Chengmen Reservoir and 
conducted preparations for an attack. The night was dark and there 
was a light rain. 

The 9th Company, assigned to capture Hill 255, crossed the 
embankment at 2100 hours and advanced. Although the company was 
fired on from both sides and the front, there was no enemy disposed 
on the embankment and the company successfully effected the break- 
through. The battalion commander ordered the attached engineer pla- 
toon to secure the embankment and assembled the main body of the 
battalion to the north of the embankment to await further develop- 
ments in the 9th Company attack. 

Since the battle situation was unknown. At 2130 hours, the 
10th Company advanced across the embankment and arrived at the foot 
of Hill 255* At this time the enemy began directing heavy fire 
against the embankment and it appeared impossible for the other units 
of the battalion (the 11th and 12th Companies) to cross. The bat- 
talion commander, having determined to take personal charge of the 



502i 



MAP NO. 2 




5b5 



attack, halted the two rear companies and, accompanied by his ad- 
jutant, advanced to the foot of Hill 255* He sent one engineer 
squad each to the 9th and 10th Companies. 

In the meantime, taking advantage of the incomplete disposition 
of the enemy, the 9th Company had effected its attack on the firir^g 
position located on Hill 255 and at 2240 hours captured the hill* 

The battalion commander immediately ordered the 10th Company 

to execute a leapfrog movement and attack the summit of Hill 341 and 

directed the 9th Company to attack the northwest corner of the enemy 

position southwest of Hill 255. By 2400 hours the 10th Company had 

succeeded in capturing Hill 341 and by 0130 hours on the 10th the 

9th Company captured the northwest corner of the enemy position* 

Note: According to prisoner interrogations conducted after the 
operation, the enemy disposed in the positions captured 
by the battalion was approximately one company in strength* 

As soon as Hill 255 was captured, enemy artillery began concen- 
trating fire upon the 3d Battalion. The battalion commander ordered 
an element of the 10th Company to secure the highest point of tha 
hill aa a strong point for launch ii^ a future attack aod ordered the 
9th and 10th Companies to secure all captured positions, avoiding 
losses from eneqy fire by utillsiig occupied enemy positions. The 
11th and 12th Companies were assembled at the northern foot of Hill 
255 and made attack preparations* 

Note: On the night of the 9th, the 38th Division Headquarters 
received the report of the decision to make a surprise 
night attack by the 228th Infantry Regiment. Division 



507 



headquarters considered that the attack force would be 
annihilated and the division commander ordered the regi- 
mental commander to withdraw his force. However, the 
regimental commander did not comply with this order. 
On the morning of the 10th, the division chief -of -staff 
came to the east side of the Chengmen Reservoir and after 
inspecting the situation of the enemy positions already 
captured and secured, the withdrawal order was cancelled. 
The main body of the 3&th Division commenced its attack 
on the evening of the 11th, with the approval of the 
Twenty-third Army, and successfully broke through the 
enemy 1 s main defense line on the 12th. The night attack 
of the 228th Infantry Regiment was the factor that expe- 
dited the occupation of the enemy's main Kowloon defense 
line earlier than had been expected. 



Author's Observations 

This is an example of a successful night attack against a strong 
enemy position effected by a force which had advanced in front of 
the enemy position in the evening and with little time to prepare 
for the attack, effected a two kilometer break-through. Several 
factors contributed to the success of this attack: 

1. The first line commander was able to observe all movements 
of the enemy and to detect all weaknesses in the enemy position. 
Since the enemy was confused by the surprise move, their troop dis- 
position was not complete and it was the opportune moment to effect 
a night attack. 

2. A thorough study of the enemy position had been made prior 
to the attack. Although the actual preparatory time for the attack 
was limited, for two months the 38th Division had conducted study of 
the terrain and the enemy positions utilizing three dimensional maps. 



508 



3. The thorough military trainirg given the troops, their high 
morale and the excellent abilities of the officers were also impor- 
tant contributing factors to the success of the operation* 



$09 



Example No. 6a 

Attack on Position on the South Side of Hill 255 by the 
10th Company of the 3d Battalion of the 228th Infantry 
Regiment at Kowloon in December 1944 

(Based on the collection of examples of small-scale 
operations published by the Inspectorate General of 
Military Training in August 19430 

Immediately after the capture of Hill 255 by the 9th Company 
(See Map No. 1), the 10th Company joined the fLghtiJig. Reaching 
the vicinity of Point B, after crossing the hill at 2240 hours on 
9 December, it received fire from an enenjy position of the right. 
The company's advance was halted and temporarily thrown into con- 
fusion. Accompanied by the leader of the 1st Platoon, the company 
commander advanced to Point B and ordered the demolishing of the 
wire entanglements. He instructed the 1st Platoon to capture Hill 
C, sent a small detachment to capture Fire Position E, ordered the 
2d Platoon to take Fire Position D, and led the remainder of the 
company to Point F# 

The 1st Platoon captured Hill C, meeting little opposition. 
The sergeant who had been ordered to capture Fire Position E, ap- 
proached with tmo men and attacked with hand grenades. The position 
proved, however, to be a concrete air vent rather than a firing 
position. 

The leader of the 2d Platoon, with a non-commissioned officer 
and four men, approached Fire Position D and threw hand grenades but 
the attack was not effective as the enemy had closed the steel case- 
ment of. the gun port. The detachment then mashed the position through 

511 



MAP NO. I 




the entrance and effected its capture after a brief hand-to-hand 
struggle. 

All three attacks were executed promptly and action was com- 
pleted within ten minutes. The company commander had, in the mean- 
time, advanced to Point F and with one orderly had captured three 
men who had been firing from an underground position at that point. 
He then sent the 3d Platoon to capture Hill 341, which was the high- 
est point in the vicinity, and ordered a few men to cut some 20 
telephone wires which were laid alorjg the underground passage. One 
squad from the 3d Platoon was sent to capture Fire Position I. 

With one squad under his direct command, the company commander 
moved to capture Fire Position G. Several hand grenades were hurled 
but since the enemy had closed the firirg ports, no results were 
achieved. The occupants of the position threw hand grenades and 
fired pistols through the upper ventilation ports. Efforts were 
made to force an entrance through the firing aperture but because 
of effective machine gun fire, being received from a neighboring 
eneinjr position, the attempt had to be abandoned. The company's 
engineer squad was ordered to demolish the steel casement with a 
five kilogram explosive charge and twa Bangalore torpedoes were 
thrown through the hole made by the demolition charge. Six of the 
occupants were killed and one officer and 20 men came out of the 
position wavirjg a white handkerchief in token of surrender. The 
occupation of the position was completed at 2310 hours. 

$15 



The capture of Fire Positions I and J was accomplished by 0010 
hours on the 10th. Investigation conducted after the conclusion of 
the attack disclosed that the fire positions were built of concrete 
1.5 to 2«0 meters thick and were connected by underground passages. 
Fire positions, however, had no individual obstacles and although 
there were field positions linked with the fire positions, fields of 
fire were not effectively established. At the time of the attack 
there were no guards or patrols posted and the enemy field positions 
were not manned. 

Author's Observations: 

Primary reasons for the success of this operation were the same 
as those advanced for the success of the 3d Battalion and the 9th 
Company. 



£16 



Example No. 6b 

A Night Attack by the Goto Platoon of the 
6th Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment 
During the Occupation of Hong Kong 

(Based on the collection of examples of attacks on fire 
positions published by the Inspectorate G e neral of Mili- 
tary Training in August 19430 

On the night of 18 December 1941> the 38th Division carried 
out the Hong Kong landing operation. The Goto Platoon of the 6th 
Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment was deployed on the extreme 
left flank of the regiment and at 2050 hours it landed on the west- 
ern coast near the Butterfield Shipyard. 

The missions of the 6th Company were the capture of the ship- 
yard and the enexpy positions on the hill to the south as well as 
covering the left flank of the regiment. It was planned to capture 
the shipyard with the main body of the company, assigning the strong - 
ly fortified hill positions to the Goto Platoon. (See Map No. 1) 

To accomplish its mission, the Goto Platoon organized the fol- 
lowing units prior to the commencement of the landing operations: 

Clearing Squad ••••• Leader and 7 aen 

(2 or 3 hand gre- 

First Assault Squad Leader and 5 (nades per man and 

(2 armor piercing 

Second Assault Squad Leader and 5 men (mines per squad. 

Grenade Discharger Squad . Leader and 5 men 
Upon completing the landing, the Goto Platoon advanced to the 
extreme left flank, concealing its move to the best of its ability. 



517 



MAP NO. I 




It encountered two double-apron wire entanglements near the south- 
western corner of the enemy position and successfully breached the 
obstacle within 30 minutes, without beirg detected. Under cover 
of darkness, the platoon passed through the break, approached Fire 
Position A and conducted reconnaissance • 

Although it was a moonless night, the Goto Platoon easily found 
Fire Position A because, not yet aware of the platoon's approach, 
Fire Positions A and B as well as Field Positions a and b were con- 
tinuing to fire tov^ard the coastal area. 

Fire Position A was surrounded by low wire entanglements. The 
platoon leader, with one assault squad, promptly demolished the 
entanglements, rushed into the positibn, through the entrance in the 
rear, annihilated the enemy and occupied the position. At this time 
the platoon began receiving machine gun fire and Field Position d 
and e were discovered further to the south. The platoon leader 
ordfered one assault squad to capture Field Positions b and c and 
Fire Position B. At the same time he took personal command of the 
other assault squads and moved to capture Field Positions d and e. 

Takir^g advantage of the confusion of the enengr, the assault 
squads attacked and soon captured Positions B, b and c. Platoon 
Leader Goto ordered the grenade squad to neutralize Positions d and 
e and then rushed into the positions and occupied them. By 2300 
hours on the 18th, the Goto Platoon had successfully occupied all 
enemy positions on the hill. 



$21 



Investigation conducted after the conclusion of the attack 
showed that the concrete of Fire Positions A and B was 50 to 80 cen- 
timeters in thickness and that gun ports were copper plate approxi- 
mately 20 millimeters thick. The principal weapon at each fire posi- 
tion was the water-cooled machine gun. 

Author's Observations: 

The effective attack carried out by the Goto Platoon was pri- 
marily successful due to the factor of initial surprise. Although 
the platoon had, of course, conducted map and long range stuc|y of 
the terrain before the fightijng started, it had had no opportunity 
for close observation. The locating of the positions was materially 
assisted by the firing at the coastal area by the defenders of the 
position. 



522 



Example No. 7 

Night Attack by the 215th Infantry Regiment 
in the Vicinity of Kuzeik in South Burma 

(Based on operations records compiled by the 1st 
Demobilization Bureau and the statements of 
Colonel Harada, commander of the 215th Infantry 
Regiment . ) 

On the morning of 20 January 1942 the Fifteenth Army crossed 
the Thailand -Burma border and invaded Burma and advanced to the 
right bank of the Salween River. 

On the night of 3 February, the 215th Infantry Regiment, lead- 
ing unit of the 33d Division, the front line division of the 
Fifteenth Army, occupied Paan on the right bank of the Salween. and 
engaged in preparations for an attack on the comparatively weak 
British garrison in the Kuzeik area. (See Map No. 1) 

The most difficult problem confronting the regiment was the 
crossing of the Salween River. As the regiment had no river -crossing 
equipment, local canoes were collected. 

The regimental commander disposed the regiment in a wooded area 
east and southeast of Paan and issued orders for a river crossirg 
operation: 

1. On the night of the 10th, one infantry company will secretly 
cross the Salween River, occupy the area south of Kuzeik and act to 
cover the river crossing operation of the main body of the regiment. 

2. On the night of the 11th, the main body of the regiment will 
cross the Salween River at a point south of Kuzeik, advance to the 
rear of the enemy positions in the vicinity of Pagoda Hill, and make 
a night attack upon the enemy. Capture of the positions will be com- 
pleted by the morning of the 12th. 



523 



MAP NO. I 




3. Simultaneously with the crossing of the main body of the 
regiment, the 3d Battalion will cross the river at a point near 
Pagat to cover the left flank of the regiment. 

4. One platoon will be dispatched from the main body of the 
regiment to the vicinity of Duyinzeik to check enemy reinforcements. 

5* Before the commencement of the river crossing operation, a 
feint will be made to deceive the enemy into thinkirg that the cros- 
siog will be made at a point between Paan and Pagat. 

6. All machine guns and infantry guns will be disposed on the 
river bank northwest of Paan. If necessary, they will support the 
attack of the main body of the regiment. 

The point south of Kuzeik was chosen for the crossing of the 
company on the night of the 10th because local inhabitants had been 
observed swimming there and it was believed that this indicated that 
there were no British troops in the area. This .assumption proved to 
be correct and the company, operatic according to plans, obtained 
the initial success by capturing Kuzeik. 

At sunset of the 11th, the main body of the regiment began the 
crossing of the Salween and although the movement was slew due to 
the necessity of employing native canoes, there was no enemy inter- 
ference. In general, the crossing made smooth progress ani was com- 
pleted by 2330 hours. 

Upon completijng the crossing, the regiment (less the 3d Batta- 
lion) advanced westward, swung northeast and attacked the enemy posi- 
tions from the rear. It was a dark, moonless night and the enemy 
was taken completely by surprise. The 1st and 2d Battalions were 
deployed in a line and at 0230 hours of the 12th, made an assault. 



527 



After offering only light resistance the enemy withdrew in confusion* 

Interrogation of 150 prisoners captured in the attack revealed 
that the area was defended by the Baruchi Battalion of the Indian 
17th Division. 

Author's Observations: 

Under normal conditions this attack would have been made after 
dawn of the day following the river crossing but because it was 
impossible to transport the heavy machine guns and infantry guns by 
canoe, the regimental commander determined that, without the support 
of the heavy weapons, a night attack would be more favorable. 

It must be noted that the British forces were not effective and 
failed to make careful reconnaissance or preparation. 



$28 



Example No. 8 

The Establishment of Raiding-inf iltration Tactics 
by the Eighteenth Army in New Guinea and the 
Formation of the Takasago Volunteer Unit 

(Based on statements of Lt Col Tanaka, former staff 
officer of the Eighteenth Army.) 

In December 1942 the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 15th Inde- 
pendent Engineer Regiment were preparing for a final stand in the 
Buna and Giruwa sectors. Both units had lost virtually all of their 
artillery and supplies of all kinds were short. Allied armament was 
so superior that whenever the Japanese opened fire their guns were 
destroyed immediately after by heavy enemy counter battery fire. It 
became obvious that some measures must be taken to destroy enemy 
artillery and supply depots without the use of the few artillery 
pieces remaining and without suf f erir^g disastrous retaliatory artil- 
lery bombardment. 

The employment of raiding -infiltration tactics appeared to be 
the only solution. This was, coincidexitly, the same solution which 
the Seventeenth Army arrived at in meeting a similar problem on 
Guadalcanal at about the same time. 

Although Japanese soldiers were well trained in normal patrol- 
ling and infiltrating methods, the tactic of penetrating deep behind 
enemy lines and the employment of demolitions in the destruction of 
enemy weapons and depots was a departure from accepted practice and 
it was generally believed that those who participated in such mis- 
sions had little chance of returning. 



$29 



In early December 1942 Colonel Yokoyama, Giruwa Sector Command- 
er, called for volunteers for artillery destroying raids and was 
successf ul in obtaining approximately 100 men, ranging from young 
men in fine physical condition to those suffering f rom wounds and 
illnesses who volunteered in order to have the opportunity of dying 
an honorable death. Volunteers were divided into groups of varying 
sizes and given training in demolition woa^k and infiltrating tactics. 
Upon completion of training, missions were assigned to groups and the 
implementation of raiding -infiltration tactics began. 

Note: Raiding -infiltration groups were composed of 5 to 20 men 
each and light machine gun and rifle squads were often 
sent to support or protect the demolition groups. Sub- 
sequent experience indicated that a group of more than 
10 men was seldom successful because it was too easily 
detected* 

The first raids were launched in the latter part of December 
1942 and January 1943 with the mission of destroying artillery em- 
placements in the Soputa and Warisota areas, behind the enemy lines. 
Of the first six raids, two were successful, two were partially 
successful and two failed and the groups failed to return. Unite 
which attempted to attack by force, using firepower in an attempt to 
neutralize installations before attacking were not successful while 
those which awaited an opportune moment and, approaching by stealth, 
conducted a surprise raid had a better chance for success. Contrary 
to expectations, losses were comparatively light and most units re- 
turned intact. (See attached Sketch) 



530 



Considering the lessons learned and the amount of success 
achieved in the early raids, it was determined to train special units 
to accomplish raiding missions rather than depend on hit or miss 
volunteer methods. Foremost among the special units were 200 young 
men from the Takasago Tribes of Formosa, commanded by highly trained 
officers and non-commissioned officers who were graduates of the 
Counter Intelligence School, chosen to form the Takasago Volunteer 
Unit in June 1943. Intensive training was conducted and that, com- 
bined with their natural aptitudes, physical ability, adaptability 
to the tropical climate, patience, marksmanship and bravery made 
them an ideal and highly valued raidirig force* Due to the skill 
which they eventually developed in their special hit and run tactics, 
as well as their ability to conceal their movements, the raidixig- 
infiltration attack was not considered by them to be a suicide mis- 
sion and their losses were comparatively light throughout the numer- 
ous campaigns in which they were engaged. 

The Takasago Volunteer Unit was assigned to the Nakai Detachment 
in the Ramu Valley where they spearheaded an attack in the Kesewa 
areai and were successful in attacking and destroying an enemy billet- 
ing area. (See Example No. 11) Later, during the withdrawal of the 
Nakai Detachment from the Kaiapit sector, the unit was designated as 
a rear guard and by their continued harassing activities facilitated 
the withdrawal of the main body of the detachaant. 

Following the attack by the Eighteenth Anny along the Drinumor 



533 



River in July 1944, the counterattacks of the heavily reinforced 
enemy forced the army to wage a wholly defensive battle because the 
men did not have the physical strength to launch an attack. Owing 
to a series of attacks, against which no counterattacks could be 
launched, one position after another had to be vacated and it was 
at this time that the Takasago Unit proved its real worth* They 
conducted many raiding attacks and expanded their operational methods 
to include a general mop-up of raided areas after each attack* 

In the spring of 1945 it was realized that the Eighteenth Axmy 
was not capable of mounting a general offensive and it was determined 
to employ raiding tactics on a large scale. While the loss of the 
Takasago Volunteer Unit as a fighting force would be serious, it was 
felt that its personnel might better serve as instructors in order 
that the army, as a whole, might be taught the techniques of raiding ♦ 
Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Takasago Unit were 
dispersed to all units of the Eighteenth Army area to act as instruc- 
tors in raiding -infiltration tactics. 

By June 1945 training had progressed to such a point that all 
Eighteenth Army units had raiding groups in constant use. Each unit 
defended its position during the day and employed raiding tactics at 
night. These harassing attacks enjoyed some measure of success in 
that the enemy was required to maintain strong defenses at night 
which had the effect of slowing down their drive and strength the 
following day ♦ 

53 k 



Author's Observations: 

One weakness of rai ding-infiltration tactics is the fact that 
higher headquarters cannot invariably confirm the results achieved 
by raiding parties. It was found that many reports tended to be 
over-optimistic and although the raiding tactics employed against 
the Australians in eastern New Guinea were most effective, they 
were not as completely successful as was reported on several occa- 
sions. It is believed that in future employment some method must be 
devised to give the higher echelons of command sufficient accurate 
information to form a true and impartial picture of actual results. 



Example No. 9 

Night Attack by the Kawaguchi Detachment 
on Guadalcanal 

(Based on operations records compiled by the Demobilization 
Bureau, "Examples of Small-scale Actions" compiled by the 
Inspectorate General of Military Training in October 1943 > 
and statements of veteran off icers. ) 

After an attack by the Ichiki Detachment had ended in failure 
on 21 August, the commander of the Seventeenth Amy dispatched the 
Kawaguchi Detachment to Guadalcanal with orders to capture the 
island from the United States forces which had landed on 7 August 
1942. 

The main body of the Kawaguchi Detachment, which was sent to 
Guadalcanal aboard Navy destroyers, debarked under cover of darkness 
in the vicinity of Taivu Point between the nights of 29 August and 
4 September. The total strength which Detachment Commander Kawaguchi 
had in the Taivu Point vicinity was the 35th Infantry Brigade Head- 
quarters, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment, 
the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment, the remnants of the 
Ichiki Detachment (about one infantry battalion) and one field artil- 
lery battery. 

Note: The 2d Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment embarked 
on small craft and landed on the morning of 5 September 
at Maravoro on the northwest tip of the island. This 
unit assumed the offensive from the west in cooperation 
with the offensive from the east by the Kawaguchi Detach- 
ment. 

Apparently the United States forces had detected the debarkation 
of the Kawaguchi Detachment as beginning in the early morning of 1 



537 



iS^M^ iha afctgfefei ^c^jpent,, fommander Kawaguchi replied 

~ v Lined by Sev^nh^^-fu «' 
-aa^n ■. « , ■ ■ AilVwJ ^ Army r^-i 



September they mounted air strafing and bombing attacks. 

To make attack preparations by securing a position to the west, 
the detachment advanced, on the night of the 2d, to the sector be- 
tween Koli Point and the Balesuma River and made a reconnaissance of 

the 1^ Map No. 1) 

■~^ig. aaaWung attacka. 
AllKotJgfr-tfte^^ gutlined^ by Seventeenth Army had 

- h , ' *" ~ " J " ecurxn 2 a position to the wes* 

called*!fr^$ffi^ d o£ b & wa - e3 5 )ressed ^ army"" u * 

•( V /.v^^n * ^ . J * U/S ^ *° ~^ le lector be- 

headqii^rtfers *he l^pal^l^^s ^ the Kawaguchi Detachment. 

TKe~dStS'fiHn^ the 5th as to the advisabili- 

- t.oee Map fe, 1) 

ty of 

llo^i#fc&gte on the Uth 

^^■jr^.,^. _ ho ~ ; -^P^eos^cl in army 

- - ifaiB.d'%(Sfc bfeacfc^SftljlQ ^^jpo^tgpne the day of attack in 

^o^dep to wait for rei^orceiitentsif* %e^^^-.btie .tact. angfl&iqn 
a €M c ifffi^t r ^.ndifeL^a§ ^|ti]L-?^ suitable for a surprise attack. 

^ *I,pLan. to launch the attack on or 1 abd{at--&fie-12th 4H# ttBvSSSCir-*-. 

^ ' x dehx a Si ri §cfe t^gg£|&£p jfith our present strength 

on ^^c^fg^r^f cfefefc fact that the attack scheduled for 'toe^ lftlfiad 
been'dxfeFStt^ to attack the Lunga Air- 

fields jiitiife^ attack J by;tftf ^K&wagucbi.^e^^gnl, 

army head4iiarter&- agreed tq sh^ige the^dttacftto ih& c , u ^7"_ ' 

1 tri^tfee :? jDfeant±me.> gtecKM^lwagp e had indicated that progress 
£&rdu^^ difficult due to the ^ act 

that many l d£ e th§ ^v@i^ fe^d flooded as £ result of the continuous 
yainsi uC ^ aad, provisions would be particu- 

larly difficulty > On- $t!n pf (< Sep teraber the commander considered 
po^'poiiijig^tee^afetaibk ^t^^tfe^ 34th and radioed a request to army 



MAP NO. I 




539 



headquarters. On the same day, however, tne seventeenth Army had 

received the following message from Imperial General Headquarters: 

!I A large enemy convoy with marines aboard, arrived at the Fiji 
Islands on the 5th." 

Due to the imminence of immediate reinforcement for the United 
States forces on Guadalcanal, the army ordered the Kawaguchi Detach- 
ment to retain the attack date of the 12th. 

At dusk on the 8th the detachment departed Koli Point and com- 
menced a flanking movement through the jungle. Prior to departing 
from army headquarters at Rabaul a night attack had been determined 
as being the only possible tactic which might be effective against 
the United States forces. However, influenced by the failure of the 
frontal attack made by the Ichiki Detachment, the decision to make 
a flanking movement through the jungle to the south was decided on 
by Detachment Commander Kawaguchi after landing on Guadalcanal Island. 

The movement through the jungle was conducted with the infantry 
battalions in four columns. Although considerably delayed due to 
unexpected difficulties all columns were able to arrive at the Tenaru 
River by the evening of the 11th* Three of the battalions merged 
into one column (the Mizuno Battalion, a mixed organization formed 
from the personnel of the Ichiki Detachment, remained on the extreme 
right flank), enabling the detachment commander to exercise direct 
control of the main body. (See Map No. 1A) 

Note: One reason given for the difficulty of the movement was 
that bearings were often lost because of the magnetic 



MAP NO. IA 




variation of the compasses. Such difficulties might 
have been due to lack of training in the use of com- 
passes in jungle movement. 

The enemy was still unaware of the approach of the detachment 

and success seemed assured. It was believed that enemy positions 

were established only on the sea front and on the east and west land 

fronts and that there were practically no enemy positions in the 

south. As a consequence of this belief, strong enemy resistance was 

not expected in the south nor at the Lunga Airfield which was to be 

attacked simultaneous with the main enemy positions. 

Note: The detachment was confident that its movement had not 
been detected by the United States forces because an 
American flyer, captured when his plane crashed on the 
route of advance, informed them that the United States 
forces were not aware of the movement. 

The detachment commander resolved to launch the attack at 2200 
hours on the 12th, capture the airfield by the morning of the 13th, 
and advance to the shore line. Rations carried when departing from 
Taivu Point were sufficient for only about 13 days and little supply 
was expected after that time. Therefore, it was apparent that pro- 
visions would be exhausted about the 14th. It had been planned to 
depend on rations captured from the United States forces after that. 

To effect an attack on the night of the 12th it would be advisa- 
ble to place each unit in position for attack preparations at about 
1400 hours and to reconnoiter the enemy situation and terrain until 
about sunset (1900 hours). The detachment commander realized that 
since the unit was well behind schedule it might be extremely diffi- 
cult to effect an attack on the night of the 12th. However? since 

5h5 



coordinated plans called for the bombarding of the airfield by the 
navy on the night of the 12th, the attack could not be postponed at 
that late date. 

The advance of the detachment was delayed even longer than had 
been anticipated and it was not only unable to take up positions for 
attack preparations by 1400 hours, but was unable to reach the pre- 
paratory positions by sunset. 

Shortly after sunset contact between the detachment headquarters 
and all battalions was lost and until the morning of the 13th each 
battalion operated independently. The 3d Battalion, on the extreme 
right flank, discontinued advance and all action at sunset because 
of a leg injury received by the battalion commander. The 2d Batta- 
lion, assigned as th,e first line attack unit, continued its advance 
through the jungl^\and arrived at the vicinity for attack prepara- 
tions. However, the battalion could not estimate the enemy situation 
or terrain and dawn of the 13th came before reconnaissance could be 
completed. 

The 1st Battalion, on tke extreme left flank, launched an attack 

against an enemy position at about 2200 hours and captured it but 

enemy artillery bombardment compelled the battalion to abandon the 

position the following morning. (See Map No. 2) 

Note: It was believed on this night that the 1st Battalion had 
assaulted Hill 30 (northwest of the airfield). However, 
it was later determined that the battalion had been 
attackingxone company of a U.S. raider battalion south 
of the airfield. 



5U6 



MAP NO. 2 




The Mizuno Battalion which had proceeded toward the Ilu River 
failed to carry out an assault due to obstacles in front of the 
enemy positions. 

On the morning of the 13th, the enemy situation and details of 
the terrain still remained unknown; even the location of the detach- 
ment could not be pinpointed. However, out of necessity, the detach- 
ment commander ordered each battalion to resume the attack at 2200 
hours on the 13th. 

Earlier than the expected time, the 1st Battalion, on the ex- 
treme left flank commenced attackirjg about sunset and succeeded in 
occupying the eneicy position to its front. Harassed by an enemy 
bombardment which was intensified at that time, the advance became 
difficult and was stalemated about 2200 hours. As on the previous 
night, the 3d Battalion did not attack. 

Note: The attack of the 1st Battalion forced two companies of 
a raider battalion to withdraw from their position. 

The 2d Battalion located roughly in the rear center, commenced 
an assault with considerable success after 2200 hours, in spite of 
a fierce bombardment which reached its height at that time. Some 
companies broke througjh the enemy position on Mukade Hill to advance 
to the sector southeast of the airfield. However, the success attain- 
ed by the attacking companies could not be maintained nor exploited; 
in the darkness and the jurjgle the men and units were badly scattered 
and it became virtually impossible for the battalion commanaer to 
direct the action. (See Example No. 9a) 

$h9 



At dawn on the 14th, the enemy bombardment and air bombings 
were again intensified and an element of the enemy counterattacked* 
Continuous losses were sustained and it became impossible for Gen- 
eral Kawaguchi to exercise any measure of control over the detach- 
ment. In view of this situation and the fact that the food supply 
had been exhausted, he decided to disengage temporarily and regroup 
his strength on the left bank of the Lunga River. The detachment 
commenced the diseiigaging action on the 14th and reached the left 
bank of the river on the 15th. 

Because of the interruption of communication the Seventeenth 
Army was not informed of the failure of the attack until the 15th. 
Upon receipt of the news, the detachment was ordered to withdraw to 
the area west of the Ifatanikau River. 

Losses sustained by Kawaguchi Detachment from the time of the 
landing, on Guadalcanal until 2 October are as shown in the followiig 
chart* 



550 



Unit 


Total Strength 
Involved in 
Fighting 


Number 
Killed in 
ac u ion 


Number 
Wounded 
in Action 


Ratio of 
Losses 


Detachment Hq 


164 


3 


4 


4$ 


1st Bn, 124th Inf Regt 


1,034 


208 


185 


38$ 


3d Bn, 124th Inf Regt 


814 


66 


62 


16$ 


2d on, i+zn ini ftegt 






(7 




Mizuno Battalion 


658 


58 


36 


14$ 


Total: 


3,328 


442 


366 


24$ 


Remarks: 

!♦ 4 Escort platoon of 41 men are included with Detachment Head- 
quarters. 


2. Deaths from wounds in action, sickness contracted at the 
front and missirg are included in the nunber killed in 
action. 



Note: Losses sustained amounted to close to one-fourth of the 
entire strength of the detachment. Although it cannot 
be denied that these were heavy looses, they had not 
reached the point which would justify the abandonment of 
the attack* 



Author's Observations: 

In the preparation of this record, the author interviewed Maj 
Gen Kawaguchi on 8 December 1953* In response to a query as to the 
reason for the failure of the attack, General Kawaguchi stated that 
the failure to postpone the attack until the 13th was the principal 
direct cause. His opinion was that if his radio message of 7 Septem- 
ber recommending the postponement of the attack had been approved by 

551 



the Seventeenth Army or if he had used his own descretion, the attack 
of the Kawaguchi Detachment would definitely have succeeded and the 
subsequent situation on Guadalcanal might have charged greatly* 
Other reasons advanced were; the lack of time to conduct attack pre* 
parations, the lack of accurate maps and the failure of the 3d Batta- 
lion to show proper fight i ng spirit. 

The lack of adequate maps must have been an important factor in 
the failure of the attack. The mistake of thinkiqg that the 1st 
Battalion, on the extreme left, had attacked Hill 30 would not have 
been made if accurate maps had been available and if time had permit- 
ted the maklqg of proper reconnaissance. For a general map, tfte 
Kawaguchi Detachment had only a hydrographical chart of Guadalcanal 
and for the Lunga area, it had an aerial photo of the coastal sector 
north of Mukade Hill. Aerial photos were reproduced as simple maps 
but the aerial photos themselves were supplied only to detachment 
headquarters. (Copies of the hydrographic chart and aeriaL photograph 
are attached as Maps 3A and 3B.) 

The Kawaguchi Detachment was under the impression^tJaat its flank- 
ing movement to Mukade Hill was well concealed from the American 
forces. However, it is new evident that the United States forces 
knew of the movement well in advance, although they were not aware 
of the exact tine and place until the attack was begun. The detach- 
ment had lost its objective of strategic surprise and had little 
chance for anythiijg other than a tactical raid. A full scale attack 



552 



MAP NO. 3A 




MAP NO. 3A 




following thorough preparation might have met with some measure of 
success. 

If the detachment had succeeded in occupying the air strip, 
the entire defensive of the United States forces would have been 
adversely affected and might have crumbled. It was, from the Japa- 
nese point of view, a most regrettable failure. 



55'9 



Example No, 9a 

Summary of the 2d Battalion Attack on the 
Night of 13 September 1942. (See Map No. 2) 

The 2d Battalion completed its attack preparations about 1900 
hours on the 13th and at 2200 hours the enemy intensified its artil- 
lery fire, bombarding the positions of the 1st and 3d Battalions. 
Without waiting for orders, Major Tamura, commander of the 2d Batta- 
lion, ordered an attack on Mukade Hill. 

The 5"th Company, on the left flank, broke through and captured 
points in the first line of the enemy and approached the secondary 
positions. At this time, enemy rifle and artillery fire was concen- 
trated on the company but the company commander massed his remaining 
men, including the reserve platoon, and in spite of the heavy fire and 
the severe losses which it inflicted, by taking advantage of the ter- 
rain and advancing by crawling, the two assault platoons succeeded in 
occupying the secondary positions. Durix^g this assault the company 
commander was killed and the assault slowed down. 

The 7th Company, on the right flank, broke through almost simul- 
taneously with the 5th Company and occupied enemy first line, positions. 
Later the company broke through several weak points in the secondary 
positions, crossed the crest line and advanced to the sector on the 
northeast side of the hill. 

The battalion commander was aware of the fierce resistance of 
the enemy and the heavy casualties being sustained but, determined to 



561 



press the attack with the object of advancing to the shore line by 
dawn of the 14th, ordered the reserve company to advance. The 6th 
Company crossed the line of the 5th Company and approached the enemy 
position for a flankirjg attack. Although the company commander was 
wounded and over half the company were casualties, the remainii^g 50 
or 60 men broke through the enemy line, crossed the crest of the 
hill and advanced to the sector southeast of the airfield about dawn 
of the 14th. The company halted in this area to regroup and make 
preparations for the next attack*- 



562 



Example No. 10 

Night Attack of the 2d Division on Guadalcanal 

(Based on operations records compiled by the Demobilization 
Bureau, statements of surviving officers and the book, 
"Guadalcanal 11 by Masanobu Tsuji.) 

After the United States forces landed on Guadalcanal on 7 
August 1942, the Seventeenth Arny failed in two attempts to recapture 
the island by attacks of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Detachments. 
Starting in the middle of September the army moved the 2d Division 
from Rabaul to Guadalcanal on destroyers and on the night of 9 Octo- 
ber, Lt Gen Hyakutake, commander of the Seventeenth Army, arrived 
at Tassafaronga to personally direct the operation. Plans formulated 
at Rabaul had taken into consideration the failure of the attempted 
surprise attacks of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Detachments and this 
third offensive was designed to overwhelm the enemy with power, mak- 
ing full use of superior artillery and fire power. At Tassafaronga, 
however, the army commander discovered that the actual strength of 
the 2d Division consisted of only five infantry battalions (exclud- 
ing those attached to the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Detachments), two 
field guns, two mountain guns and four 15 cm howitzers, with only a 
small amount of ammunition. 

Ship transportation capacity was only half of that scheduled 
and the number of men who debarked was between one-third and one-half 
of full division strength. The amount of munitions transported was 
also extremely small. 

563 



Imperial General Headquarters was strongly demanding the re- 
capture of the Guadalcanal airfields by 20 October and in view of 
the reduced strength of the 2d Division, the army commander realized 
the necessity of revising the attack plan. On the morning of the 
11th, the 2d Division reported that the mountainous area south of 
the enemy positions was not wooded and recommended the adoption of a 
flanking attack. The army commander decided that a flanking attack 
would be more advisable than the frontal attack originally contem- 
plated and on the 12th he informally directed the 2d Division to 
employ an element to divert the eneiqy to the coastal area and conduct 
a flanking movement with the main body from the southern foot of Mt 
Austen to the right bank of the Lung a River and to occupy the air- 
field with a surprise attack. The 2d Division reported that it would 
be able to make an attack on or about 20 October and on the same day 
ordered the 2d Engineer Regiment to commence construction of the 
division route of march. (See Map No. 1) 

On 13 October the Seventeenth Army issued an order to the 2d 
Division to commence preparations. The Kawaguchi Detachment Head- 
quarters and one comparatively strong battalion were transferred to 
the division and the remaining detachment strength was placed under 
direct army command. In accordance with the army order, on the 14th 
at 0800 hours, the 2d Division issued an order to prepare for action: 

"The 4th Infantry Regiment and the bulk of artillery strength 
on Guadalcanal will be organized into the Sumiypshi Force to contain 
the enemy in the coastal area. The remaining combat strength will 
prepare for a flanking attack. Units will carry 12 days provisions 
and as much ammunition as possible." 

56U 




565 



Preparations proceeded well; by 14 October the 2d Engineer 
Regiment had constructed half of the route , by the morning of the 
l$th, reinforcements (the 16th and the 230th Infantry Regiments) had 
landed at Kokumbona and the massing of the attack force was complet- 
ed. A bombardment conducted by the Sumiyoshi force and naval forces 
against the Lung a Airfield from the 13 th to the night of the 14 th 
covered the transportation and unloadii^g operation. It was believed 
at first that this bombardment had been highly effective, however, 
as a result of enemy bombing which began at dawn on the 15th, three 
transports out of six were destroyed and only one-tenth of the am- 
munition and one-half of the provisions were unloaded. 

On 15 October the Seventeenth Anny issued orders to the 2d 
Division: 

"After sunset of X Day the 2d Division will make a surprise 
attack on the enemy flank from the southern side of the Lunga Air- 
field and destroy the enemy on Guadalcanal." 

Although tentatively scheduled for the 20th, the exact date of 

X Day was to be decided on in accordance with the situation of the 

division. 

The 2d Division, at 1000 hours 15 October, ordered the commence- 
ment of movement to the upper Lux^ga River i At 1400 hours on the 16th, 
all units commenced movement from the left bank of the Oki River with 
the 29th Infantry Regiment as the leadijqg element. Yfith the start 
of the movement, the army commander placed the Sumiyoshi force under 
his direct command with the intention of using that force -to expedite 



567 



the attack of the division by permitting it to concentrate on the 
airfield. The units of the former Kawaguchi Detachment were placed 
under the Sumiyoshi force > which was ordered to advance to the left 
bank of the Matanikau River to attack Mt Austen and the enemy posi- 
tions on the right bank of the Matanikau River* 

The movement of the 2d Division was extremely difficult and 
slow because of poor roads and rugged terrain. The lack of horses 
and other transportation facilities made the movement of heavy wea- 
pons impossible and artillery pieces were abandoned along the route 
of march. Eventually, the leading unit reached a point six kilo- 
meters northeast of the Lunga River crossing point about sunset of 
the 19th, A concentration of troops, in that vicinity, was effected 
on the 20th. 

Note: The 2d Division had estimated that the point was two 
kilometers behind the scheduled line of deployment. 
However, it was later discovered that the division was 
actually located about a day's march to the rear of the 
scheduled line. 

The army commander on beiiig informed that the 2d Division was 
arriving at the scheduled point on the 19th, issued the following 
order: 

1. The time has come for the decisive battle between the 
United States and the Japanese forces. 

2. X Day will be the 22d. 

3. Officers and men of each unit will exert the utmost efforts 
to accomplish their mission. 

In accordance with the army order the 2d Division issued the 

following order at 1200 hours on the 20th: 

568 



1* The known enemy positions are shown on the appended map, 

2. The division will deploy on the line of its present loca- 
tion, effect a surprise night attack, capture the enemy airfield 
and destroy the enen^y on the left bank of the Lunga River, The 
direction of the main effort of attack will be along the right 
bank of the Lunga River to the northwest sector of the airfield. 
The time of assault is tentatively scheduled for 1800 hours on the 
22d, but time will be confirmed in a separate order. 

3. The Right Flank Force (3d Battalion of the 124th Infantry 
Regiment, the 230th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, and one 
engineer company under the command of Major General Kawaguchi) will 
prepare for attack at the present line, direct the main effort of 
attack on the left, conduct a surprise break-through of the enemy 
positions on the southern edge of the airfield, capture the eneipy 
positions along the edge of the jungle on the north side of the 
airfield and advance to the coast line. After advancing to the 
coast line, the main body will concentrate in the vicinity of the 
south side of the Yamori River and will annihilate the remaining 
enemy west of the Ilu River. 

4. The Left Flank Force (29th Infantry Regiment and one engi- 
neer company under the command of Maj Gen Nasu) will prepare for an 
attack at the present line and effect a surprise attack against the 
enemy positions near the southern edge of the airfield. Immediately 
after advancing to the motor road north of the airfield, it will 
cross the Lunga River, capture the Kuma position from the rear and 
complete the mop-up of the enemy on the left bank sector by dawn. 

5. The boundary between the Right and Left Flank Forces will 
be the line connecting the open grassy area east of the Lunga River, 
the radio receiving station north of the airfield and the eastern 
mouth of the Lunga River. 

6. The reserve force (16th Infantry Regiment) will follow the 
rear of the Right Flank Force. It will be prepared to cross the 
Lunga River and make preparation to attack the Kuma position from 
the flank. 

7. The engineer unit will assist the Left Flank Force and the 
reserve force in crossing the Lunga River. 

The strength of the 2d Division was, at that time, nine infantiy 

battalions (about 5,600 men). The mortar, antitank, and motintain gun 



569 




571 



units were assigned to both the Left and Right Flank Forces but had 
practically no guns and only four mountain guns with 50 rounds of 
ammunition per gun were actually used in the attack. 

All units of the 2d Division departed from the assembly point 
in the morning of the 21st and advanced toward the line of deploy- 
ment . 

The division chief of staff had been with the engineer unit 
which was engaged in route construction, determining and designating 
the division's line of march* The construction work of the engineer 
unit made slow progress and because of a misjudgement in plotting 
they could not, even on the 21st, estimate precisely when they would 
reach the line of deployment. Because of this situation, the divi- 
sion commander was requested to postpone the attack one day. The 
division commander having received the approval of the army commander, 
issued an order to postpone the time and date of the attack from 
1800 hours on the 22d to 1900 hours on the 23d. 

On the morning of the 22d, the engineer unit advanced to the 
prearranged line of deployment and marked attack positions for the 
Left and Right Flank Forces. Although both forces exerted utmost 
efforts, the advance was slow and it was apparent on the evening of 
the 22d that even if the first line units of the forces should arrive 
in front of the enemy position by the evenixjg of the 23d, the arri- 
val of reserve units would be delayed and it would be impossible to 
make complete preparations for a night attack. In spite of this 



573 



situation, taking into consideration the coordination of the opera- 
tion with the Combined Fleet, the division commander refused further 
postponement of the attack. 

At 1600 hours on the 22d the division received the following 
report f rom Maj Gen Kawaguchi, commander of the Right Flank Force: 

"If the attack is effected as scheduled (on the 23d) only the 
3d Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment will be committable . 
The main body of the 230th Infantry Regiment will not be available 
because of its slow progress. A postponement of one day is request- 
ed, " 

At that time, the Left Flank Force reported that it would be 
possible to attack after sunset of the 23d. The division commander 
accepted the recommendation of the Right Flank Force, postponed the 
date of attack to 1900 hours on the 24th but on the evening of the 
23d he relieved Major General Kawaguchi from command and assigned 
Colonel Shoji, commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment, to the com- 
mand of the Right Flank Force. (See Map No. 2) 

Note: According to Major General Kawaguchi, there was another 
reason for his removal as commander of the Right Flank 
Force. After a study of the aerial photograph delivered 
during the advance, General Kawaguchi came to the con- 
clusion that there were strong enemy positions in the 
attack front of the Right Flank Force and was most in- 
sistent in recommending a flanking attack from the right 
bank sector of the Ilu River. The recommendation was 
not approved by the division commander and hard feelings 
developed. As a matter of fact, General Kawaguchi 1 s 
estimate of the situation was not altogether correct as 
it was later discovered that the right bank of the Ilu 
River was also strorgly defended by the American 164th 
Infantry Regiment. 

Early in the morning of the 24th, the commander of the 2d Divi- 
sion advanced with the reserve unit to the rear of the Right Flank 



571* 



MAP NO. 2 




Force and at 1400 hours issued the followixjg order: 

1. Through divine aid and desperate effort by the officers and 
mn, the division has been able to advance to the enemy's flank with- 
out being detected* 

2. With divine protection, the division commander will effect 
the attack in accordance with the established plan and defeat the 
*nemy in the vicinity of the airfield. 

3. The two Flank Forceswill effect an assault at 1900 hours and 
penetrate deep into the enemy line. 

4. The division commander will remain at his present location 
ujntil 1600 hours and will then advance toward the airfield behind the 
Left Flank Force. 

Infantrymen and engineers of the two division forces exerted 
their utmost efforts to construct the route of approach. However, 
the advance was still extremely difficult because of the rugged ter- 
rain and, as the jur^gle became more and more dense, it became diffi- 
cult to plot points and take bearings. At about 1700 hours it began 
to rain heavily and at sunset it was virtually impossible to advance. 
The rain stopped about 2400 hours, the moon came out and while it was 
then possible to take action, the time scheduled for attack had long 
since passed. 

The Right Flank Force was unable to make an assault because of 
insufficient attack preparations. 

On the* Left Flank, the right front battalion lost its bearings 
and was unable to attack. Infantrymen and engineers of the left 
front battalion demolished wire entanglements and assaulted the enemy 
position about 0030 hours. As a result of heavy enemy fire from 



577 



automatic weapons and mortars, the assault was checked just short 
of the enemy positions. 

Colonel Komiya, commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment, took 
command of the left flank reserves (2d Battalion, 29tji Infantry 
Regiment) and, utilizing all available fire power of heavy weapons, 
assaulted the enemy position. After forcix^g a breSch in the enemy's 
first line, the battalion penetrated deep into the enemy positions. 
However, before they could secure the breach the enemy closed it. 

At dawn of the 25th it became apparent that the night attack 
had ended in failure along the entire line. The division commander 
again made preparations to capture the airfield and support the 2d 
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment which had penetrated the 
enemy positions. He determined to effect an assault with the entire 
division strength on the night of the 25th. At 1200 hours he issued 
the following order: 

1. The Left Flank Force will support the 2d Battalion of the 
29th Infantry Regiment which has breached the enemy lines, penetrat- 
ed deep into enemy territory and captured the airfield, 

2. The 16 th Infantry Regiment and the 2d Engineer Regiment 
(less two companies) will be added to the command of the Left Flank 
Force. 

3. To night the Right Flank Force will attack, capture the air- 
field and accomplish other assigned missions. 

After learning of the failure of the night attack on the 24th, 

the Seventeenth Amy also issued an order to resume the attack on 

the night of the 25th. Throughout the entire day of the 25th the 



578 



enemy* bombarded the front and rear sectors of the Left Flank Force 
and at noon enemy fighter planes strafed troops in the front line. 

The Right Flank Force regrouped and prepared for attack. How- 
ever, during the afternoon it shifted to the defense because of a 
report (later found to be erroneous) that an element of the enemy 
was approaching the right flank in an enveloping move. The dispatch 
of this information to division headquarters was delayed until that 
night and no further instructions were received by the Right Flank 
Force. As a consequence the Right Flank Force suspended all attack 
preparations and did not participate in the attack on the night of 
the 25th. 

The Left Flank Force deployed the newly added 16th Infantry 
and the 2d Engineer Regiments on its right flank. With the approach 
of night Maj Gen Nasu, commander of the Left Flank Force personally 
led the force in a desperate attack. An element of the 16th Infantry 
succeeded in demolishing the enemy's wire entanglements and rushed 
into the enemy positions but were thrown back. The main body of the 
force also exerted all-out efforts to assault the enemy position but 
failed to accomplish a break-through. With daybreak the enemy fire 
with automatic weapons and mortars became extremely heavy and casual- 
ties increased. 

In the attack General Nasu and the commander of the l6th ^Infan- 
try Regiment, Colonel Hiroyasu, were killed. Virtually every key 
officer in the attacking force was seriously wounded or killed. No 



579 



contact could be made with the 2d Battalion of the 29th Infantry and 
the breach effected by that unit had been firmly closed. 

The second night attack of the „2& Division ended in complete 
failure, the division. had no reserves remaining, all provisions were 
expended and there was no supply transportation. On the 26th, the 
Seventeenth Army ordered the 2d Division to suspend the attack* 

Author's Observations: 

This attack failed of success because of the lack of two ele- 
ments essential for a flanking surprise attack operation. 

One was the lack of knowledge of the terrain and the climate of 
Guadalcanal. There were no accurate maps and the available aerial 
photographs were incomplete. The erroneous report of the 2d Division 
that the mountains were not densely wooded was undoubtedly a big 
factor in the adoption of this plan of operations. However the con- 
ditions in the jungle, the terrain and the rainfall proved contrary 
to all information, causing serious delays and the several changes 
in the date of attack. Furthermore, as a result of the long and dif- 
ficult movement, the 2d Division lost the bulk of its artillery, 
heavy weapons and field rations, and the physical condition of the 
officers and men declined, causing a great decrease in fighting power. 
Map No. 3 is one of the aerial photo maps used by the 2d Division. 
It should be noted that this photograph shows mainly the Lunga Sector 
and does not include the areas along the route of advance. The fact 
that this photograph was delivered after the commencement of the 

580 



MAP NO. 3 




AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF LUIMGA SECTOR 

581 



advance may also have had some bearirg on the situation. 

Secondly, the Seventeenth Army and the 2d Division made a seri- 
ous error in their estimation of the enemy situation. The strength 
of the United States forces was estimated at about 10,000 men with 
declining morale. It later developed that American strength on 
Guadalcanal approximated 23,000 men and that neither their morale 
nor training was in any way inferior. This underestimate been 
largely responsible for the failure of the attack by the Kawaguchi 
Detachment but the Seventeenth Army and the 2d Division did not 
abandon its original estimates of enemy strength. The attack order 
of the 2d Division makes it clear that it was believed that the 
division could destroy the United States forces at one blow. 

It was later discovered that on 23 October, just prior to the 
attack by the Japanese 2d Division, the United States 1st Marine 
Division had disposed two battalions of the 7th Marine Regiment on 
a 2,560 meters front along Bloody Ridge (south of the airfield). 
However, as a result of the diversion by the Sumiyoshi force on the 
23rd, the 7th Marine headquarters and one battalion were transferred 
to the coastal area on the 24th. As a consequence of this move, 
when the 2d Division attacked, only the 1st Battalion of the 7th 
Marines was defending a front of 2,560 meters. The artillery disposi- 
tion had also been changed in accordance with a reconnaissance report 
that Japanese forces had been sighted south of the airfield. It was 
only in the late afternoon of the 24th that the 1st Marine Battalion 



583 



became aware of the approach of the Japanese forces and it was then 
too late to change dispositions. 

The diversion created by the Sumiyoshi force obtained the ex- 
pected results and the 2d Division succeeded in completely conceal- 
ing its plan of attack until just before it was launched* Consider- 
ing these circumstances, and despite various unfavorable conditions, 
the 2d Division had a possibility of success in the night attack. 
However, they failed to achieve success against a single marine bat- 
talion because the shortage of provisions, the strain of a long and i 
arduous march through dense jungle terrain under difficult climatic 
conditions had had a most adverse affect upon the physical condition 
of the officers and men. The tendency to consistently underestimate 
the strength and fighting power of the United States forces and the 
restriction of movement as a result of the loss of air supremacy were 
also factors which materially contributed to the failure to achieve 
any measure of success. 

Some degree of success might have been achieved had the attack 
been limited to a strategic surprise attack. It is apparent that 
the attack disposition of the division was not satisfactory and the 
order issued by the 2d Division was incomplete in that it did not 
designate whether both Flank Forces would conduct surprise attacks 
simultaneously or whether they would employ firepower at the same 
time. According to the order, "they would occupy the airfield and 
annihilate the main body of the United States forces by dawn of the 



£81 



25th. ?f Even without encountering resistance it would have been im- 
possible to accomplish that mission in consideration of the past 
slow rate of jungle movement. 

On two successive nights the Japanese forces repeated an attack 
against the same section of enemy positions and in the same manner, 
not attempting to break through weak points. 

An important factor affecting the outcome was the American use 
of resourceful measures in their defensive operations. They inflict- 
ed huge losses on the attacking units and destroyed them by prompt 
dispatch of reserve units to the battle area. Their employment of 
artillery fire, intensive use of infantry fire power and fire control 
by means of detecting devices was particularly effective. 



58$ 



Example No. 11 

Night Attack by the Nakai Detachment in the 
Vicinity of Kesewa, New Guinea 

(Based on operations records compiled by the First 
Demobilization Bureau and statement of Major Kawahigashi, 
commander of the 1st Battalion, 78th Infantry Regiment.) 

In early December 1943> the main body of the Eighteenth Army 
was involved in the Finschhafen Operation in New Guinea. The Nakai 
Detachment, attached to the Eighteenth Amy, was deployed on the 
Finisterre Mountain line south of Madang where it was engaging the 
Australian 7th Division which had advanced along the Markham and 
Ramu Rivers from Lae. The mission of the Nakai Detachment was to 
check the advance of the 7th Division at the mountains and to cover 
Madang, the advance operations base for the Eighteenth Army. 

The Nakai Detachment had as its nucleus the 78th Infantry Regi- 
ment (less one company) and included the 5th Company of the 80th 
Infantry Regiment, the Saito Volunteer Unit (a raiding-infiltration 
unit of about 150 men from the Takasagp tribe of Formosa), one field 
gun battalion, and one independent engineer regiment. The 239th 
Infantry Regiment was subsequently assigned by the Eighteenth Army. 

Duriqg the first part of October the Australian 7th Division had 
made a strong attack in the vicinity of Mt Kankirei but had been re- 
pulsed. It was believed, however, that the enemy might plan to move 
an element west of the Kesewa area^ and advance to Madang by breaking 

1. No town or area of "Kesewa n appears on available maps and 
author of this combat example is not now available for questioning. 
According to the editor's best information, Kesewa was an arbitrary 
name used by the Japanese forces to designate the general area between 
the southwest slope of the Finisterre mountain range and the Ramu River. 
Points within the area were identified further as No. 2 Kesewa, 
No, 3 Kesewa, etc. ^7 



through the flank of the Eighteenth Army. An enemy battalion had 
advanced to No, 2 Kesewa and other elements of the 7th Division were 
disposed in the vicinity of Kadovar, Isariba and Soshi. The activi- 
ties of Australian intelligence units in the Urigina area, west of 
Soshi, had been intensified. (See Map No, 1) 

In consideration of this situation Detachment Commander Nakai 
determined to strike a blow at the enemy in the Kesewa area in order 
to frustrate their plan to advance northwest. On 2 December he 
issued the followir^ attack plan: 

1* A surprise attack will be made at 0400 hours on 8 December. 

2. The 78th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d and 3d Battalions) 
plus the 5th Company, 80th Infantry Regiment, and the Saito Volunteer 
Unit will prepare for an attack in the vicinity of Mt Futabayama and 
attack the enemy at No* 2 Kesewa at 0400 hours on 8 December* The 
attack will commence with a raiding -infiltration attack by the Saito 
Volunteer Unit. 

3. The 3d Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment will make a 
surprise attack at Soshi at 0400 hours on 8 December. Subsequently 
it will advance in the direction of No. 2 Kesewa. 

4. The 239th Infant iy Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions) 
will attack the enemy in the vicinity of Kadovar and Isariba and 
later advance to Kesewa. 

5* The 2d Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment will defend 
the position in the vicinity of Mt Kankirei. 

In accordance with the detachment plan the assault units pre- 
pared for attack. The 78th Infantry Regiment organized the No, 2 
Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit from the 1st Battalion (less the 3d Com- 
pany), the 5th Company of the 80th Regiment and the Saito Volunteer 
Unit, under Major Kawahigashi, commander of the 1st Battalion. 



588 



MAP NO. I 




5P9 



On the 5th of December the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit obtained 
the following information regarding the enemy situation and terrain: 

1. Enemy security at Asias was relaxed and there was no recon- 
naissance in the area of Hill 910. 

2. There were three tent groups disposed south, east and west 
of No. 2 Kesewa. The number of tents in each gioup were estimated 
to be from 30 to 40, with a total of about 100 accomodating approxi- 
mately 1,000 men. There was a defense position on the north side 

of No. 2 Kesewa but it was not manned at night. 

3. The terrain from Mt Futabayama to Plantation C, via Hill 
910, was heavily wooded. Further south was a grassland area with 
woods only along the river. 

4. There was an old native trail on the crest line between 
Hill 910 and Plantation C. 

5. The enemy did not seem to be aware of any unusual Japanese 
activity and reconnaissance activities had gone unobserved. 

On December 5th the commander of the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit 

issued the following directive: 

1. The Unit will leave Junction A at 1800 hours on 7 December 
and make a surprise attack on the enemy in the No. 2 Kesewa area at 
0400 hours on the 8th. 

2. The 5th Company of the 80th Infantry Regiment will be the 
advance party and will move to Point D via Hill 910, Plantation C 
and Point D to cut off the enemy retreat in Asias and Segere. 

3. The Saito Volunteer Unit will overtake the advance party at 
Point D and at 0400 hours on the 8th will, in a surprise attack, 
demolish simultaneously all tent groups in the No. 2 Kesewa area. 

4. The 4th Company will accompany the Saito Volunteer Unit and 
will mop-up the tent areas following their demolition by the Saito 
Unit. 

5. Remaining units will follow immediately in the rear of tte 
4th Company in the following order: 



591 



Battalion Headquarters 
1st Company- 
Machine Gun Company- 
Battalion Gun Platoon 
2d Company 

These units will be prepared to support the battle after dawn. 
(Sunrise on the 8th was at 0500 hours.) 

At 1800 hours the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit commenced advance 
as planned and continued the advance through the night, utilizing 
luminous bars fixed on knapsacks to keep men in column. At 0200 
hours on the 8th the leading unit arrived at the edge of the hill 
north of No. 2 Kesewa. The commander ordered the commencement of 
infiltration, indicating targets to the Saito Volunteer Unit and the 
4th Company. (See Map Nos. 2 and 3) 

The Saito Volunteer Unit approached each tent group by crawling 
and about 0500 hours blew all groups simultaneously , using two -kilo- 
gram charges of TNT. (Due to unforeseen difficulties the tine of 
attack had been delayed one hour. ) The enemy was taken by complete 
surprise, thrown into confusion and routed to the southeast without 
resistance and in disorder. The 4th Company mopped up in the tent 
groups and the operation at No. 2 Kesewa was completed without com- 
mitting the main body of the battalion. The mop-up being completed, 
the battalion, together with the other elements of the Surprise 
Attack Unit exploited their success by moving in the direction of 
No. 3 and 4 Kesewa areas. 

In the Segere and Asias areas, the 3d and 7th Companies of the 
78th Infantry Regiment were successful in driving the enemy out of 



$92 



MAP NO. 2 




$93 



MAP NO. 3 



MT. FUTABAYAMA 




(NO DISPOSITION OF TROOPS) 



MOVEMENT OFNO.2 KESEWA 
SURPRISE ATTACK UNIT 

7 DEC 1943 

» JAPANESE ARMY 

AUSTRALIAN ARMY 



NO 2 KESEWA^ 



SOUTH (30) 



595 



their positions at approximately 0400 hours* 

The 3d Battalion of the 78th Infantry assaulted the enemy at 
Soshi at dawn and occupied that area. It subsequently advanced to 
Koroba, left an element there to cut off enemy retreat from the 
direction of Isariba and then advanced to No. 2 Kesewa. 

All units achieved success in accordance with the original 
plans, with the exception of the 239th Infantry Regiment whose ad- 
vance was slowed by flooded streams along the route of advance. 
Delayed by difficult conditions, the regiment did not attack until 
about 1000 hours on the 8th. In addition, because an enemy group 
of about one company strength at Kadovar and Isariba off ered stubborn 
resistance, the advance to Koroba was delayed until the 10th. 

Following the mop-up of the enemy in the Kesewa area it appeared 
that the Australian 7th Division would not constitute a serious 
threat in that area for some time and the units of the Nakai Detach- 
ment returned to th^ir original positions. 

Author's Observations: 

The success of this operation hinged on the outcome of the 
attack by the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit. To ensure success two 
phases had been adopted in the original planning. The first phase 
called for the surprise attack by the Saito Volunteer Unit followed 
by the 4th Company. In the event that those units failed to achieve 
their objective, preparation had been made to destroy the enemy with 



597 



an attack in force by the main body of the 1st Battalion. In the 
Soshi area, where the 3d Battalion attacked, ordinary night combat 
tactics were employed. 

The overall operational plan was a combination of ordinary 
night assault and raiding-infiltration tactics, which came into use 
about the end of 1942. 

The success of this operation can be attributed to the careful 
planning and detailed reconnaissance conducted as well as the fact 
that all units, particularly the Saito Volunteer Unit, were well 
trained in jurjgle and night fighting. The success may also have been 
due in a large measure to the relaxed security situation of the 
Australian forces. 



598 



Example No. 12 

Night Attack by the Eighteenth Army near 
Aitape, New Guinea in July 1944 

(Based on operations records compiled by the 1st Demobilization 
Bureau and statements of former staff officer of the Eighteenth 
Army, Lt Col Tanaka; commander of the 1st Battalion of the 78th 
Infantry Regiment, Major Kawahigashi; commander of the Infantry 
Gun Unit of the 80th Infantry Regiment, Major Samejima; and 
commander of the 1st Battalion of the 237th Infantry Regiment, 
Major Yamashita.) 

Allied forces landed on Aitape and Hollandia on 22 April 1944 
and the Eighteenth Amy Commander immediately determined to annihi- 
late these forces in order to support the Second Area Aimy in 
western New Guinea. The 20th Division, moving west from Hansa, was 
ordered to advance toward Aitape and Eighteenth Amy headquarters 
began attack preparations. In early May the 20th Division passed 
through Wewak and moved westward, arriving at the Drinumor River 
about June 10th, where it deployed along the east bank. En route 
it had met and defeated several enemy advance groups in the vicinity 
of Ulau and Yakamul. 

It had been the intention of the Eighteenth Amy to attack 
before the United States forces had an opportunity to fortify the 
Aitape area. However, the 41st Division, which had also been 
ordered to participate in the operation was required to effect a 
long withdrawal from Madang arid Hansa and did not arrive in Wewak 
until the middle of June. Transportation of munitions from Tfewak 
was also slower than had been anticipated, particularly the ammuni- 
tion for the 41st Division. Since the division was short of normal 

$99 



transport a large percentage of the munitions had to be carried by 
the men. 

In early July, therefore, the Eighteenth Army was still making 
attack preparations, with its units disposed as indicated on Map 
No. 1. 

The enemy appeared to be constructing its main position in the 
vicinity of Aitape and had established a force, estimated to be 
•three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, in an advance 
position on the west bank of the Drinumor River. (See Map No. 2) 

The enemy positions along the Drinumor were lacking in depth, 
being disposed in a single line, except along the coastal area, and 
because the enemy strength was comparatively small for a line extend- 
ing over ten kilometers, there were many gaps in the defenses. 
Although positions were comparatively weak, some machine gun positions 
were covered and simple wire entanglements had been laid at vital 
spots. Command of the air and sea in that vicinity was completely in 
the hands of the enemy. With Aitape as their base, about 50 enemy 
aircraft and 20 naval ships delivered day and night attacks against 
the entire Japanese front, denying daylight movement almost entirely. 

The provisions stocked by the Eighteenth. Army were approximately 
half of the amount required and forecasts indicated that they would 
be completely expended by the end of August. It was, therefore, 
obvious that the early commencement of an attack was imperative. 
The Eighteenth Array Commander determined to launch an attack with 



600 




601 



MAP NO. 2 




603 



the objective of breaking through the advance positions on the bank 
of the Drinumor in order to establish the army in positions from 
which the main enemy* position in Aitape could be attacked. 

Two alternatives for the attack seemed possible and the Eight- 
eenth Aimy staff studied the question as to -whether it would be more 
advisable to make a flanking movement to the Afua area, around the 
right flank of the enemy position, or to attempt a break-through at 
the center of the enemy line. The 20th Division expressed the view 
that because of the decline in the physical condition of the troops, 
it would-be difficult to accomplish ihe long and arduous move which 
a flanking attack would entail and recommended an attack at the 
center of the enemy line. Since reconnaissance had indicated that 
the advance positions were weak, a center break-through seemed logi- 
cal and possible and the suggestion of the 20th Division was adopted. 

On July 3d the Eighteenth Army Commander issued the following 
order: 

1. Commencement of attack will be at about 2200 hours on 10 

July. 

2. The main attack will be directed at the center of the enemy 
position in the vicinity of Kawanakajima. After effecting the 
bfeak-through, success will be exploited to the north and south and 
enemy forces in the Paup and Afua areas will be annihilated. 

3. The attack will be a surprise night attack but preparations 
will be made for an attack by force should we fail to surprise the 
enemy and meet heavy opposition. 

4. After breaking through the enemy position in the vicinity 
of Kawanakajima, the 20th Division will advance to the Afua area and 
annihilate the enemy in that vicinity. 



60$ 



5. The 41st Division Commander will direct the 237th Infantry 
Regiment to cross the Drinumor River abreast of the right flank of 
the 20th Division, turn north after accomplishing the break-through, 
and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of Paup. 

This attack procedure was based on a plan of attack which had 
been formulated by the 20th Division which had favored the adoption 
of a night attack because of the inferiority of Japanese air strength 
and general firepower and because it was necessary to conserve am- 
munition for the attack on the enemy positions at Aitape. 

Although it was preferable to oomioence the attack as soon as 
possible after sunset, since the men were in such poor physical con- 
dition, it was considered imperative that they be fed prior to making 
an attack. Because enemy air and naval attacks made it impossible to 
prepare meals during daylight hours and all cooking had to be done 
after sunset, it was determined to launch the attack at 2200 hours 
before the darkness was dispelled by moonrise at about 2230 hours. 

The situation of the Eighteenth Army was desperate, its rear 
had already been cut by the Allied forces, food shortages and the 
continuous fighting of the past year and a half had reduced physical 
and numerical strength to a low ebb, since the middle of June the 
20th Division had been forced to exist on one-third rations, morale 
was low and most of the men were unable to move at a pace faster than 
a walk. There were no horses available and, since manpower was the 
only means of transporting heavy weapons and ammunition, the number 
of guns of all types as well as the amount of ammunition had to be 



606 



drastically reduced* Strength and armament of attack units was 
approximately as shown below: 

1. 78th Infantry Regiment (20th Division) 

3 battalions: With 2 or 3 machine guns and 1 battalion gun 
each, A total strength of about 1,200 men, 
including 12 companies with strengths of 60 
to 70 men and about 5 light machine guns each. 

Antitank and Regimental Gun Units: 1 gun each. 

Total Begimental Strength? Approximately 1,300 men. 

2. 80th Infantry Regiment (20th Division) 

3 battalions: With 2 or 3 machine guns and 1 battalion gun 
each. A total strength of about 900 men, 
including 12 companies with strengths of 50 
to 60 men and 4 to 6 light machine guns each. 

Antitank and Regimental Gun Units: 1 gun each. 

Total Regimental strength: Approximately 1,000 men. 

3. 79th Infantry Regiment (20th Division - Reserve) 
Total Regimental Strength: About 550 men. 

4. Artillery Regiment (20th Division) - 10 mountain guns. 

5. 237th Infantry Regiment (41st Division) 

3 battalions: With 4 machine guns and 1 battalion gun each. 

A total strength of about 1,450 men, includ- 
ing 12 companies with approximately 90 men 
in each. 

Antitank and Regimental Gun Units: 1 gun each. 
Attached Mountain Gun Battery: 2 guns. 
Total Regimental Strength: Approximately 1,700 men. 
The total strength of all attack units (including reserves) on 
10 July was approxijiiately 7,000 men, equal to only about five infantry 



607 



and one artillery battalions. The fact that the amount of ammuni- 
tion which could be carried was very small, further weakened the 
fighting power of the force. 

Except for the hilly section near Afua, the battle area con- 
sisted of marshland and dense jungle, while in the area near the 
coast there were many swamps where mud and water was chest deep. 
The width of the Drinumor River bed varied between 70 and 120 meters, 
with a meandering stream 30 to 50 meters in width. Yfeter was waist 
deep and the velocity of flow comparatively fast (about three meters 
per second). River banks were generally steep, the east bank being 
one or two meters in height and the west bank somewhat higher. In 
many parts reeds grew to the height of a man's head. The steep 
banks, swift current and dense jungle growth were serious obstacles 
to men whose strength had so greatly deteriorated. 

In spite of difficulties, the attack preparations of the 20th 
Division progressed smoothly. Patrols were dispatched to the banks 
of the river to reconnoiter the enemy situation and the terrain. 
In preparation for the attack, machine gun and heavy weapon positions, 
approach routes and target areas were established* 

Since the headquarters of the 41st Division was located in the 
vicinity of Matapau, the arrival of the division order to the 237th 
Infantry Regiment, which was sent through channels, was decayed and 
the commencement of attack preparations by that regiment were delayed. 
Because of the delay, the main body of the regiment reached the east 



608 



bank of the Drinumor barely in time to commence the attack. However, 
the 1st Battalion, which had been dispatched to the first line in 
June, was thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the enemy situa- 
tion and was employed as the first line attack unit. 

The 20th Division and the 237th Infantry Regiment were disposed 
as shown on Map No. 3* The attack front was shortened to add the 
greatest possible depth to the attack and the 20th Division directed 
its main attack effort at a point directly to the front of the 3d 
Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment. Originally, the Eighteenth 
Army had planned to have the main effort directed from the right 
flank of the 20th Division. ■ However, because liaison between the 
division and the 237th Regiment was unsatisfactory, the plan was 
changed. 

The change in attack points made it unnecessary for the 237th 
Infantry to attack abreast of the 20th Division and it was possible 
for it to hit a weak point in the enemy position. Heavy weapons 
units were ordered to establish positions on the east bank by sunset 
of the day of attack and prepare to deliver fire against those enemy 
installations which were situated to permit delivery of flanking fire. 
The attack unit was to leave the assembly point, about 3 kilometers 
east of the Drinumor River, and deploy on a line of departure along 
the east bank by 2100 hours, on the 10th. 

As the day of attack approached, it became evident that the 
physical strength of officers and men of all units had so deteriorat- 
ed that it would be impossible for them to run up the slope of the 

609 



MAP NO. 3 





niQpnciTinM nr iimitc 

L/lOr UDI 1 IUIM Ur U\W 1 O Ur 




ZOTH UIV AIMD 237TH IIMr REGT 




10 JULY 1944 




> JAPANESE ARMY 




""" A PM Y 




1 




KILOMETER 





611 



river bank without halting for rest and most of the 20th Division 
first line commanders considered it expedient to effect a heavy 
artillery attack to destroy the enemy guns before launching the 
assault. The suggestion to employ preliminary fires which would 
eliminate the element of surprise was submitted to the Army Commander 
and approved. The attack plan was revised to provide for a ten minute 
concentration employing all firepower, except rifles and light machine 
guns, to begin at 2150 and continue until the time of assault at 
2200 hours. 

In accordance with the established plan the artillery units of 
the 20th Division and the 237th Infantry Regiment opened fire at 
2150 hours, the first line infant ry companies advanced to the river 
and started their movement toward the enemy positions. 

Within a minute after the commencement of the artillery con- 
centration, the enemy opened fire with all available weapons and a 
few minutes later artillery units in the coastal area began firing. 
An accurate and heavy barrage which was laid down along the line of 
departure was lowered to cover the river bed as well. In addition 
to the iartillery barrage, the east bank and the river bed were covered , 
by cross fires. Particularly hfcavy fire was sustained by the 1st 
Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment, the extreme left flank unit* 
All units on the 20th Division front suffered heavy losses in the 
river bed and along the east bank, which delayed the commencement 
of the actual assault. However, the officers and men rallied and 



613 



crossing the river over the bodies of their fallen dead successfully 
penetrated the enemy position and captured it at 0130 hours on the 
11th. 

The 1st Battalion of the 78th Infantiy Regiment suffered more 
heavily than other units, having 290 casualties out of a total 
strength of 36O and was forced to abandon the assault. About 600 
men of the 78th Infant ry Regiment were killed or wounded during the 
course of the attack and almost all heavy weapons were destroyed. 
Losses of the 80th Regiment were much lighter. 

In the area of the 237th Infantry Regiment the enemy artillery 
fire was less intensive and since the. regiment avoided a frontal 
attack, losses and casualties were comparatively light. At about . 
2200 hours on the 10th, the regiment secured a foothold on the west 
bank and conducted mop-up operation from its rear, routing tte enemy 
to the northwest. Because of the possibility of firing into the 1st 
Battalion, the regiment did not conduct counter artillery fire. 
Progress of the attack by the 237th Infantry Regiment is shown on 
Map No. 4 # 

On the 11th, mop-up operations were conducted along the west 
bank and the enemy in Af ua and on Hills 50 and 56 was routed. The 
entire enemy advance force having withdrawn to the west, the units 
of the 20th Division assembled in the western sector of the occupied 
area and prepared for a further advance westward. The 237th Infantiy 
Regiment conducted regrouping and pommenced attack preparations against 
Paup # 

61U 



MAP NO. 4 




Author 1 s Observations: 

United States forces were reinforced immediately after the 
conclusion of the night attack and on the 12th began a series of 
counterattacks which continued until August 4th when th^ Eighteenth 
Army, having expended its fighting strength, was forced to break off 
the engagement. The original attack on the night of the 10th had 
been successful in that a break-thro qgh had been accomplished and 
the enemy forced to withdraw to the west. 

Reasons offered for the success were the c cmparatively weak 
positions and shallowness of the enemy advance lins. Some surviving 
officers of the engagement claim that the employment of fire power 
to neutralize the enemy position prior to the assault was responsible 
for victory; on the other hand Major Yamashita, commander of the 1st 
Battalion of the 237th Infantry Regiment, holds that the employment 
of fire power in this manner is a violation of the principles of 
night surprise attack and that its use in this case was responsible 
for the tremendous losses sustained by the 20th Division. However, 
the 1st Battalion did not have the problems which confronted the 
balance of the attacking units. Not having been through the entire 
New Guinea campaign the men of the battalion were comparatively 
fresh and in much better physical condition than the others, in addi- 
tion the freedom given the 1st Battalion in the choice of an attack 
point, enabling them to drive through a weak part of the enemy line 
made fire support less necessaxy. 



61?